



# **NETSCOUT FIPS Object Module *by* NETSCOUT Systems, Inc.**

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## **FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy**

**Software Version: 1.0**

**FIPS 140-2, Level 1 Validation**

**October 2021**



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# 1. Introduction

NETSCOUT SYSTEMS, INC. is a provider of application and network performance management products. Headquartered in Westford, Massachusetts, NETSCOUT serves enterprises community, government agencies and telecommunications service providers.

## 1.1. Module Overview

This document is a FIPS 140-2 Security Policy for the NETSCOUT FIPS Object Module; also referred to as “the module”. This policy describes how the module meets the FIPS 140-2 security requirements and how to operate the module in a FIPS compliant manner.

This policy was created as part of the FIPS 140-2, Level 1 validation effort of the module. Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 “**Security Requirements for Cryptographic modules (FIPS 140-2)**” details the United States Federal Government requirements for cryptographic modules. Detailed information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the NIST website at <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html>.

The NETSCOUT FIPS Object Module provides cryptographic functionality to NETSCOUT’s series of applications. The module is classified under FIPS 140-2 as a software based, multi-chip standalone module embodiment. The module itself is a statically linked object module (fipsanister.o), intended to be linked to a calling application at build time. The physical cryptographic boundary is considered as the general-purpose computing (GPC) platforms on which the module was tested. The logical cryptographic boundary of the module is the pre-compiled object file which provides the necessary cryptographic functions. Within the logical boundary lies the algorithmic boundary (NETSCOUT Cryptographic Library), represented by the NIST CAVP tested algorithms specified in Table 2.

The tar archive containing the NETSCOUT FIPS Object Module prior to build time, contains the HMAC-SHA-1 digest: **7f486fbb598f3247ab9db10c1308f1c19f384671** when the following command is issued:

```
openssl sha1 -hmac etaonrishdlcupfm openssl-fips-2.0.8.tar.gz
```

*The module was tested in the following operational environments, and is only considered to be a FIPS 140-2 validated module when operating in these environments:*

- Custom Linux 3.10 running on a NETSCOUT PowerEdge R740 {standard} with an Intel® Xeon® Silver 4110 with PAA;
- Custom Linux 3.10 running on a NETSCOUT PowerEdge R740 {standard} with an Intel® Xeon® Silver 4110 without PAA;
- Custom Linux 3.10 running on a NETSCOUT PowerEdge R740 {enhanced} with an Intel® Xeon® Gold 6142 with PAA;
- Custom Linux 3.10 running on a NETSCOUT PowerEdge R740 {enhanced} with an Intel® Xeon® Gold 6142 without PAA;
- Custom Linux 3.10 running on a NETSCOUT 690 Series {690J} with an Intel Atom® Processor C3955 with PAA;
- Custom Linux 3.10 running on a NETSCOUT 690 Series {690J} with an Intel Atom® Processor C3955 without PAA;
- Custom Linux 3.10 running on a NETSCOUT 1400 Series {1410J} with an Intel® Xeon® Silver 4110 with PAA;
- Custom Linux 3.10 running on a NETSCOUT 1400 Series {1410J} with an Intel® Xeon® Silver 4110 without PAA;
- Custom Linux 3.10 running on a NETSCOUT 2400 Series {2410J} with an Intel® Xeon® Silver 4110 with PAA;
- Custom Linux 3.10 running on a NETSCOUT 2400 Series {2410J} with an Intel® Xeon® Silver 4110 without PAA;
- Custom Linux 3.10 running on a NETSCOUT 2600 Series {2695J} with an Intel® Xeon® Gold 6126 with PAA;
- Custom Linux 3.10 running on a NETSCOUT 2600 Series {2695J} with an Intel® Xeon® Gold 6126 without PAA;
- Custom Linux 3.7.5 running on a NETSCOUT 3300 Series {3300D} with an Intel® Xeon® E5-2620 v3 with PAA;
- Custom Linux 3.7.5 running on a NETSCOUT 3300 Series {3300D} with an Intel® Xeon® E5-2620 v3 without PAA;
- Timesys Linux 3.8.13 running on a NETSCOUT 3900 Series {3900} with an NXP QorIQ® P4081 without PAA;
- Custom Linux 3.10 running on a NETSCOUT 4700 Series {4795J} with an Intel® Xeon® Gold 6126 with PAA;
- Custom Linux 3.10 running on a NETSCOUT 4700 Series {4795J} with an Intel® Xeon® Gold 6126 without PAA;
- Custom Linux 3.10 running on a NETSCOUT 4800 Series {4895J} with an Intel® Xeon® Gold 6152 with PAA;
- Custom Linux 3.10 running on a NETSCOUT 4800 Series {4895J} with an Intel® Xeon® Gold 6152 without PAA;
- Custom Linux 4.14.151 running on a NETSCOUT 5000 Series {5010} with an Intel Atom® Processor C2538 with PAA;
- Custom Linux 4.14.151 running on a NETSCOUT 5000 Series {5010} with an Intel Atom® Processor C2538 without PAA;



- Custom Linux 4.14.151 running on a NETSCOUT 5000 Series {5010-16X} with an Intel Atom® Processor C2538 with PAA;
- Custom Linux 4.14.151 running on a NETSCOUT 5000 Series {5010-16X} with an Intel Atom® Processor C2538 without PAA;
- Custom Linux 4.14.151 running on a NETSCOUT 5100 Series {5100} with an Intel Atom® Processor C2538 with PAA;
- Custom Linux 4.14.151 running on a NETSCOUT 5100 Series {5100} with an Intel Atom® Processor C2538 without PAA;
- Custom Linux 4.14.151 running on a NETSCOUT 5100 Series {5110} with an Intel Atom® Processor C2538 with PAA;
- Custom Linux 4.14.151 running on a NETSCOUT 5100 Series {5110} with an Intel Atom® Processor C2538 without PAA;
- Custom Linux 4.14.151 running on a NETSCOUT 5100 Series {5120} with an Intel® Xeon® D-1518 with PAA;
- Custom Linux 4.14.151 running on a NETSCOUT 5100 Series {5120} with an Intel® Xeon® D-1518 without PAA;
- Custom Linux 3.10 running on a NETSCOUT 6600 Series {6695J} with an Intel® Xeon® Gold 6126 with PAA;
- Custom Linux 3.10 running on a NETSCOUT 6600 Series {6695J} with an Intel® Xeon® Gold 6126 without PAA;
- Custom Linux 4.14.151 running on a NETSCOUT 7000 Series {7010} with an Intel Atom® Processor C2538 with PAA;
- Custom Linux 4.14.151 running on a NETSCOUT 7000 Series {7010} with an Intel Atom® Processor C2538 without PAA;
- Custom Linux 4.14.151 running on a NETSCOUT 7100 Series {7100} with an Intel Atom® Processor C2538 with PAA;
- Custom Linux 4.14.151 running on a NETSCOUT 7100 Series {7100} with an Intel Atom® Processor C2538 without PAA;
- Custom Linux 4.14.151 running on a NETSCOUT 7100 Series {7110} with an Intel Atom® Processor C2538 with PAA;
- Custom Linux 4.14.151 running on a NETSCOUT 7100 Series {7110} with an Intel Atom® Processor C2538 without PAA;
- Custom Linux 4.14.151 running on a NETSCOUT 7100 Series {7120} with an Intel® Xeon® D-1518 with PAA;
- Custom Linux 4.14.151 running on a NETSCOUT 7100 Series {7120} with an Intel® Xeon® D-1518 without PAA;
- Custom Linux 3.10 running on a NETSCOUT 9700 Series {9795J} with an Intel® Xeon® Gold 6126 with PAA;
- Custom Linux 3.10 running on a NETSCOUT 9700 Series {9795J} with an Intel® Xeon® Gold 6126 without PAA;
- Custom Linux 3.10 running on a NETSCOUT 9800 Series {9802J} with an Intel® Xeon® Gold 6152 with PAA;
- Custom Linux 3.10 running on a NETSCOUT 9800 Series {9802J} with an Intel® Xeon® Gold 6152 without PAA;
- Custom Linux 3.10 running on a NETSCOUT 9800 Series {9807J} with an Intel® Xeon® Gold 6152 with PAA;
- Custom Linux 3.10 running on a NETSCOUT 9800 Series {9807J} with an Intel® Xeon® Gold 6152 without PAA;
- Custom Linux 3.10 running on a NETSCOUT 9800 Series {9895J} with an Intel® Xeon® Gold 6152 with PAA;
- Custom Linux 3.10 running on a NETSCOUT 9800 Series {9895J} with an Intel® Xeon® Gold 6152 without PAA;
- ArbOS 7.0 running on a NETSCOUT APS 2600 Series {APS 2600} with an Intel® Xeon® E5-2608L v3 with PAA;
- ArbOS 7.0 running on a NETSCOUT APS 2600 Series {APS 2600} with an Intel® Xeon® E5-2608L v3 without PAA;
- ArbOS 7.0 running on a NETSCOUT APS 2800 Series {APS 2800} with an Intel® Xeon® E5-2648L v3 with PAA;
- ArbOS 7.0 running on a NETSCOUT APS 2800 Series {APS 2800} with an Intel® Xeon® E5-2648L v3 without PAA.

***\*All operational environments above have been tested and are intended to be used in single-user mode.***

The security levels supported by the software module are as follows:

*Table 1 - Summary of FIPS security requirements and compliance levels*

| Section                                      | Level |
|--|-------|
| 1. Cryptographic Module Specification        | 1     |
| 2. Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces | 1     |
| 3. Roles, Services, and Authentication       | 2     |
| 4. Finite State Model                        | 1     |
| 5. Physical Security                         | N/A   |
| 6. Operational Environment                   | 1     |
| 7. Cryptographic Key Management              | 1     |



|                                 |     |
|---------------------------------|-----|
| 8. EMI/EMC                      | 1   |
| 9. Self-Tests                   | 1   |
| 10. Design Assurance            | 3   |
| 11. Mitigation of Other Attacks | N/A |
| Overall Level                   | 1   |

## 1.2. **IMPORTANT ADVISORY: NIST SP 800-131A Transitions**

**PLEASE BE ADVISED** of the following algorithm transitions, in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-131A.


Table 2 - NIST SP 800-131A Transitions

| Transition      | Description   |
|-----------------|---|
| 186-2 RSA       | After <b>September 1<sup>st</sup>, 2020</b> , the following RSA 186-2 services in this module <b><u>shall not</u></b> be used: “GenKey9.31”, “SigGen9.31”, “SigGenPKCS1.5”, and “SigGenPSS”. Only RSA 186-4 services and RSA 186-2 Signature Verification for legacy use will be allowed. Any use of the modes specified above after this date will automatically constitute a non-Approved mode of operation. Please see <b><u>IG G.18 Limiting the Use of FIPS 186-2</u></b> for more information.  |
| NIST SP 800-56A | After <b>December 31<sup>st</sup>, 2021</b> , the EC Diffie-Hellman key agreement component specified in this security policy will no longer be allowed for use in the Approved mode. This is due to the transition to NIST SP 800-56A Revision 3, for which the key agreement components in the module are non-compliant. Any use of EC Diffie-Hellman after this date will automatically constitute a non-Approved mode of operation. Please see <b><u>D.1-rev3 CAVP Requirements for Vendor Affirmation to SP 800-56A Rev3 and the Transition from the Validation to the Earlier Versions of This Standard</u></b> for more information. |
| NIST SP 800-56B | After <b>December 31<sup>st</sup>, 2023</b> , non-compliant NIST SP 800-56B key transport schemes will no longer be allowed. Use of the module for this purpose after that date will automatically constitute a non-Approved mode of operation. <b><u>Please see D.4 Requirements for Vendor Affirmation of SP 800-56B</u></b> for more information.  |



## 2. Modes of Operation & Cryptographic Functionality

Figure 1 - Block Diagram



The module supports both FIPS 140-2 Approved and non-Approved modes. There are also security functions which are non-Approved but allowed. The tables below list these security functions in their respective categories.



### 3. Approved & Allowed Cryptographic Functions

Table 3 - FIPS Approved Cryptographic Functions

| Algorithm   | Function   | Options  | CAVP Cert.   |
|---|--|--|--|
| AES<br>[FIPS 197] AES<br>[SP 80038B] CMAC<br>[SP 80038C] CCM<br>[SP 80038D] GCM | Encryption,<br>Decryption<br>and CMAC                            | ECB Mode: Encrypt/Decrypt Key Size: 128, 192, 256.<br>CBC Mode: Encrypt/Decrypt Key Size: 128, 192, 256.<br>OFB Mode: Encrypt/Decrypt Key Size: 128, 192, 256.<br>CFB1 Mode: Encrypt/Decrypt Key Size: 128, 192, 256.<br>CFB8 Mode: Encrypt/Decrypt Key Size: 128, 192, 256.<br>CFB128 Mode: Encrypt/Decrypt Key Size: 128, 192, 256.<br>CTR Mode: Encrypt only Key Size: 128 192 256<br>CMAC Generation using AES (128, 192, 256)<br>CMAC Verification using AES 128, 192, 256)<br>CCM using (128, 192, 256)<br><br>AES GCM Mode: Encrypt/Decrypt – Key Size: 128, 192, 256 | Certs.<br><br>#C976, #C977,<br>#C1878,<br>#C1879,<br>#C1880,<br>#C1881 and<br>#C2144 |
| CVL   | Key Agreement  | SP 800-56A ECC CDH Primitive (Section 5.7.1.2) Component<br>Curves tested: P-224 P-256 P-384 P-521 K-233 K-283 K-409 K-571<br>B-233 B-283 B-409 B-571  | Certs.<br><br>#C977, #C1878,<br>#C1879, #C1880,<br>#C1881 and<br>#C2144              |
| DRBG<br>(NIST SP 800-90A)   | Random<br>Number<br>Generation<br>Symmetric<br>Key<br>Generation | Hash_DRBG (SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512)<br>HMAC_DRBG (SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512)<br>CTR DRBG (AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256)  | Certs.<br><br>#C976, #C977,<br>#C1878,<br>#C1879,<br>#C1880,<br>#C1881 and<br>#C2144 |



|              |  |  |  |
|--------------|--|--|--|
| <p>DSA</p>   | <p>Digital Signature Operations</p>  | <p>PQG<br/>                     Generation:<br/>                     L= 2048, 3072<br/>                     N= 224, 256<br/>                     SHA = 224, 256, 384 and 512</p> <p>PQG Verification:<br/>                     L= 1024, 2048, 3072<br/>                     N= 224, 256<br/>                     SHA = 224, 256, 384 and 512</p> <p>Key Pair:<br/>                     L= 2048, 3072<br/>                     N= 224, 256</p> <p>Signature<br/>                     Generation:<br/>                     L= 2048, 3072<br/>                     N= 224, 256<br/>                     SHA = 224, 256, 384 and 512</p> <p>Signature<br/>                     Verification:<br/>                     L= 1024, 2048, 3072<br/>                     N= 160, 224, 256<br/>                     SHA = 1, 224, 256, 384 and 512</p>  | <p>Certs.<br/><br/>                     #C977, #C1878,<br/>                     #C1879,<br/>                     #C1880,<br/>                     #C1881 and<br/>                     #C2144</p> |
| <p>ECDSA</p> | <p>Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Operations<br/><br/>                     (The Module supports only NIST defined curves for use with ECDSA and ECDH.)</p> | <p>Key Pair Generation</p> <p>Curves:<br/>                     B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, P-224, P- 256, P-384, P-521</p> <p>Public Key</p> <p>Validation Curves:<br/>                     B-163, B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-163, K-233, K-283, K-409, K- 571, P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521</p> <p>Signature Generation</p> <p>Curve/SHA pairs<br/>                     tested:<br/>                     P = 224, 256, 384 and 521 /w SHA-224, 256, 384 and 512.<br/>                     K = 233, 283, 409 and 571 /w SHA-224, 256, 384 and 512.<br/>                     B = 233, 283, 409 and 571 /w SHA-224, 256, 384 and 512.</p> <p>Signature Verification</p> <p>Curve/SHA pairs<br/>                     tested:<br/>                     P = 192, 224, 256, 384 and 521 /w SHA-1, 224, 256, 384 and 512.<br/>                     K = 163, 233, 283, 409 and 571 /w SHA-1, 224, 256, 384 and 512.<br/>                     B = 163, 233, 283, 409 and 571 /w SHA-1, 224, 256, 384 and 512.</p> | <p>Certs.<br/><br/>                     #C977, #C1878,<br/>                     #C1879,<br/>                     #C1880,<br/>                     #C1881 and<br/>                     #C2144</p> |





|             |   |   |   |
|-------------|---|---|---|
| <p>HMAC</p> | <p>Keyed Hashing Operations</p>         | <p>HMAC SHA1:<br/>KeySizes tested: KS &lt; BS KS = BS KS &gt;<br/>BS MAC sizes tested: 10 12 16 20</p> <p>HMAC SHA224:<br/>KeySizes tested: KS &lt; BS KS = BS KS &gt;<br/>BS MAC sizes tested: 14 16 20 24 28</p> <p>HMAC SHA256:<br/>KeySizes tested: KS &lt; BS KS = BS KS &gt;<br/>BS MAC sizes tested: 16 24 32</p> <p>HMAC SHA384:<br/>KeySizes tested: KS &lt; BS KS = BS KS &gt;<br/>BS MAC sizes tested: 24 32 40 48</p> <p>HMAC SHA512:<br/>KeySizes tested: KS &lt; BS KS = BS KS &gt;<br/>BS MAC sizes tested: 32 40 48 56 64</p>   | <p>Certs.<br/><br/>#C977, #C1878,<br/>#C1879,<br/>#C1880,<br/>#C1881 and<br/>#C2144</p> |
| <p>RSA</p>  | <p>RSA Digital Signature Operations</p> | <p>FIPS 186-2</p> <p>Signature Verification 9.31:<br/>Modulus lengths: 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, 4096<br/>SHAs: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512</p> <p>Signature Verification PKCS1.5<br/>Modulus lengths: 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, 4096<br/>SHAs: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512</p> <p>Signature Verification PSS:<br/>Modulus lengths: 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, 4096<br/>SHAs: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512</p> <p>FIPS 186-4</p> <p>Signature Generation 9.31:<br/>Mod 2048 SHA: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512<br/>Mod 3072 SHA: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512</p> <p>Signature Generation PKCS1.5:<br/>Mod 2048 SHA: SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512<br/>Mod 3072 SHA: SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512</p> <p>Signature Generation PSS: Mod 2048:<br/>SHA-224: Salt Length: 0<br/>SHA-256: Salt Length: 0<br/>SHA-384: Salt Length: 0<br/>SHA-512: Salt Length: 0<br/>Mod 3072:<br/>SHA-224: Salt Length: 0<br/>SHA-256: Salt Length: 0<br/>SHA-384: Salt Length: 0<br/>SHA-512: Salt Length: 0</p> | <p>Certs.<br/><br/>#C977, #C1878,<br/>#C1879,<br/>#C1880,<br/>#C1881 and<br/>#C2144</p> |



|                         |                                       |   |  |
|-------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|--|
| SHS                     | Hashing                               | SHA-1 Byte only<br>SHA-224 Byte only<br>SHA-256 Byte only<br>SHA-384 Byte only<br>SHA-512 Byte only   | Certs.<br><br>#C977, #C1878,<br>#C1879,<br>#C1880,<br>#C1881 and<br>#C2144 |
| Triple-DES <sup>1</sup> | Encryption,<br>Decryption<br>and CMAC | CBC, CFB1, CFB8, CFB64, OFB and ECB Modes:<br>Encrypt/Decrypt Key Option = 1 (K1, K2, K3 independent)<br>CMAC Verification using TDES (3-Key) | Certs.<br><br>#C977, #C1878,<br>#C1879,<br>#C1880,<br>#C1881 and<br>#C2144 |

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<sup>1</sup> As per the SP 800-67rev1 Transition specified in the CMVP Implementation Guidance, please be advised that this module shall not be used to perform more than 2<sup>20</sup> encryptions with the same Triple-DES key when generated as part of a recognized IETF protocol. If the key is not generated as part of a recognized IETF protocol, then the limit of 2<sup>16</sup> encryptions shall apply.



Table 4 – FIPS Allowed Cryptographic Functions

| Category                   | Algorithm | Description   |
|----------------------------|-----------|---|
| Key Encryption, Decryption | RSA       | <p>The RSA algorithm is used by the calling application for encryption or decryption of keys. No claim is made for SP 800-56B compliance, and no CSPs are established into or exported out of the module using these services.</p> <p>If the implemented RSA is used in a key transport scheme, please be advised that the supported key strengths range from 1024 to 16384 bits. You must ensure that only keys between 2048 and 16384 bits (providing 112 to 270 bits of encryption strength) are used for this purpose. Failure to use this range of keys will result in a non-compliant module.</p> <p><b>Note: After December 31, 2023) this security function will no longer be allowed for use in the Approved mode)</b></p> |
| Key Agreement Component    | CVL       | <p>EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength)</p> <p><b>(Note: After December 31, 2021) this security function will no longer be allowed for use in the Approved mode)</b></p>   |
| NDRNG                      | N/A       | <p>Underlying PRNG supplied by the OS and allowed for use in conjunction with the seeding of the Approved NIST SP 800-90A DRBG. The PRNG is outside of the module's logical boundary but inside cryptographic boundary of the module.</p>   |



## 4. Non-Approved Cryptographic Functions

The following cryptographic services, algorithms and schemes shall not be used in an Approved mode of operation. Any use of these schemes and algorithms will cause the module to be operating in a non- Approved mode. Keys and secret critical security parameters defined in the approved mode of operation, shall not be accessed or shared while in a non-approved mode of operation. Furthermore, critical security parameters shall not be generated while in a non-approved mode. The approved DRBG may be used in a non-approved mode. However, the approved DRBGs seed or seed key shall not be accessed or shared in the non-approved mode. Access rights are denoted below as Read (R), Write (W) or Execute (X).

Table 5 – FIPS Non-Approved Cryptographic Security Functions & Services

| Service                   | Role     | Description   | Access | Input    | Output      |
|---------------------------|----------|---|--------|----------|-------------|
| Random number generation  | User, CO | ANSI X9.31 RNG (non-compliant)<br>Used for random number and symmetric key generation.  | R,W,X  | API Call | Return Code |
| Asymmetric key generation | User, CO | Used to generate DSA, ECDSA and RSA keys:<br>RSA SGK, RSA SVK; DSA SGK, DSA SVK; ECDSA SGK, ECDSA SVK<br><br><u>Non-Approved RSA Functions</u><br><br><ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>186-2 RSA Key Generation &amp; Signature Generation (non-compliant) (See Table 2 for details.)</li> </ul> <u>Non-Approved DSA Functions</u><br><br><ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>186-2 DSA Key Generation – Use of 1024 bit keys (non-compliant)</li> <li>186-4 DSA Key Generation – Use of 1024 bit keys (non-compliant)</li> <li>186-2 DSA - Use of SHA-1 for Digital Signature Generation (non-compliant)</li> <li>186-4 DSA - Use of SHA-1 for Digital Signature Generation (non-compliant)</li> </ul> <u>Non-Approved ECDSA Functions</u><br><br><ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>186-2 ECDSA – Use of curves PKG: CURVES(P-192 K-163 B-163) SIG(gen): CURVES( P-192 P-224 P-256 P-384 P-521 K-163 K-233 K-283 K-409 K-571 B-163 B-233 B-283 B-409 B-571)</li> <li>186-4 ECDSA – Use of curves PKG: CURVES( P-192 K-163 B-163 ) SigGen: CURVES( P-192: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P-224:(SHA-1) P-256:(SHA-1)P-384: (SHA-1) P-521:(SHA-1) K-163: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) K-233:(SHA-1)</li> <li>K-283:(SHA-1) K-409:(SHA-1) K-571:(SHA-1) B-163: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) B-233:(SHA-1) B-283: (SHA-1) B-409:(SHA-1) B-571:(SHA-1))</li> </ul> | R,W,X  | API Call | Return Code |
| Key agreement             | User, CO | [SP 800-56A] (5.7.1.2) - All NIST Recommended B, K and P curves sizes 163 and 192   | R,W,X  | API Call | Return Code |



|                                   |          |  |       |          |             |
|-----------------------------------|----------|--|-------|----------|-------------|
| Storage Device<br>Confidentiality | User, CO | [SP 800-38E] XTS<br>(non-Approved due to lack of comparison test (IG A.9)) | R,W,X | API Call | Return Code |
|-----------------------------------|----------|--|-------|----------|-------------|



## 5. Critical Security Parameters & Public Keys

All CSPs used by the module are described in this section. All access to these CSPs by Module services are described in Section 9, “Roles, Services and Authentication”. The CSP names are generic, corresponding to API parameter data structures.

Table 6 - Module CSPs

| CSP Name       | Description  |
|----------------|--|
| RSA SGK        | RSA (2048 to 16384 bits) signature generation key  |
| RSA KDK        | RSA (2048 to 16384 bits) key decryption key  |
| DSA SGK        | [FIPS 186-4] DSA (2048/3072) signature generation key  |
| ECDSA SGK      | ECDSA (All NIST defined B, K, and P curves except sizes 163 and 192) signature generation key                                |
| EC DH Private  | EC DH (All NIST defined B, K, and P curves except sizes 163 and 192) private key agreement key.                              |
| AES EDK        | AES (128/192/256) encrypt / decrypt key  |
| AES CMAC       | AES (128/192/256) CMAC generate / verify key   |
| AES GCM        | AES (128/192/256) encrypt / decrypt / generate / verify key  |
| TDES EDK       | TDES (3-Key) encrypt / decrypt key (192 bits/168 key bits, providing 112 bits of strength)                                   |
| TDES CMAC      | TDES (3-Key) CMAC generate / verify key  |
| HMAC Key       | Keyed hash key (160/224/256/384/512)   |
| Hash_DRBG CSPs | V (440/888 bits), C (440/888 bits), seed, and entropy input (length dependent on security strength)                          |
| HMAC_DRBG CSPs | V (160/224/256/384/512 bits), seed, Key (160/224/256/384/512 bits) and entropy input (length dependent on security strength) |
| CTR_DRBG CSPs  | V (128 bits), seed, Key (AES 128/192/256) and entropy input (length dependent on security strength)                          |
| COADDigest     | Precalculated HMACSHA1 digest used for Crypto Officer role authentication  |
| UserADDigest   | Precalculated HMACSHA1 digest used for User role authentication  |

Table 7 - Module Public Keys

| CSP Name     | Description   |
|--------------|---|
| RSA SVK      | RSA (2048 to 16384 bits) signature verification public key  |
| RSA KEK      | RSA (2048 to 16384 bits) key encryption key   |
| DSA SVK      | [FIPS 186-4] DSA (2048/3072) signature verification key or [FIPS 186-2] DSA (1024) signature verification key |
| ECDSA SVK    | ECDSA (All NIST defined B, K and P curves) signature verification key   |
| EC DH Public | EC DH (All NIST defined B, K and P curves) public key agreement key.  |



## 6. Key Management

For all CSPs and Public Keys:

### 6.1. Key/CSP Generation

The Module implements NIST SP 800-90A compliant DRBG services for the creation of symmetric keys, and for generation of DSA and ECDSA keys. The calling application is responsible for the storage of generated keys returned by the module. Symmetric keys are the direct output of the DRBG. Asymmetric key generation conforms to FIPS PUB 186-4.

The AES - GCM key and IV is generated as per IG A.5, and the Initialization Vector (IV) is a minimum of 96 bits. If module power is lost and restored, the calling application shall ensure that any AES-GCM keys used for encryption or decryption are redistributed.

For operation in the Approved mode, Module users (the calling applications) shall use entropy sources that contain at least 112 bits of entropy. To ensure full DRBG strength, the entropy sources must meet or exceed the security strengths.

### 6.2. Key/CSP Entry

All CSPs enter the Module's logical boundary in plaintext as API parameters, associated by memory location. However, none cross the physical boundary.

### 6.3. Key/CSP Output

The Module may output any keys or CSPs as part of the explicit results of key generation services. The calling application is responsible for the management and protection of all keys and CSPs. The module itself does not export keys outside the physical boundary.

### 6.4. Key/CSP Storage

The Module stores DRBG state values for the lifetime of the DRBG instance. The module uses CSPs passed in by the calling application on the stack. The Module does not store any CSP persistently (beyond the lifetime of an API call), except for DRBG state values used for the Module's default key generation service.

### 6.5. Key/CSP Zeroization

Zeroization of sensitive data is performed automatically by API function calls for temporarily stored CSPs. In addition, the module provides functions to explicitly destroy CSPs related to random number generation services. The calling application is responsible for parameters passed in and out of the module.

Private and secret keys are provided to the module by the calling application and are destroyed when released by the appropriate API function calls. Keys residing in internally allocated data structures (during the lifetime of an API call) can only be accessed using the Module defined API. The operating system protects memory and process space from unauthorized access. Only the calling application that creates or imports keys can use or export such keys. All API functions are executed by the invoking calling application in a non-overlapping sequence such that no two API functions will execute concurrently. An authorized application as user (Crypto-Officer and User) has access to all key data generated during the operation of the module.



## 7. Instructions for Operating in the Approved Mode

The NETSCOUT FIPS Object Module is a software module, which is intended to be used with NETSCOUT's line of software application products. Tables "FIPS Approved Cryptographic Functions" and "FIPS Allowed Cryptographic Functions" in this document, serve as the benchmark for cryptographic algorithms and schemes which allow the module to operate in the FIPS 140-2 compliant mode of operation.

In order to maintain operation in the Approved mode, the module shall be started using the `FIPS_module_mode_set()` command, and only the Approved and Allowed cryptographic functions shall be used. For every security function that is executed from table "FIPS Non-Approved Cryptographic Security Functions & Services", the module will be automatically operating in the non-Approved mode during the time such functions are active.

The calling application is responsible for invoking the module using an API call, which returns a "1" for success and "0" for failure. If the initialization process fails for any reason, then all cryptographic services fail from this point on. The specifics of the error are translated by the calling application.

## 8. Ports & Interfaces

The physical ports of the module are the same as the hardware on which it is executing. The logical interface is a C language application program interface (API).

*Table 8 - Logical Interfaces*

| Logical interface type | Description   |
|------------------------|---|
| Control Input          | API entry point and corresponding stack parameters        |
| Data Input             | API entry point data input stack parameters               |
| Data Output            | API entry point data output stack parameters              |
| Status Output          | API entry point return values and status stack parameters |

As a software module, control of the physical ports is outside the scope of the module. However, when the module is performing self-tests, or is in an error state, all output on the logical data output interface is inhibited. The module is single-threaded and when in the error state, returns only an error value. (No data output is returned).





## 9. Roles, Services & Authentication

The module implements a very basic role-based authentication method, inherited from the FIPS Object Module on which it is based. Since the module is built and linked at NETSCOUT, and the option of having a Crypto-Officer and User password must be implemented at build time, there is no practical option for operators to use this feature. Due to the standard way in which the module is built according to the FIPS Object Module security policy, the default (and published) authentication key and passwords are implemented according to Page 97 of the "User Guide for the OpenSSL FIPS Object Module v2.0". (This occurs by default when the module is built without the option of injecting unique passwords.) Please be advised, that while the password can be changed to a non-default value at build time, any known, published value cannot be considered secret, and therefore does not meet the requirement.

For completeness, the strength of authentication for these known values are as follows: The minimum password length is 16 characters, the probability of a random successful authentication attempt in one try is a maximum of  $1/256^{16}$ , or less than  $1/10^{38}$ . The Module permanently disables further authentication attempts after a single failure, so this probability is independent of time.

Only one role may be active at a time, as the module does not allow concurrent operators. The User and Crypto-Officer roles are assumed explicitly. Access rights are denoted below as Read (R), Write (W) or Execute (X).

The underlying, operating system segregates operator processes into separate process spaces. Each process space is logically separated from all other processes by the operating system software and hardware. The module functions entirely within the process space of the calling application, and implicitly satisfies the FIPS 140-2 requirement for a single user mode of operation.

Both roles have access to all services provided by the module.

- User Role (User): Loading the Module and calling any of the API functions.
- Crypto Officer Role (CO): Installation of the Module within the non-modifiable OE and calling of any API functions.

Table 9 - Approved Services & CSP Access

| Service      | Role     | Description  | Access | Input    | Output      |
|--------------|----------|--|--------|----------|-------------|
| Initialize   | User, CO | Module initialization. Does not access CSPs.   | R,X    | API Call | Return Code |
| Self-test    | User, CO | Perform self-tests (FIPS_selftest). Does not access CSPs.  | R,X    | API Call | Return Code |
| Authenticate | User, CO | Role-based authentication using passwords published in FIPS Object Module User Guide.  | R      | API Call | Return Code |
| Show status  | User, CO | Functions that provide module status information: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Version (as unsigned long or const char *)</li> <li>- FIPS Mode (Boolean) Does not access CSPs.</li> </ul>  | R,X    | API Call | Return Code |
| Zeroize      | User, CO | Functions that destroy CSPs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- fips_drbg_uninstantiate: for a given DRBG context, overwrites DRBG CSPs (Hash_DRBG CSPs, HMAC_DRBG CSPs, CTR_DRBG CSPs)</li> </ul> All other services automatically overwrite CSPs stored in allocated memory. | R,W,X  | API Call | Return Code |



|                           |          |  |       |          |             |
|---------------------------|----------|--|-------|----------|-------------|
| Random number generation  | User, CO | Used for random number and symmetric key generation.<br><ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Seed or reseed a DRBG instance</li> <li>- Determine security strength of a DRBG instance</li> <li>- Obtain random data</li> </ul> Uses and updates Hash_DRBG CSPs, HMAC_DRBG CSPs, CTR_DRBG CSPs. | R,W,X | API Call | Return Code |
| Asymmetric key generation | User, CO | Used to generate DSA and ECDSA keys: DSA SGK, DSA SVK; ECDSA SGK, ECDSA SVK<br>There is one supported entropy strength for each mechanism and algorithm type, the maximum specified in SP800-90  | R,W,X | API Call | Return Code |
| Symmetric encrypt/decrypt | User, CO | Used to encrypt or decrypt data. Executes using AES EDK, AES, GCM, TDES EDK (passed in by the calling process).  | R,W,X | API Call | Return Code |
| Symmetric digest          | User, CO | Used to generate or verify data integrity with CMAC. Executes using AES CMAC, TDES, CMAC (passed in by the calling process).   | R,W,X | API Call | Return Code |
| Message digest            | User, CO | Used to generate a SHA-1 or SHA-2 message digest. Does not access CSPs.  | R,W,X | API Call | Return Code |
| Keyed Hash                | User, CO | Used to generate or verify data integrity with HMAC. Executes using HMAC Key (passed in by the calling process).   | R,W,X | API Call | Return Code |
| Key transport             | User, CO | Used to encrypt or decrypt a key value on behalf of the calling process (does not establish or transport keys into the module). Executes using RSA KDK, RSA KEK (passed in by the calling process).  | R,W,X | API Call | Return Code |
| Key agreement             | User, CO | Used to perform key agreement primitives on behalf of the calling process (does not establish keys into the module). Executes using EC DH Private, EC DH Public (passed in by the calling process).  | R,W,X | API Call | Return Code |
| Digital signature         | User, CO | Used to generate or verify RSA, DSA or ECDSA digital signatures. Executes using RSA SGK, RSA SVK; DSA SGK, DSA SVK; ECDSA SGK, ECDSA SVK (passed in by the calling process).   | R,W,X | API Call | Return Code |
| Utility                   | User, CO | Miscellaneous helper functions. Does not access CSPs.  | R,W,X | API Call | Return Code |

## 10. Physical Security

The module maintains physical security by using production grade components and standard passivation, as allowed by FIPS 140-2 level 1.



# 11. Module Self-Tests

The module performs the applicable power-up self-tests listed below, when initialized (or on-demand):

Table 10 - Module Power-Up Self-Tests

| Algorithm/Scheme        | Type              | Description   |
|-------------------------|-------------------|---|
| Software Integrity Test | Known Answer Test | HMAC-SHA-1  |
| HMAC                    | Known Answer Test | One KAT per SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 (Per IG 9.3, this testing covers SHA POST requirements.)         |
| AES                     | Known Answer Test | Separate encrypt and decrypt, ECB mode, 128 bit key length  |
| AES CCM                 | Known Answer Test | Separate encrypt and decrypt, 192 key length  |
| AES GCM                 | Known Answer Test | Separate encrypt and decrypt, 256 key length  |
| XTS-AES                 | Known Answer Test | 128, 256-bit key sizes to support either the 256-bit key size (for XTS_AES128)<br>Or the 512bit key size (for XTS_AES256) |
| AES-CMAC                | Known Answer Test | Generate and verify CBC mode, 128, 192, 256 key lengths   |
| Triple-DES              | Known Answer Test | 3-Key Triple-DES with separate encrypt and decrypt, ECB mode.   |
| Triple-DES-CMAC         | Known Answer Test | 3-Key Triple-DES with CMAC generate and verify, CBC mode.   |
| RSA                     | Known Answer Test | Sign and verify using 2048 bit key, SHA-256, PKCS#1   |
| DSA                     | Known Answer Test | Sign and verify using 2048 bit key, SHA-384   |
| NIST SP 800-90A DRBG    | Known Answer Test | CTR_DRBG: AES, 256-bit with and without derivation function<br>HASH_DRBG: SHA-256<br>HMAC_DRBG: SHA-256                   |
| ECDSA                   | Known Answer Test | Keygen, sign, verify using P224, K233 and SHA512.   |
| EC Diffie-Hellman       | Known Answer Test | Shared secret calculation per NIST SP 800-56A §5.7.1.2, IG 9.6  |
| ANSI X9.31 DRNG         | Known Answer Test | DRNG test over key lengths over 128, 192 and 256 bits   |

The initialization API call `FIPS_module_mode_set()` invokes the module itself and all subsequent power-up self-tests automatically and without operator intervention. If any component of the power-up self-test fails, an internal flag is set to prevent subsequent invocation of any cryptographic function calls. The module will only enter the FIPS Approved mode if the module is reloaded and the re-initialization succeeds. The power-up self-tests can be performed on-demand by re-initializing the module. Any failure of a power-up self-test represents a hard error, which means the module must be replaced. The operator may attempt to restart the module to clear any error, however hard errors will require replacement of the module. Upon cryptographic service failure (including initialization, self-tests and conditional failures), the operator can call the last error API function to get the error associated with the failure.



The module performs the applicable conditional self-tests listed below:

Table 11 - Module Conditional Self-Tests

| Algorithm/Scheme     | Type                      | Description   |
|----------------------|---------------------------|---|
| NIST SP 800-90A DRBG | Known Answer Test         | As per Section 11.3 of NIST SP 800-90A - Conditional upon Instantiation, Generation, Reseed and Uninstantiation.  |
| NIST SP 800-90A DRBG | Continuous Test           | Continuous test for DRBG stuck fault.   |
| NDRNG                | Continuous Test           | OS based entropy source. Continuous test performed.   |
| ANSI X9.31 DRNG      | Continuous Test           | Continuous test for DRNG stuck fault. (This is a non-compliant DRNG which executes only in the non-Approved mode.)  |
| RSA                  | Pairwise Consistency Test | Performed upon the condition of RSA keypair generation.<br><i>(Note: this test is performed in the non-Approved mode only, as the implemented RSA Key Generation does not conform to FIPS 186-4.)</i> |
| DSA                  | Pairwise Consistency Test | Performed upon the condition of DSA keypair generation.   |
| ECDSA                | Pairwise Consistency Test | Performed upon the condition of ECDSA keypair generation.   |

**Notes:**

- In the event of a DRBG self-test failure, it is necessary for the calling application to uninstantiate and re-instantiate the DRBG as per the requirements of SP 800-90A. The implemented NIST SP 800-90A DRBGs (Hash, HMAC and CTR) all contain the critical functions tests for instantiate, generate, reseed and uninstantiate.
- Pairwise Consistency Tests are performed for both Sign/Verify and Encrypt/Decrypt.
- The Module supports all NIST defined curves.
- The resulting symmetric key or generated seed is an unmodified output from the DRBG.
- The application developer **shall** ensure that the blocking `/dev/random` character device is utilized.

## 12. Mitigation of Other Attacks

The module is not designed to mitigate against attacks which are outside of the scope of FIPS 140-2.



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