

# Apple iOS 14: iPhones and Apple iPadOS 14: iPads

## Common Criteria Configuration Guide

PP\_MD\_V3.1  
with  
MOD\_MDM\_AGENT\_V1.0,  
MOD\_VPN\_CLI\_V2.1  
PP\_WLAN\_CLI\_EP\_V1.0

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## 1 Revision History

Version	Date	Change
1.0	2021-05-25	Updates for iOS 14/iPadOS 14.

## 2 Trademarks

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### 3 Introduction

This document is written for administrators and users of Apple mobile devices that are managed using a mobile device management (MDM) solution. The “Apple iOS 14: iPhones Security Target” [IOS\_ST] and “Apple iPadOS 14: iPads Security Target” [IPADOS\_ST] includes specifications for security where the mobile device operating environment includes a Wi-Fi network and includes evaluation of the Always-On virtual private network (VPN) provided by iOS/iPadOS. This configuration guide applies to both evaluations VID11146 (Apple iOS 14: iPhones) and VID11147 (Apple iPadOS 14: iPads). Where applicable, the guide shall point out the differences between iPhones and iPads.

According to the [IOS\_ST] and the [IPADOS\_ST], the evaluated devices are a series of Apple iPhone and iPad mobile devices running the iOS 14 and iPadOS 14 operating systems, respectively. The operating systems manage the mobile device hardware, provide mobile device agent functionality, and provide the technologies required to implement native applications (apps). The operating systems provide a built-in MDM application programming interface (API), giving management features that may be utilized by external MDM solutions and allowing enterprises to use Configuration Profiles to control some of the mobile device settings. The devices provide a consistent set of capabilities allowing for supervision. These capabilities include the preparation of devices for deployment, the subsequent management of the devices, and the termination of management. Some of the Configuration Profiles detailed in this configuration guide are listed in [Appendix: Configuration Profiles](#).

The devices are expected to be part of an MDM solution that enables the enterprise to control and administer all devices that are part of the enterprise MDM solution.

The devices do not include the pre-installed 3rd party apps that run on top of the operating systems but do include controls that limit application behavior.

For the user, the operating systems provide support to end users by providing support for connectivity using the Wireless LAN radio client and provide functionality for the management of the Wi-Fi interface. Additionally, the operating systems support end users in an enterprise setting by providing always-on connectivity via an IPsec VPN tunnel in order to provide secure, reliable access to enterprise assets.

For clarity the following conventions will be used throughout this document.

- Keys: This document will specify keys, or attributes, that will need to be set to certain values to configure the mobile devices into the evaluated configuration. When a key is mentioned, it will be written in the following font: *AlwaysOn*.
- GUI navigation: There are certain configurations or values that can be viewed by navigating to it on the mobile device itself. When instructions for these are mentioned, it will be written in the following font: *Settings » Siri & Search*.
- Document sections: In the referenced Apple documentation the navigation to relevant sections are indicated as “*Hardware Security and Biometrics*” → “*Touch ID and Face ID*”.

### 3.1 Purpose

This document is intended to provide information for the secure installation and use of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) for the Common Criteria (CC) evaluation of the mobile devices. The TOE was the mobile devices specified in Table 2 and Table 3. Readers of this document may use the term “mobile device” synonymously with the term “TOE”. This guidance is based on the CC requirements and the requirements given in the following documents:

- Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.1, dated 2017- 06-16 [PP\_MD\_V3.1] with:
- PP-Module for MDM Agents, Version 1.0, dated 2019-04-25 [MOD\_MDM\_AGENT],
- Extended Package (EP) for Wireless LAN (WLAN) Clients, Version 1.0, dated 2016-02-08 [PP\_WLAN\_CLI\_EP], and
- PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 2.1, dated 2017- 10-05 [MOD\_VPN\_CLI].

### 3.2 TOE Security Functionality

In the evaluated configuration, the mobile devices provide the following security functionality.

- Security audit
- Cryptographic support
- User data protection
- Identification and authentication
- Security management
- Protection of the TOE Security Functionality (TSF)
- TOE access
- Trusted path/channels

### 3.3 Supporting Apple Documentation

This document provides clarifications to the Apple documentation as related to configuring the mobile devices into the evaluated configuration. The official Apple documentation should be referred to and followed only as directed within this document. This document supplements and supersedes the Apple documentation. Table 1: Guidance Documents lists the guidance documents relevant to the configuration and operation of the mobile devices.

Reference	Document Name	Location
Mobile Device Administrator Guidance		

Reference	Document Name	Location
[CCGUIDE]	Apple iOS 14: iPhones and Apple iPadOS 14: iPads Common Criteria Configuration Guide (This document)	<a href="https://www.niap-ccevs.org/MMO/Product/st_vid11146-agd.pdf">https://www.niap-ccevs.org/MMO/Product/st_vid11146-agd.pdf</a> <a href="https://www.niap-ccevs.org/MMO/Product/st_vid11147-agd.pdf">https://www.niap-ccevs.org/MMO/Product/st_vid11147-agd.pdf</a>
[DEV_MAN] (April 2021)	Device Management	<a href="https://developer.apple.com/documentation/devicemanagement">https://developer.apple.com/documentation/devicemanagement</a>
<b>Mobile Device User Guidance</b>		
[iPhone_UG]	iPhone User Guide for iOS 14 (2020)	<a href="https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/welcome/ios">https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/welcome/ios</a>
[iPad_UG]	iPad User Guide for iPadOS 14 (2020)	<a href="https://support.apple.com/guide/ipad/welcome/ipados">https://support.apple.com/guide/ipad/welcome/ipados</a>
[PASSCODE_Help] (March 18, 2021)	Use a passcode with your iPhone, iPad or iPod touch	<a href="https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204060">https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204060</a>  International: <a href="https://support.apple.com/HT204060">https://support.apple.com/HT204060</a>
[BLUETOOTH_HELP] (September 24, 2019)	Pair a third-party Bluetooth accessory with your iPhone, iPad, or iPod touch	<a href="https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204091">https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204091</a>  International: <a href="https://support.apple.com/HT204091">https://support.apple.com/HT204091</a>
<b>Mobile Device Management</b>		
[AConfig]	Apple Configurator 2 User Guide (online)	<a href="https://support.apple.com/guide/apple-configurator-2/welcome/mac">https://support.apple.com/guide/apple-configurator-2/welcome/mac</a>
[ABM_Guide] (October 2020)	Apple Business Manager User Guide	<a href="https://support.apple.com/guide/apple-business-manager/welcome/web">https://support.apple.com/guide/apple-business-manager/welcome/web</a>
[PM_Help] (2021)	Profile Manager User Guide	<a href="https://support.apple.com/guide/profile-manager/welcome/mac">https://support.apple.com/guide/profile-manager/welcome/mac</a>

Reference	Document Name	Location
[MDM_SETTINGS] (April 26, 2021)	Mobile Device Management Settings	<a href="https://support.apple.com/guide/mdm/welcome/web">https://support.apple.com/guide/mdm/welcome/web</a>
<b>Supporting Documents</b>		
[DeployRef]	Deployment Reference for iPhone and iPad	<a href="https://support.apple.com/guide/deployment-reference-ios/welcome/web">https://support.apple.com/guide/deployment-reference-ios/welcome/web</a>
[PROFS_LOGS]	Profiles and Logs (applies to both iOS and iPadOS)	<a href="https://developer.apple.com/bug-reporting/profiles-and-logs/?platforms=ios">https://developer.apple.com/bug-reporting/profiles-and-logs/?platforms=ios</a>
[LOGGING]	Logging	<a href="https://developer.apple.com/documentation/os/logging?language=objc">https://developer.apple.com/documentation/os/logging?language=objc</a>
[TRUST_STORE]	List of available trusted root certificates in iOS 14, iPadOS 14, macOS11, watchOS 7, and tvOS 14	<a href="https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212140">https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212140</a> International: <a href="https://support.apple.com/HT212140">https://support.apple.com/HT212140</a>
[MANAGE_CARDS] (April 12, 2021)	Manage the cards that you use with Apple Pay	<a href="https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT205583">https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT205583</a> International: <a href="https://support.apple.com/HT205583">https://support.apple.com/HT205583</a>
[PAY_SETUP] (January 15, 2021)	Set up Apple Pay	<a href="https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204506">https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204506</a> International: <a href="https://support.apple.com/HT204506">https://support.apple.com/HT204506</a>
[CONTENT-CACHING]	Set up content caching on Mac	<a href="https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/set-up-content-caching-on-mac-mchl3b6c3720/10.15/mac/10.15">https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/set-up-content-caching-on-mac-mchl3b6c3720/10.15/mac/10.15</a>
[APFS_DOC]	File system formats available in Disk Utility on Mac	<a href="https://support.apple.com/en-euro/guide/disk-utility/dsku19ed921c/20.0/mac/11.0">https://support.apple.com/en-euro/guide/disk-utility/dsku19ed921c/20.0/mac/11.0</a>
<b>App Developer Guidance</b>		
[CKTSREF] (2021)	Certificate, Key, and Trust Services	<a href="https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/certificate-key-and-trust-services">https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/certificate-key-and-trust-services</a>

Reference	Document Name	Location
[KEYCHAINPG] (2021)	Keychain Services Programming Guide	<a href="https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/keychain_services">https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/keychain_services</a>
[AP_SEC]	Apple Platform Security	<a href="https://manuals.info.apple.com/MANUALS/1000/MA1902/en_US/apple-platform-security-guide.pdf">https://manuals.info.apple.com/MANUALS/1000/MA1902/en_US/apple-platform-security-guide.pdf</a>
[APFS_DEV_DOC] (2021)	About Apple File System	<a href="https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation/file_system/about_apple_file_system">https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation/file_system/about_apple_file_system</a>

Table 1: Guidance Documents

### 3.4 Evaluated Mobile Devices

Table 2 and Table 3, lists the iPhone and iPad devices that are covered by the CC evaluation.

Processor	Device Name	Model Number
iPhones		
A9	iPhone 6s	A1633
		A1688
		A1691 (China)
		A1700 (China)
	iPhone 6s Plus	A1634
		A1687
		A1690 (China)
		A1699 (China)
	iPhone SE	A1662
		A1723 (China)
		A1724 (China)
A10 Fusion	iPhone 7	A1660
		A1779 (Japan)
		A1780 (China)
		A1778
	iPhone 7 Plus	A1661
		A1785 (Japan)
		A1786 (China)
		A1784

A11 Bionic	iPhone 8	A1863
		A1906 (Japan)
		A1907
		A1905 (GSM)
	iPhone 8 Plus	A1864
		A1898 (Japan)
		A1899
		A1897 (GSM)
	iPhone X	A1865 (Japan)
		A1902 (Japan)
		A1901
A12 Bionic	iPhone Xs	A1920 (US/CA/HK)
		A2097
		A2098 (Japan)
		A2099 (Global)
		A2100 (China)
	iPhone Xs Max	A1921 (US/CA)
		A2101 (Global)
		A2102 (Japan)
		A2104 (China/HK)
	iPhone XR	A1984 (US/CA)
		A2105 (Global)
		A2106 (Japan)
		A2107 (US/CA)
		A2108 (HK/China)
A13 Bionic	iPhone 11	A2111
		A2221
		A2223
	iPhone 11 Pro	A2160
		A2215
		A2217
	iPhone 11 Pro Max	A2161
		A2218
		A2220
		A2219
	iPhone SE (2 <sup>nd</sup> gen)	A2275 (US/CA)
		A2298 (China)
		A2296

A14 Bionic	iPhone 12 mini	A2176
		A2398
		A2399
		A2400
	iPhone A12	A2172
		A2402
		A2403
		A2404
	iPhone 12 Pro	A2341
		A2406
		A2407
		A2408
	iPhone 12 Pro Max	A2342
		A2410
		A2411
		A2412

**Table 2: Mobile Devices Covered by the Evaluation, lists the iPhones that are covered by the VID11146 evaluation.**

Processor	Device Name	Model Number
iPads		
A9	iPad 9.7-inch (5 <sup>th</sup> gen)	A1822
		A1823
A9X	iPad Pro 9.7-inch	A1673
		A1674
		A1675
	iPad Pro 12.9-inch	A1584
		A1652
A10 Fusion	iPad 9.7-inch (6 <sup>th</sup> gen)	A1893
		A1954
	iPad 10.2-inch (7 <sup>th</sup> gen)	A2197
		A2199
		A2200
		A2198 (Hong Kong)

A10X Fusion	iPad Pro 12.9-inch (2 <sup>nd</sup> gen)	A1670
		A1671
		A1821 (China)
	iPad Pro 10.5-inch	A1701
		A1709
		A1852 (China)
A12 Bionic	iPad mini (5 <sup>th</sup> gen)	A2133
		A2125 (China)
		A2124
		A2126
	10.5-inch iPad Air (3 <sup>rd</sup> gen)	A2152
		A2154 (China)
		A2123
		A2153
	iPad 10.2-inch (8 <sup>th</sup> gen)	A2270
		A2428
		A2429
		A2430 (China)
A12X Bionic	iPad Pro 11-inch	A1934 (US/CA)
		A1979 (China)
		A1980
		A2013 (US/CA)
	iPad Pro 12.9 inch (3 <sup>rd</sup> gen)	A2014 (US/CA)
		A1876
		A1895
		A1983 (China)
A12Z Bionic	iPad Pro 11-inch (2 <sup>nd</sup> gen)	A2228
		A2231 (China)
		A2230
		A2068
	iPad Pro 12.9-inch (4 <sup>th</sup> gen)	A2229
		A2069
		A2232
		A2233 (China)
A14 Bionic	iPad Air (4 <sup>th</sup> gen)	A2316
		A2324 (US/CA)
		A2072 (Global)
		A2325 (China)



*Table 3: Mobile Devices Covered by the Evaluation, lists the iPads that are covered by the VID111147 evaluation.*

### 3.5 Assumptions

The following assumptions apply when operating the mobile devices in the evaluated configuration. These assumptions must be valid within the organization to maintain security of the mobile devices.

#### 3.5.1 Administrators

- One or more competent, trusted personnel who are not careless, willfully negligent, or hostile, are assigned and authorized as the mobile device administrators, and do so using and abiding by guidance documentation.
- Device administrators are trusted to follow and apply all administrator guidance in a trusted manner.
- Personnel configuring the mobile device and its operational environment will follow the applicable security configuration guidance.
- Device administrators will configure the mobile device's security functions correctly to create the intended security policy.

#### 3.5.2 Mobile device users

- Mobile device users are not willfully negligent or hostile and use the mobile device within compliance of a reasonable enterprise security policy.
- The mobile device user exercises precautions to reduce the risk of loss or theft of the mobile device.
- The mobile device user will immediately notify the administrator if the mobile device is lost or stolen.
- Physical security, commensurate with the value of the mobile device and the data it contains, is assumed to be provided by the environment.

#### 3.5.3 Network

- The mobile device relies on network connectivity to carry out its management activities. The mobile device will robustly handle instances when connectivity is unavailable or unreliable.
- Information cannot flow between the wireless client and the internal wired network software integrity verification of the MDM agent.
- Information cannot flow onto the network to which the VPN client's host is connected without passing through the device.

### 3.5.4 Other

- The MDM Agent relies upon mobile platform and hardware evaluated against the [PP\_MD\_V3.1] and assured to provide policy enforcement as well as cryptographic services and data protection. The mobile device platform provides trusted updates and software integrity verification of the MDM Agent.

## 3.6 Organizational Security Policies

The following requirements are for policies that must be implemented by the deploying organization in support of meeting the security requirements of the [IOS\_ST] and the [IPADOS\_ST].

- The mobile device administrators must adhere to the organizational security policies.
- The mobile device must be supervised using an MDM solution prior to connecting to the network.
- The mobile device user is held accountable for their actions while using the device.
- The mobile device user must promptly report their lost or stolen device to the mobile device administrator. The mobile device administrator must take appropriate actions using the MDM solution used to manage the mobile device.

## 3.7 Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) in the STs requiring configuration

In the evaluated configuration, the devices address each SFR in the following table. Table 4: *SFR Configuration Requirements*, identifies each SFR specified in the Security Targets [IOS\_ST] and the [IPADOS\_ST] and provides references to sections within this document for information on the function in the Related Section column. The Configurable? column denotes if the function needs to or can be configured.

SFR ID	Function Description	Configurable?	Related Section
FAU_ALT_EXT.2 {AGENT}	Agent Alerts	No	Section 4.3.5
FAU_GEN.1(1) {MDF} {WLAN}	Audit Data Generation	Yes	Section 6.1
FAU_GEN.1.2(1) {MDF} {WLAN}	Audit Data Generation	Yes	Section 6.1
FAU_GEN.1.1(2) {AGENT}	Audit Data Generation	Yes	Section 6.1
FAU_GEN.1.2(2) {AGENT}	Audit Data Generation	Yes	Section 6.1
FAU_SEL.1(2) {AGENT}	Security Audit Event Selection	Yes	Section 6.2, Section 6.3

SFR ID	Function Description	Configurable?	Related Section
FAU_STG.1 {MDF}	Audit Storage Protection	No: Audit records are not accessible to device Administrators or Users and must be viewed on a trusted workstation or MDM server.	Section 6.2
FAU_STG.4 {MDF}	Prevention of Audit Data Loss	No: The default behavior is to overwrite the oldest entry.	Section 6.2
FCS_CKM.1(1) {MDF} {VPN}	Cryptographic Key Generation	No: The API allows specification of the requested key sizes and key types.	Section 5.2.1
FCS_CKM.1/WLAN {WLAN}	WLAN Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric Keys for WPA2 Connections)	No: Wireless LAN (WLAN) keys are generated for the cipher suite offered by the access point.	N/A
FCS_CKM.1/VPN {VPN}	VPN Cryptographic Key Generation (IKE)	No: IKEv2 is an available option and the API allows for the specification of the key size and key types.	Section 5.3.6
FCS_CKM.2(1) {MDF} {VPN}	Cryptographic Key Establishment	No: The API allows specification of the requested key sizes and key types.	Section 5.2.2
FCS_CKM.2(2) {MDF}	Cryptographic Key Establishment (While device is locked)	No: Key establishment is hard coded.	Section 5.2.2
FCS_CKM.2/WLAN {WLAN}	WLAN Cryptographic Key Distribution (GTK)	No: The WLAN protocol is implemented according to IEEE 802.11 2012.	N/A
FCS_CKM_EXT.1 {MDF}	Cryptographic Key Support (REK)	No: REK is permanently etched in silicon and is both unmodifiable as well as inaccessible by iOS/iPadOS and apps.	N/A

SFR ID	Function Description	Configurable?	Related Section
FCS_CKM_EXT.2 {MDF}	Cryptographic Key Random Generation (DEK)	No: Generation and maintenance of DEK is hard coded.	N/A
FCS_CKM_EXT.3 {MDF}	Cryptographic Key Generation (KEK)	No: Generation and maintenance of KEK is hard coded.	N/A
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 {MDF} {VPN} {WLAN} {AGENT}	Key Destruction	No: Zeroization of keys is hard coded.	N/A
FCS_CKM_EXT.5 {MDF}	TSF Wipe	Yes	Section 5.4.3
FCS_CKM_EXT.6 {MDF}	Salt Generation	No: Generation and maintenance of Salt is hard coded.	N/A
FCS_CKM_EXT.7 {MDF}	Cryptographic Key Support (REK)	No: REK is permanently etched in silicon and is both unmodifiable as well as inaccessible by iOS/iPadOS and apps.	N/A
FCS_COP.1(1) {MDF} {VPN}	Confidentiality Algorithms	No: For AES operations performed by the TSF.  No: For AES operations performed by third party where the API allows specification of the AES cipher type	Section 5.2.6
FCS_COP.1(2) {MDF}	Hashing Algorithms	No: For hash operations performed by the TSF for TLS.  Yes: For hash operations performed for VPN  No: For hash operations performed by third party where the API allows specification of the hash cipher type.	Section 5.2.3

SFR ID	Function Description	Configurable?	Related Section
FCS_COP.1(3) {MDF}	Signature Algorithms	No: For signature operations performed by TSF.  No: For signature operations performed by third party where the API allows specification of the hash cipher type.	Section 5.2.1
FCS_COP.1(4) {MDF}	Keyed Hash Algorithms	No: For HMAC operations performed by TSF  No: For HMAC operations performed by third party where the API allows specification of the hash cipher type.	Section 5.2.3
FCS_COP.1(5) {MDF}	Password-Based Key Derivation Functions	No: Generation and maintenance of PBKDF is hard coded.	N/A
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 {MDF} {AGENT}	HTTPS protocol	No: The used HTTPS cipher suite is defined by the HTTPS server where all cipher suites listed in the [IOS_ST] and the [IPADOS_ST] are always available.	Section 5.3.2
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 {VPN}	IPsec	Yes	Section 5.3.5, Section 5.3.3
FCS_IV_EXT.1 {MDF}	Initialization Vector Generation	No: Generation and maintenance of IVs is hard coded.	N/A
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 {MDF} (Kernel and User space and SEP iterations.)	Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)	No: Generation of random numbers is hard coded.	Section 5.2.4
FCS_SRV_EXT.1 {MDF}	Cryptographic Algorithm Services	No	Section 5.2
FCS_STG_EXT.1 {MDF}	Secure Key Storage	No	Section 5.6.13

SFR ID	Function Description	Configurable?	Related Section
FCS_STG_EXT.2 {MDF} {VPN}	Encrypted Cryptographic Key Storage  DEK and KEK encryption	No: Generation and maintenance of DEK and KEK is hard coded.	N/A
FCS_STG_EXT.3 {MDF}	Integrity of Encrypted Key Storage	No: Generation and maintenance of DEK and KEK is hard coded.	N/A
FCS_STG_EXT.4 {AGENT}	Cryptographic Key Storage	No	N/A
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 {MDF}	TLS Protocol	Yes	Section 5.3.2
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1/WLAN {WLAN}	Extensible Authentication Protocol-Transport Layer Security (EAP- TLS)	No: Used TLS cipher suites are defined by the TLS server where all cipher suites listed in the [IOS_ST] and the [IPADOS_ST] are always available. The API of the third-party application defines specific TLS protocol rules.	Section 5.3.1
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 {MDF}	TLS Protocol	No	Section 5.3.2
FDP_ACF_EXT.1 {MDF}	Security Access Control	No: Access control settings are hard coded.	Section 5.4.2
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 {MDF}	Protected Data Encryption	No: Data is always encrypted. TSF is hard coded to use the appropriate data protection levels based on classes.  External storage must be formatted in the AFPS format with encrypted volumes. Unencrypted external storage is not allowed in the evaluated configuration.	Section 5.4

SFR ID	Function Description	Configurable?	Related Section
FDP_DAR_EXT.2 {MDF}	Sensitive Data Encryption	No: Data is always encrypted. TSF is hard coded to use the appropriate data protection level based on classes.  External storage must be formatted in the AFPS format with encrypted volumes. Unencrypted external storage is not allowed in the evaluated configuration.	Section 5.4
FDP_IFC_EXT.1 {MDF} {VPN}	Subset Information Flow Control	Yes	Section 5.3.5, Section 5.3.3
FDP_PBA_EXT.1 {MDF}	Storage of Critical Biometric Parameters	No	N/A
FDP_RIP.2 {VPN}	Full Residual Information Protection	No	N/A
FDP_STG_EXT.1 {MDF}	User Data Storage	No: The trust anchor database maintenance is hard coded. The mobile device administrator can add/remove their own Anchors of Trust to/from that database.	Section 5.5.6
FDP_UPC_EXT.1 {MDF}	Inter-TSF User Data Transfer Protection	Yes: Depending on the protocol used, configuration is possible (e.g., IPsec) while other options are not configurable (e.g., Bluetooth)	FTP_ITC_EXT.1 (Section 5.3) FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 (Section 5.3.2) FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 (Section 5.3.5) FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 (Section 5.3.2)
FIA_AFL_EXT.1 {MDF}	Authentication Failure Handling	Yes	Section 5.5.4

SFR ID	Function Description	Configurable?	Related Section
FIA_BLT_EXT.1 {MDF}	Bluetooth User Authorization	No: The Bluetooth protocol allows different types of authorization which are supported by the mobile device. The used authorization type depends on the remote device capability.	Section 5.3.4
FIA_BLT_EXT.2 {MDF}	Bluetooth Mutual Authentication	No: Bluetooth mutual authentication is required prior to data transfer.	Section 5.3.4
FIA_BLT_EXT.3 {MDF}	Rejection of Duplicate Bluetooth Connections	No: No mobile device can establish duplicative Bluetooth connections.	N/A
FIA_BLT_EXT.4 {MDF}	Secure Simple Pairing	No: Secure simple pairing cannot be disabled.	Section 5.3.4
FIA_BMG_EXT.1 {MDF}	Accuracy of Biometric Authentication	No	N/A
FIA_BMG_EXT.2 {MDF}	Biometric Enrollment	No	Section 5.5.3
FIA_BMG_EXT.3 {MDF}	Biometric Verification	No	Section 5.5.3
FIA_BMG_EXT.5 {MDF}	Handling Unusual Biometric Templates	No	N/A
FIA_ENR_EXT.2 {AGENT}	Enrollment of Mobile Device into Management	Yes	Section 4.3.1
FIA_PAE_EXT.1 {WLAN}	Port Access Entity (PAE) Authentication	No: The WLAN protocol is implemented according to IEEE 802.11 2012.	N/A
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 {MDF}	Password Management	Yes	Section 5.5.1
FIA_TRT_EXT.1 {MDF}	Authentication Throttling	No: The authentication delay is hard coded.	N/A



SFR ID	Function Description	Configurable?	Related Section
FIA_UAU.5.1 {MDF}	Multiple Authentication Mechanisms	Yes	Section 5.5
FIA_UAU.5.2 {MDF}	Multiple Authentication Mechanisms	Yes	Section 5.5
FIA_UAU.6(1) {MDF}	Re-Authentication	No: Users must be re-authenticated before any changes to the password authentication factor can be made.	Section 5.5.5
FIA_UAU.6(2) {MDF}	Re-Authentication (Locked)	No	Section 5.5.5
FIA_UAU.7 {MDF}	Protected Authentication Feedback	No: Enabled by default.	Section 5.5.2
FIA_UAU_EXT.1 {MDF}	Authentication for Cryptographic Operations	Yes: The mobile device user must set a passphrase to enable authentication token protection.	Section 5.5.1
FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1 {MDF}	Timing of Authentication	No	Section 5.6.2
FIA_UAU_EXT.2.2 {MDF}	Timing of Authentication	No	Section 5.6.2
FIA_X509_EXT.1 {MDF}	Validation of Certificates	No: The certificate validation rules are hard coded.	N/A
FIA_X509_EXT.1/WLAN {WLAN}	X509 Certificate Validation (EAP-TLS)	Yes	Section 5.3, Section 5.5.6
FIA_X509_EXT.2 {MDF} {VPN}	X509 Certificate Authentication	Yes: The certificates required for authentication must be provided.  Note that some root certificates are provided in the Apple Trust store.	Section 5.3, 5.5.6

SFR ID	Function Description	Configurable?	Related Section
FIA_X509_EXT.2/WLAN {WLAN}	X509 Certificate Authentication (EAP-TLS)	Yes	Section 5.5.6
FIA_X509_EXT.3 {MDF} {AGENT}	Request Validation of Certificates	No: The API is provided with certificate validation rules hard coded.	Section 5.5.6
FMT_MOF_EXT.1 {MDF}	Management of Security Functions Behavior	Yes	Section 3.8
FMT_POL_EXT.2 {AGENT}	Trusted Policy Update	No	N/A
FMT_SMF_EXT.1 {MDF}	Specification of Management Functions	Yes	Section 3.8
FMT_SMF_EXT.1/ WLAN {WLAN}	Specification of Management Functions (WLAN)	Yes	Section 3.8
FMT_SMF.1/VPN1 {VPN}	Specification of Management Functions (VPN)	Yes	Section 3.8
FMT_SMF_EXT.2 {MDF}	Specification of Remediation Actions	Yes	Section 4.3.4, 5.4.3
FMT_SMF_EXT.4 {AGENT}	Specification of Management Functions (Agent)	No	N/A
FMT_UNR_EXT.1 {AGENT}	User Unenrollment Prevention	Yes	Section 4.3.4
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 {MDF}	Anti-Exploitation Services (ASLR)	No: The service is hard coded.	N/A
FPT_AEX_EXT.2 {MDF}	Anti-Exploitation Services (Memory Page Permissions)	No: The service is hard coded.	N/A
FPT_AEX_EXT.3 {MDF}	Anti-Exploitation Services (Overflow Protection)	No: The service is hard coded.	N/A
FPT_AEX_EXT.4 {MDF}	Domain Isolation	No: The service is hard coded.	N/A

SFR ID	Function Description	Configurable?	Related Section
FPT_JTA_EXT.1 {MDF}	JTAG Disablement	No: JTAG interfaces are not present on iOS/iPadOS devices.	N/A
FPT_KST_EXT.1 {MDF}	Key Storage	No: Keys are stored in secure enclave or in key chain. Wrapped keys are stored in Effaceable Storage.	N/A
FPT_KST_EXT.2 {MDF}	No Key Transmission	No: Keys are stored in secure enclave or in key chain.	N/A
FPT_KST_EXT.3 {MDF}	No Plaintext Key Export	No: Keys are stored in secure enclave that does not provide key export facility. The mobile device does not export keys stored in key chain.	N/A
FPT_NOT_EXT.1 {MDF}	Self-Test Notification	No	N/A
FPT_STM.1 {MDF}	Reliable Time Stamps	Yes	Section 5.6.4
FPT_TST_EXT.1 {MDF} {AGENT}	TSF Cryptographic Functionality Testing	No	Section 5.2
FPT_TST_EXT.1/VPN {VPN}	TSF Self-Test (VPN)	No	Section 5.2
FPT_TST_EXT.1/ WLAN {WLAN}	TSF Cryptographic Functionality Testing (WLAN)	No	Section 5.2
FPT_TST_EXT.2 {MDF}	TSF Integrity Testing	No	N/A
FPT_TST_EXT.3 {MDF}	TSF Integrity Testing	No	Section 5.5.6
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 {MDF} {VPN}	Trusted Update: TSF Version Query	No	N/A
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 {MDF}	Trusted Update Verification	No	N/A
FPT_TUD_EXT.3 {MDF}	Trusted Update Verification	No	Section 5.6.10
FPT_TUD_EXT.4 {MDF}	Trusted Update Verification	No	Section 5.6.10

SFR ID	Function Description	Configurable?	Related Section
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 {MDF}	TSF and User-initiated Locked State	Yes	Section 5.6.3
FTA_TAB.1 {MDF}	Default TOE Access Banners	Yes	Section 5.6.5
FTA_WSE_EXT.1 {WLAN}	Wireless Network Access	Yes	Section 5.6.7
FTP_ITC_EXT.1(1) {VPN}	Trusted Channel Communication	Yes	Section 5.3
FTP_ITC_EXT.1(2) {AGENT} {MDF}	Trusted Channel Communication	Yes	Section 5.3
FTP_ITC_EXT.1/WLAN (3) {WLAN}	Trusted Channel Communication	Yes	Section 5.3
FTP_TRP.1(2) {AGENT}	Trusted Path (for Enrollment)	Yes	Section 2.3

Table 4: SFR Configuration Requirements

### 3.8 Security Management Configuration

In the evaluated configuration, the mobile devices perform the management functions listed in Table 5: Required Mobile Device Management Functions.

These management functions can be managed either by the mobile device user or by an authorized mobile device administrator (marked by 'X')

In addition, the Provided Guidance column references the section(s) in this document where guidance can be found to perform the respective management function. The management function values in parenthesis (e.g., F1, F2) in the following table correspond to the function values specified in the [IOS\_ST] and the [IPADOS\_ST] Table 5 and include the additional management functions specific to Wi-Fi and VPN management functionality also given in the [IOS\_ST] and the [IPADOS\_ST].

Management Function	Restricted to the User	Administrator	Restricted to the Administrator	Provided Guidance
Configure password policy (F1)	-	X	X	Section 5.5.1
Configure session locking policy (F2)	-	X	X	Sections 5.6.3

Management Function	Restricted to the User	Administrator	Restricted to the Administrator	Provided Guidance
Enable/disable the VPN protection (F3)	-	X	X	Sections 5.3.5
Enable/disable Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, cellular radio, NFC, UWB (F4)	X	-	-	Section 5.6.7
Enable/disable cameras (F5)	X	X	-	Section 5.6.6
Enable/disable microphones (F5)	X	X	-	Section 5.6.6
Transition to the locked state (F6)	-	X	-	Section 5.6.3
TSF wipe of protected data (F7)	-	X	-	Section 5.4.3
Configure application installation policy by denying installation of applications (F8)	-	X	X	Section 5.6.12
Import keys/secrets into the secure key storage (F9)	-	X	-	Section 5.2.5
Destroy imported keys/secrets and no other keys/secrets in the secure key storage (F10)	-	X	-	Section 5.2.5

Management Function	Restricted to the User	Administrator	Restricted to the Administrator	Provided Guidance
Import X.509v3 certificates in the Trust Anchor Database (F11)	-	X	X	Section 5.5.6
Remove imported X509v3 certificates and no other X509v3 certificates in the Trust Anchor Database (F12)	X	X	-	Section 5.5.6
Enroll the mobile device in management (F13)	X	-	-	Section 4.3.1
Remove applications (F14)	-	X	X	Section 5.6.1
Update system software (F15)	-	X	-	Section 5.6
Install applications (F16)	-	X	X	Section 5.6.1
Remove Enterprise applications (F17)	-	X	-	Section 5.6.1
Configure the Bluetooth trusted channel <sup>1</sup> (F18)	X	-	-	Section 5.6.7
Enable/disable display notifications in the locked state of all notifications (F19)	X	X	-	Section 5.6.2
Enable data-at-rest protection (F20)	-	-	-	Section 5.4.1

<sup>1</sup> There is no configuration for the Bluetooth trusted channel. It is secure by default.

Management Function	Restricted to the User	Administrator	Restricted to the Administrator	Provided Guidance
Enable removable media's data-at-rest protection (F21)	-	X	X	Section 5.4.1
Enable/disable location services (across device and on a per-app basis) (F22)	X	X	-	Section 5.6.8
Enable/disable the use of Biometric Authentication Factor (F23)	-	X	X	Section 5.5.3
Wipe Enterprise data (F28)	-	X	-	Section 5.4.3
Configure whether to establish a trusted channel or disallow establishment if the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate (F30)	-	X	-	Section 5.5.6
Configure certificate used to validate digital signature on application (F33)	-	X	X	Sections 5.5.6
Configure the unlock banner (F36)	-	X	X	Section 5.6.5
Configure the auditable items (F37)	-	X	-	Section 6.3
Enable/disable the Always On VPN protection (F45)	-	X	X	Section 5.3.5

Management Function	Restricted to the User	Administrator	Restricted to the Administrator	Provided Guidance
Configure security policy for Wi-Fi network (in FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1/WLAN {WLAN})	-	X	X	Section 5.3.6
Specify CA to accept certificates from (in FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1/WLAN {WLAN})	-	X	X	Section 5.3.6
Specify Wi-Fi security type (in FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1/WLAN {WLAN})	-	X	X	Section 5.3.6
Specify authentication protocol for Wi-Fi (in FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1/WLAN {WLAN})	-	X	X	Section 5.3.6
Specify client credentials used for Wi-Fi authentication (in FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1/WLAN {WLAN})	-	X	X	Section 5.3.6
Specify IPsec-capable network devices to use for connection (in FMT_SMF.1/VPN {VPN})	-	X	X	Section 5.3.6
Specify client credentials for VPN connection (in FMT_SMF.1/VPN {VPN})	-	X	X	Section 5.3.6
Configure the reference identifier of the peer (in FMT_SMF.1/VPN {VPN})	-	X	X	Section 5.3.6
Configure IKE protocol versions used (in FMT_SMF.1/VPN {VPN})	-	X	X	Section 5.3.6
Configure IKE authentication techniques used (in FMT_SMF.1/VPN {VPN})	-	X	X	Section 5.3.6



Management Function	Restricted to the User	Administrator	Restricted to the Administrator	Provided Guidance
Configure cryptoperiod for established session keys (in FMT_SMF.1/VPN {VPN})	-	X	X	Section 5.3.6
Configure certificate revocation check (in FMT_SMF.1/VPN {VPN})	-	X	X	Section 5.3.6
Configure algorithm suites used during IPsec exchanges (in FMT_SMF.1/VPN {VPN})	-	X	X	Section 5.3.6
Load X.509v3 certificate for VPN security functions (in FMT_SMF.1/VPN {VPN})	-	X	X	Section 5.3.6
Update TOE and verify updates (in FMT_SMF.1/VPN {VPN})	-	X	X	Section 5.3.6

*Table 5: Required Mobile Device Management Functions*

### 3.9 Un-evaluated Functionalities

The following security functionalities were not evaluated and are therefore not included in the secure configuration of the mobile devices.

#### 3.9.1 Two-Factor Authentication

Two-factor authentication is an extra layer of security for an Apple ID used in the Apple store, iCloud and other Apple services. It is designed to enhance the security on these on-line Apple accounts.

This feature is outside the scope of the evaluation.

#### 3.9.2 Bonjour

Bonjour is Apple's standards-based, zero configuration network protocol that lets devices find services on a network.

This feature is outside the scope of the evaluation.

#### 3.9.3 VPN Split Tunnel

VPN split tunnel is not included in the evaluation and must be disabled in the mobile device configurations meeting the requirements of this CC evaluation.

While VPN split tunnel is not included, in the evaluated configuration the VPN must be in its Always-On configuration. See section 5.3.5 VPN Configuration for more information.

### **3.9.4 Siri Interface**

The Siri interface supports some commands related to configuration settings.

This feature is not included in the evaluation and must be disabled in the mobile device configurations that meet the requirements of this CC evaluation.

### **3.9.5 Shared iPad for education**

Apple offers the ability to configure the iPad devices for multiple users. This configuration was not included in the evaluation and must not be used in the mobile device configurations that meet the requirements of this CC evaluation.

### **3.9.6 Third-party MDM Agents**

Some third-party applications are available that provide functionality as a mobile device MDM Agent. No third-party MDM Agent applications were included in the evaluation and are outside the scope of the evaluated configuration.

### **3.9.7 VPN Protocols and Authentication Methods**

The following Virtual Private Network (VPN) protocols are not included in the evaluation and must be disabled in the mobile device configurations that meet the requirements of this CC evaluation.

- Cisco IPsec
- Layer Two Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) over IPsec
- Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) VPN
- Shared secret authentication

## 4 Secure Delivery and Installation

### 4.1 Prerequisites

Prior to deploying the mobile device(s) onto the network, an MDM solution must be architected and deployed. The MDM solution will support the mobile device administrator in configuring and managing the mobile devices. There are various MDM solutions that can be used to achieve this.

A VPN gateway supporting IPsec and the necessary VPN settings discussed below must be architected and deployed. The VPN infrastructure will support secure communication with the devices. If the devices will be utilizing x509 certificates for authenticating to the VPN connection then a public key infrastructure (PKI) system will need to be deployed by the organization which includes a certificate authority (CA) trusted both by the VPN gateway and the device, and an Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responder or published certificate revocation list (CRL) to service revocation checking requests.

### 4.2 Secure Delivery of the Devices

The evaluated mobile devices are intended for authorized mobile device users of entities such as business organizations and government agencies.

The mobile device administrator of the devices is responsible for performing the necessary configuration to ensure that the mobile devices are configured as specified by the evaluation.

#### 4.2.1 Obtaining the mobile device(s)

To obtain a device listed in Table 2 and Table 3, follow the directions for the distribution channel that best fits your situation.

The normal distribution channels for obtaining these devices include the following.

- The Apple Store (either a physical store or online at <https://apple.com>)
- Apple retailers
- Service carriers (e.g., AT&T, Verizon)
- Resellers

#### Business specific distribution channel

There is a distinct online store for Business customers with a link from the "Apple Store" to Apple and Business: (<https://www.apple.com/business/>). Additionally, the following link to "Shop for Business" is provided (<https://www.apple.com/retail/business/>).

#### Government specific distribution channel

Government customers can use the link: <https://www.apple.com/r/store/government/>.

#### Additional

Large customers can have their own Apple Store Catalog for their employees to purchase devices directly from Apple under their corporate employee purchase program.

#### 4.2.2 Verifying the device(s)

When the mobile devices are received, the model number of the devices should be verified to ensure that the model number is one of those listed in Table 2 and Table 3. This can be accomplished using any of the following methods.

- Physically checking the back of the mobile devices.
- Once authenticated to the mobile device, the information is available to mobile device users in [Settings » General » About](#) under “Model Number”.
- Mobile device administrators can query the mobile devices using the Mobile Device Management (MDM) protocol described in [MDM\_SETTINGS]. The Results Payload from the mobile device provides the requested information.

The iOS/iPadOS version of the devices, which must be a version of iOS/iPadOS 14, should also be verified. This can be accomplished using either of the following methods.

- A mobile device user can obtain information about the iOS/iPadOS software on the mobile device by following the instructions in the [iPad\_UG] section [“Get information about your iPhone”](#) and in the [iPhone\_UG] section [“Get information about your iPad”](#).
- Mobile device administrators can query the mobile devices using the MDM protocol described in [MDM\_SETTINGS]. The Results Payload from the mobile device provides the requested information.

### 4.3 Mobile Device Supervision and Configuration

In order to ensure that the devices are configured in a way that meets the requirements of this Common Criteria evaluation, the devices must be placed under management (supervised mode).

Once in supervised mode, the mobile devices are typically managed using an MDM solution. The process for doing this will vary based on the MDM solution chosen by the organization deploying the devices and it is up to the mobile device administrator to determine the detailed steps as they apply to the organization’s chosen MDM solution. The mobile devices are configured through the use of Configuration Profiles that are specified by the mobile device administrator and deployed to the mobile devices.

#### 4.3.1 Mobile Device Enrollment into Management Configuration

iOS/iPadOS natively includes an MDM agent. Mobile device users and/or device administrators can enroll the mobile device in management. Information for enrolling the mobile device is provided in the section [“Configuration and management”](#) → [“Mobile device management \(MDM\)”](#) of the [DeployRef].

The MDM server identity is provided to the mobile device by sending an MDM payload in a Configuration Profile. Examples of Configuration Profiles can be found in [Appendix: Configuration Profiles](#).

The methods by which the mobile device can be enrolled for management are as follows.

- The Apple Business Manager (ABM), which provides an automated and enforced method of automatically enrolling new devices
- Using Apple's Profile Manager, which provides a manual method of enrolling mobile devices
- Using the Apple Configurator 2, which provides both automated and manual methods of enrolling mobile devices
- Using Email or a Website, which provides a way to distribute an enrollment profile to a mobile device

#### *4.3.1.1 Apple Business Manager*

For the Apple Business Manager (ABM), each MDM server must be registered with Apple at the ABM management portal which is made available by Apple at <https://business.apple.com>.

The ABM provides details about the server entity to identify it uniquely throughout the organization deploying the MDM server. Each server can be identified by either its system-generated universally unique identifier (UUID) or by a user-provided name assigned by one of the organization's users. Both the UUID and server name must be unique within the organization.

The organization assigns iOS/iPadOS devices to Apple's virtual MDM server using either Apple order numbers or device serial numbers. When the iOS/iPadOS device is powered on, the mobile device will automatically connect to the virtual MDM server during setup and will be assigned to the MDM server specified in the MDM payload sent by the virtual MDM server to the iOS/iPadOS device.

During the mobile device enrollment, the MDM enrollment service returns a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) dictionary to the mobile device with the keys shown in Table 6: Essential MDM Payload.

Additional information on the ABM is provided in the [ABM\_Guide]. Additional information on managing mobile devices is provided in [MDM\_SETTINGS] and [DEV\_MAN].

#### *4.3.1.2 Apple Profile Manager*

For enrolling a device using Apple's Profile Manager, see the "[Mobile Device Management](#)" section of [PM\_Help].

#### *4.3.1.3 Apple Configurator*

For enrolling a device using the Apple Configurator 2, see the "[Prepare iOS and iPadOS devices automatically](#)", "[Automated device enrollment](#)" and "[Prepare devices manually](#)" sections of [AConfig].

#### 4.3.1.4 Other Methods

Other methods of enrollment may be specific to the MDM application being used by a deploying organization. In general, the Configuration Profile is made available to the mobile device often through a link provided on a website, or by email to the mobile device user. Once the mobile device user clicks the link the enrollment process is started.

### 4.3.2 Mobile Device Configuration

Many aspects of the security functionality of the mobile devices are configured using Configuration Profiles that are installed on the mobile devices. Configuration Profiles are Extensible Markup Language (XML) files that allow the distribution of configuration information to mobile devices. They may contain settings for a number of configurable parameters on the mobile device.

Configuration Profiles can be deployed in any one of the following ways.

- Using the Apple Configurator 2 tool, available from the Apple Store
- Via an email message
- Via a web page
- Using over-the-air configuration
- Using over the air configuration via a MDM application

iOS/iPadOS supports using encryption to protect the contents of Configuration Profiles, and Configuration Profiles can also be signed to guarantee data integrity.

Within a Configuration Profile, various Keys are used to specify the desired configuration. These are organized by topic into groups called “Payloads.”

Detailed information on Configuration Profiles is given in the Device Management [DEV\_MAN] and information on some of the Configuration Profiles used in this configuration guide can be found in [Appendix: Configuration Profiles](#).

The following mandatory configurations must be configured using Configuration Profiles.

### 4.3.3 Configure MDM Agent and MDM Communications

MDM Agent-Server communication is achieved securely using the MDM protocol which is built on top of HTTP, transport layer security (TLS), and push notifications that use HTTP PUT over TLS (secure sockets layer (SSL)). A managed mobile device uses an identity to authenticate itself to the MDM server over TLS (SSL). This identity can be included in the profile as a Certificate Payload or can be generated by enrolling the mobile device with Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP).

The MDM Agent communications uses the iOS/iPadOS Security Framework as described in section 5.3.2 TLS Configuration. Configuring the device’s TLS protocol automatically configures the MDM Agent communications. If an additional CA certificate needs to be added to support the MDM Server, see section 5.3.2.3.

#### 4.3.4 Device Un-enrollment Prevention

During the enrollment process, a Configuration Profile including an MDM Payload is loaded onto the mobile device and used to associate the mobile device to an MDM Server. If the MDM Payload is removed, the mobile device will no longer be enrolled with the MDM server and can no longer be considered to be in the evaluated configuration.

As described in [DEV\_MAN], the mobile device administrator can specify the *PayloadRemovalDisallowed* key to allow or disallow the ability of a mobile device user to remove the MDM Payload from the device.

The mobile device must be in Supervised Mode to lock the MDM Payload to the device.

An MDM Payload can have a removal password associated with it. If the *PayloadRemovalDisallowed* key is set to prevent unenrollment and the MDM Payload has a removal password associated with it, the mobile device user can unenroll the mobile device only if the mobile device user knows the removal password.

#### 4.3.5 MDM Agent Alerts

The iOS/iPadOS MDM Agent generates and sends an alert in response to an MDM server request for applying a Configuration Profile and in response to receiving a reachability event. These responses are always enabled.

When the application of a Configuration Profile to a mobile device is successful, the MDM Agent replies with an MDM Result Payload with Status value "Acknowledged".

When the application of a Configuration Profile is unsuccessful, the MDM Agent replies with an MDM Result Payload with *Status* value "Error" or *CommandFormatError*, "Idle" and "NotNow".

When a reachability event is received by the iOS/iPadOS MDM Agent, the MDM Agent replies with an MDM Result Payload to acknowledge that the mobile device received the event.

More information on the MDM Result Payloads is found in [MDM\_SETTINGS] and [DEV\_MAN].

#### 4.3.6 The MDM Payload

The Mobile Device Management (MDM) Payload, a simple property list, is designated by the com.apple.mdm value in the PayloadType field.

Payload	Key	Setting
MDM	<i>PayloadRemovalDisallowed</i>	Must be set to true
MDM	<i>AccessRights</i>	Must be set to a value that includes the logical OR with "8".

**Table 6: Essential MDM Payload keys for the evaluated configuration**

## 5 Mobile Device Configuration

This section provides more detailed guidance to configure the supervised mobile devices in the way that conforms to the requirements of the CC evaluation.

This section provides details of the dictionary key values that must be used, or where certain options for the key value are not allowed, in order to meet the requirements of the evaluated configuration described in the [IOS\_ST] and the [IPADOS\_ST].

For dictionary keys not mentioned in this document, please refer to the deploying organization's security policies.

### 5.1 General Restrictions

#### 5.1.1 Keys for General Restrictions

Payload	Key	Description
Restrictions	<i>allowAssistant</i>	Must be set to 'false'. (Siri is not allowed in the evaluated configuration.)
Restrictions	<i>allowAssistantUserGeneratedContent</i>	Must be set to 'false'. (Siri is not allowed in the evaluated configuration.)
Restrictions	<i>allowAssistantWhileLocked</i>	Must be set to 'false'. (Siri is not allowed in the evaluated configuration.)
Restrictions	<i>allowLockScreenControlCenter</i>	Must be set to 'false'.
Restrictions	<i>allowEnablingRestrictions</i>	Must be set to 'false'.
Restrictions	<i>allowUSBRestrictedMode</i>	Must be set to 'true'.

*Table 7: Essential keys in the Restrictions Payload*

### 5.2 Cryptographic Support Functions

The mobile devices include three cryptographic modules that provide the cryptographic services via the following three cryptographic modules.

- Apple corecrypto Module v11.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software] (User Space)
- Apple corecrypto Module v11.0 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] (Kernel Space)
- Apple corecrypto Module v11.0 [Apple silicon, Secure Key Store, Hardware]

**Warning:** The use of other cryptographic engines beyond those listed above was neither evaluated nor tested during the mobile device's Common Criteria evaluation.



The approved mode of operation for these cryptographic modules is configured by default and cannot be changed by the mobile device user or administrator. If the mobile device starts up successfully, then the modules have passed all self-tests and are operating in the approved mode.

## **5.2.1 Key Generation, Signature Generation and Verification**

### *5.2.1.1 General information*

The mobile devices generate the following asymmetric keys.

- Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) with key sizes of 2048 bits or greater
- Elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC) with NIST curves P-256 and P-384, with key sizes of 256 bits and 384 bits respectively
- ECC curve 25519, with a key size of 256 bits
- Finite-field cryptography (FFC) with key sizes of 2048 bits or greater

### *5.2.1.2 Mobile device users*

For the evaluated configuration, no configuration is required from the mobile device user.

### *5.2.1.3 Mobile device administrators*

For the evaluated configuration, no configuration is required from the mobile device administrator.

## **5.2.2 Key Establishment**

### *5.2.2.1 General information*

The mobile devices use the following for key establishment.

- RSA-based scheme
- ECC-based scheme
- Diffie-Hellman (DH)-based scheme

Key establishment is used for TLS and IKE.

### *5.2.2.2 Mobile device users*

For the evaluated configuration, no configuration is required from the mobile device user.

### *5.2.2.3 Mobile device administrators*

For the evaluated configuration, no configuration is required from the mobile device administrator.

## 5.2.3 Hashing

### 5.2.3.1 General information

The mobile devices perform the hash functions secure hash algorithm (SHA)-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 with message digest sizes 160, 256, 384, and 512 bits.

Functions to perform hashing are provided as part of the Apple corecrypto libraries. The invoking function dictates which SHA function is used. Neither the mobile device user nor the mobile device administrator has the ability to configure this choice.

Similarly, each TLS ciphersuite uses a specific and appropriate SHA function. Neither the mobile device user nor the mobile device administrator has the ability to configure this choice.

### 5.2.3.2 Mobile device users

For the evaluated configuration, no configuration is required from the mobile device user.

### 5.2.3.3 Mobile device administrators

For VPN connections with IKEv2, the integrity algorithm to be used is selectable by the mobile device administrator by setting the *IntegrityAlgorithm* key in the VPN payload. Note that setting *IntegrityAlgorithm* to 'SHA1-96' is not allowed in the evaluated configuration.

## 5.2.4 Random Number Generation

### 5.2.4.1 General information

For random bit generation, the mobile devices use a deterministic random bit generator (DRBG), seeded by an internal entropy source. That source accumulates entropy from software-based noise, and seeds the DRBG with a minimum of 256 bits of entropy.

### 5.2.4.2 Mobile device users

For the evaluated configuration, no configuration is required from the mobile device user.

### 5.2.4.3 Mobile device administrators

For the evaluated configuration, no configuration is required from the mobile device administrator.

## 5.2.5 Keys/Secrets Import/Destruction

### 5.2.5.1 General information

Cryptographic keys are stored in keychains. In iOS/iPadOS, an application only has access to its own keychain items, so access restrictions are automatically satisfied.

The "Keychain Services Programming Guide" [KEYCHAINPG] describes how keychain items are created, managed, and deleted.

### 5.2.5.2 Mobile device users

For the evaluated configuration, no configuration is required from the mobile device user.

### 5.2.5.3 Mobile device administrators

For the evaluated configuration, no configuration is required from the mobile device administrator.

## 5.2.6 Keys for Configuring Cryptographic Functions

This section provides details of dictionary key values which must be used, or which are not allowed to be used in order to meet the requirements of the evaluated configuration described in the [IOS\_ST] and the [IPADOS\_ST].

Payload	Key	Description
VPN	<i>EncryptionAlgorithm</i>	May be set to one of the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>'AES-128'</li> <li>'AES-256' (Default)</li> <li>'AES-128-GCM' (16-octet ICV)</li> <li>'AES-256-GCM' (16-octet ICV)</li> </ul> 'DES' and '3DES' are not allowed in the evaluated configuration. Note that 'AES-128' and 'AES-256' use the CBC mode of operation.
VPN	<i>IntegrityAlgorithm</i>	May be set to one of the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>'SHA1-160'</li> <li>'SHA2-256' (Default)</li> <li>'SHA2-384'</li> <li>'SHA2-512'</li> </ul> 'SHA1-96' is not allowed in the evaluated configuration.
VPN	<i>DiffieHellmanGroup</i>	Set to one of the following: '5', '14', '15', '19', or '20'.

**Table 8: Essential keys for Configuring Cryptographic Functions**

## 5.3 Network Protocols

### 5.3.1 EAP-TLS Configuration

#### 5.3.1.1 General information

For Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)-TLS, iOS/iPadOS implements TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, and TLS 1.2 supporting the cipher suites listed in Table 9: EAP-TLS Ciphersuites.

In the evaluated configuration, the mobile devices must use only the EAP-TLS cipher suites.

Ciphersuite Name
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256

**Table 9: EAP-TLS Ciphersuites**

No additional configuration is needed for the automatic recovery of a broken Wi-Fi connection.

#### 5.3.1.2 Mobile device user

For the evaluated configuration, no configuration is required from the mobile device user.

#### 5.3.1.3 Mobile device administrator

The cipher suites in Table 9: EAP-TLS Ciphersuites above are automatically selected by the mobile devices (i.e., the mobile devices do not support the individual selection of EAP-TLS cipher suites) when Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)-EAP is configured via Configuration Profile as follows.

- *EncryptionType* key must be set to 'WPA2'.
- *AcceptEAPTypes* key must be set to '13', the value representing EAP-TLS.

Because the evaluation of the mobile devices included TLS versions 1.0, 1.1, and 1.2, setting the *TLSMinimumVersion* and *TLSMaximumVersion* keys is a matter for the deploying organization's policy. These keys configure the minimum and maximum TLS versions to be used with EAP-TLS authentication. The default minimum value is '1.0' and the default maximum value is '1.2'.

### 5.3.2 TLS Configuration

#### 5.3.2.1 General information

TLS is provided by the APIs of the iOS/iPadOS Security Framework, which uses the Apple corecrypto Module v11.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software].

The library implements TLS 1.0, 1.1, and 1.2 supporting the cipher suites listed in Table 10: TLS Ciphersuites. In the evaluated configuration, only TLS 1.2 is supported. The [IOS\_ST] and the [IPADOS\_ST] limits the cipher suites used by TLS connections in the evaluated configuration.

The supported cipher suites below are automatically selected by the mobile devices (i.e., the devices do not support the individual selection of TLS cipher suites). The TLS cipher suites available are defined by the TLS server where all cipher suites listed in the [IOS\_ST] and the [IPADOS\_ST] are always available. Thus, no additional configuration is required by the administrator.

Ciphersuite Name
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384

**Table 10: TLS Ciphersuites**

There are some trusted root certificates that are preinstalled with iOS/iPadOS in a Trust Anchor Database to establish a chain of trust. These certificates are automatically trusted, and do not need to be included when creating a Configuration Profile. A list of iOS/iPadOS trusted root certificates can be found at [TRUST\_STORE].

There are also blocked and always-ask certificates in the Trust Anchor Database. Blocked certificates are believed to be compromised and are never trusted. Always-ask certificates prompt the user whether they want to trust the certificate. Lists of these certificates can also be found at [TRUST\_STORE].

### 5.3.2.2 Mobile device users

For the evaluated configuration, no configuration is required from the mobile device user.

### 5.3.2.3 Mobile device administrators

## TLS/HTTPS Configuration

The mobile device must be configured to automatically reject untrusted HTTPS certificates rather than prompting the user to ask whether to accept it. This is done by setting the *allowUntrustedTLSPrompt* key to 'false' in the Restrictions Payload.

Some restrictions must be placed on AirPrint to ensure that it both only uses TLS, and only uses trusted certificates for TLS communication. This is done by setting both the *ForceTLS* key in the AirPrint Payload and the *forceAirPrintTrustedTLSRequirement* key in the Restrictions Payload to 'true'.

The mobile device administrator must also configure the *TLSTrustedServerNames* and *PayloadCertificateAnchorUUID* dictionary keys in the Wi-Fi Payload EAPClientConfiguration Dictionary such that they specify which server certificate common names and certificates will be accepted by the mobile device.

### Reference Identifier Configuration

Mobile device administrators can use the functions of the Certificate, Key, and Trust Services [CKTSREF] API to manage and manipulate certificates.

The iOS/iPadOS device implements a set of X.509 policy checks that cannot be altered. If an application wants to enforce additional checks, it can use the API detailed in [CKTSREF].

When interpreting the term "reference identifier" as the name of the remote peer whose certificate should be validated, the TOE TLS and IKE stacks set the FQDN of the remote peer with the X.509 protocol checker. This operation is hard-coded and cannot be influenced by the user via any API when using TLS or IKE.

Guidance documentation for setting additional constraints in validating an X.509 certificate can be specified with the rule definitions in the "[Security Policy Keys](#)" section of the "[Policies](#)" chapter in [CKTSREF].

### Certificate Authority (CA) Configuration

Additional CAs can be added to the mobile device by using a Configuration Profile with the *EAPClientConfiguration* dictionary, and the *PayloadCertificateAnchorUUID* and, *TLSTrustedServerNames* dictionary keys in the Wi-Fi Payload.

### Client Certificate Configuration

A client certificate with its keys can be installed on the mobile device using a Certificate payload in the Configuration Profile, as described in [DEV\_MAN]. Examples of Configuration Profiles can be found in [Appendix: Configuration Profiles](#).

### Configuration of the Supported Elliptic Curves Extension

The supported elliptic curves below are automatically selected by the mobile devices (i.e., the mobile devices do not support the individual selection of elliptic curves). The [IOS\_ST] and the [IPADOS\_ST] limits the curves used by TLS connections in the evaluated configuration. The curves available are defined by the server where all curves listed in the [IOS\_ST] and the

[IPADOS\_ST] are always available. This behavior does not require any additional configuration by the mobile device administrator.

The following curves are available.

- secp256r1 (P-256)
- secp384r1 (P-384)
- secp521r1 (P-521) (SigGen/SigVer only)

Curve25519 is also supported by the mobile devices and may be disabled in the operational environment.

### 5.3.3 IPsec Configuration

#### 5.3.3.1 General information

The mobile devices implement IPsec natively, as part of their operating system, so any processing of packets used in IPsec communication takes place on the mobile device. IPsec VPN tunnels are configured and controlled by the Network Extension Framework, which is a part of the Core OS Layer of the mobile devices' operating system.

The Security Policy Database (SPD) is created and configured by defining exceptions for IP traffic routing in a Configuration Profile. By default, all IP traffic is sent through a protected channel between the devices and the desired endpoint (PROTECT in the SPD). Any deviations from the default routing behavior must be explicitly specified as exceptions in the Configuration Profile, using the Wi-Fi Payload. Examples of Configuration Profiles can be found in [Appendix: Configuration Profiles](#).

Packet processing exceptions can be created for applications which make use of Captive Networking Identifiers (Captive Networking Apps), as well as for VoiceMail, AirPrint, and CellularServices. The mobile device administrator will need to refer to their organization's security policies to determine whether exceptions should be created and how those exceptions should be configured.

Exceptions for Captive Networking Apps can be configured in the Wi-Fi Payload to allow traffic for these apps to pass outside the tunnel (BYPASS in the SPD). Exceptions for voicemail, AirPrint, and CellularServices can allow traffic to pass unencrypted outside the tunnel (BYPASS in the SPD) or drop the traffic entirely (DISCARD in the SPD).

When the VPN is configured as Always-On, the mobile device uses IKEv2 for security association (SA) establishment. Since the mobile device must be configured with Always-On VPN in order to be in the evaluated configuration, the use of IKEv2 does not need to be configured separately.

#### 5.3.3.2 Mobile device users

For the evaluated configuration, no configuration is required from the mobile device user.

### 5.3.3.3 Mobile device administrators

To configure exceptions for Voicemail, AirPrint, and CellularServices, the mobile device administrator can specify a *ServiceExceptions* array in the AlwaysOn dictionary of the VPN payload.

Each entry in a *ServiceExceptions* array lists a *ServiceName* key and a corresponding *Action* key. The allowed values for *ServiceName* and *Action* can be found in Table 12: Essential Keys for the VPN Payload. For each *ServiceName*, the corresponding *Action* can be set to 'Allow' (BYPASS in the SPD) or 'Drop' (DISCARD in the SPD).

To configure exceptions for Captive Networking Apps, the mobile device administrator can use the *AllowCaptiveWebSheet*, *AllowAllCaptiveNetworkPlugins*, and *AllowedCaptiveNetworkPlugins* keys in the Configuration Profile. Information on these keys can be found in [DEV\_MAN].

When the VPNTType key is set to 'AlwaysOn', a catch-all PROTECT rule is created in the SPD. Any traffic not covered by an exception will be covered by that rule.

The mobile device administrator must not declare conflicting traffic exceptions, e.g. declaring both an 'Allow' and a 'Drop' value for 'Voicemail'. This guarantees that the SPD is unambiguous and unaffected by the ordering of SPD entries.

## 5.3.4 Bluetooth Configuration

### 5.3.4.1 General information

On iOS/iPadOS, manual authorization for Bluetooth connections is implicitly configured, as Bluetooth pairing can only occur when the mobile device is explicitly made discoverable through the [Settings » Bluetooth](#) interface. When the mobile device is made discoverable in this manner, another device (or the mobile device itself) can send a pairing request. Commonly, a six-digit number is displayed on both sides which must be manually matched by a mobile device user, i.e. the PIN is shown and the user must accept it before the pairing will complete. If one device does not support this automatic exchange of a PIN, a window for entering a manual PIN is presented to the user. The PIN entered must match on both sides.

Two conditions must be met for the mobile device to become discoverable: Bluetooth must be enabled, and the Bluetooth configuration panel must be both active and in the foreground. If the Bluetooth configuration panel is not the active panel, or if Bluetooth is disabled, the mobile device is not discoverable. There is no other method to make the mobile device discoverable or not discoverable.

Devices that want to pair with the evaluated devices via Bluetooth are required by iOS/iPadOS to use Secure Simple Pairing, which uses Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) based authentication and key exchange.

iOS/iPadOS requires that remote Bluetooth devices use an encrypted connection. Connections via Bluetooth/LE are secured using AES-128 in CCM mode. Further information about Bluetooth security is found in [BT]. This behavior requires no additional configuration by the mobile device administrator.



#### 5.3.4.2 Mobile device users

For instructions on how to turn Bluetooth on and off and how to pair and unpair a Bluetooth device, the mobile device user can refer to “[Set up and listen to Bluetooth devices on iPhone](#)” in the [iPhone\_UG] or the “[Set up and listen to Bluetooth devices on iPad](#)” in the [iPad\_UG]. Bluetooth can be disassociated by the mobile device user via the Control Center.

Further information on enabling and disabling Bluetooth can be found in article [BLUETOOTH\_HELP].

#### 5.3.4.3 Mobile device administrators

In the evaluated configuration, the mobile device administrator can allow or disallow the mobile device user from making modifications to Bluetooth settings on the mobile device by using the *allowBluetoothModification* key in the Restrictions Payload in a Configuration Profile.

### 5.3.5 VPN Configuration

#### 5.3.5.1 General information

In the evaluated configuration, the VPN must be in its Always-On configuration. The Always-On VPN configuration enables the organization to have full control over supervised device traffic by tunneling all IP traffic back to the organization.

#### 5.3.5.2 Mobile device users

For the evaluated configuration, no configuration is required from the mobile device user.

#### 5.3.5.3 Mobile device administrators

The mobile device administrator uses the VPN Payload to configure a traditional systemwide VPN based on IPsec, to specify Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) settings, and to specify attributes such as:

- the Always-On VPN configuration,
- the Certificate authentication method, and
- administrator-defined certificates.

Always-On VPN must be enabled by setting the *VPNType* key to ‘AlwaysOn’ in the Configuration Profile. When ‘AlwaysOn’ is selected as the *VPNType* for a Configuration Profile, the corresponding *ProtocolType* key must be set to ‘IKEv2’. The *Interfaces* array, which lists the interfaces a particular Always-On VPN configuration applies to, can optionally be specified as ‘Cellular’, ‘WiFi’ (Default), ‘Cellular’, or ‘WiFi’.

The mobile device administrator must specify the Service Set Identifiers (SSIDs) which the iOS/iPadOS device can connect to. This is done by specifying an array of strings of allowed SSIDs using the *SSIDMatch* key in the OnDemandRules dictionary of the VPN payload.

IKEv2 must be configured using the IKEv2 Dictionary Keys. The mobile device administrator must specify the IP address or hostname of the VPN server via *RemoteAddress*, the client identifier via

*LocalIdentifier*, the remote identifier via *RemoteIdentifier*, the authentication method as 'Certificate' via *AuthenticationMethod*, and the certificate to be used for authentication via *PayloadCertificateUUID*.

Optional keys can be configured which allow:

- enabling extended authentication via *ExtendedAuthEnabled*;
- the specification of a username and password via *AuthName* and *AuthPassword*;
- the specification of the interval the connection is kept alive when the peer cannot be reached via *DeadPeerDetectionRate*;
- the specification of the Common Name of the server certificate issuer and/or the Common Name of their server certificate via *ServerCertificateIssuerCommonName* and *ServerCertificateCommonName*; and
- the specification of *IKESecurityAssociationParameters* and *ChildSecurityAssociationParameters*, both of which allow the further specification of an *EncryptionAlgorithm*, an *IntegrityAlgorithm*, and a *DiffieHellmanGroup* as described in Table 13: Essential keys for Data Protection.

### 5.3.6 Keys for Configuring Network Protocols

This section provides details of the dictionary key values that must or must not be used in order to meet the requirements of the evaluated configuration described in the [IOS\_ST] and the [IPADOS\_ST].

For dictionary keys not mentioned in this document, please refer to the deploying organization's security policies.

#### 5.3.6.1 TLS Configuration Keys

Payload	Key	Description
Restrictions	<i>allowUntrustedTLSPrompt</i>	Must be set to 'false'.
Restrictions	<i>forceAirPrintTrustedTLSRequirement</i>	Must be set to 'true'.
AirPrint	<i>ForceTLS</i>	Must be set to 'true'.
Wi-Fi	<i>EncryptionType</i>	Must be set to 'WPA2'.
<b>EAPClientConfiguration Dictionary Keys</b>		
Wi-Fi	<i>AcceptEAPTypes</i>	Must be set to '13' (EAP-TLS).
Wi-Fi	<i>PayloadCertificateAnchorUUID</i>	Must contain at least one UUID of a certificate payload that is to be trusted.  Note that setting this key prevents the mobile device from asking the user if certificates are trusted.
Wi-Fi	<i>TLSTrustedServerNames</i>	Must be set.

Wi-Fi	<i>TLSCertificatesRequired</i>	Must be set to 'true'.
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**Table 11: Essential Payload Keys for TLS and EAP-TLS****5.3.6.2 VPN Configuration keys**

Payload	Key	Description
VPN	<i>VPNType</i>	Must be set to 'AlwaysOn'.
VPN	<i>OnDemandEnabled</i>	Must be set to '0'.
<b>IKEv2 Dictionary Keys</b>		
VPN	<i>RemoteAddress</i>	Must be set. Specifies the IP address or hostname of your organization's VPN server.
VPN	<i>LocalIdentifier</i>	Must be set.
VPN	<i>RemoteIdentifier</i>	Must be set.
VPN	<i>AuthenticationMethod</i>	Must be set to 'Certificate'.
VPN	<i>PayloadCertificateUUID</i>	Must be set. Specifies the universally unique identifier (UUID) of the identity certificate used as the account credential.
VPN	<i>CertificateType</i>	Must be set to one of the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• RSA (Default)</li> <li>• ECDSA P-256</li> <li>• ECDSA P-384</li> <li>• Specifies the type of PayloadCertificateUUID used for IKEv2 machine authentication.</li> </ul>
VPN	<i>ServerCertificateIssuerCommonName</i>	Must be set. Specifies the Common Name of the server certificate issuer. This key will cause IKE to send a certificate request to the server based on the specified certificate issuer.
VPN	<i>EnableCertificateRevocationCheck</i>	Must be set to '1'. Enables a certificate revocation check for IKEv2 connections.
VPN	<i>IKESecurityAssociationParameters</i>	Optional. A dictionary which specifies the parameters for IKEv2 IKE_SA_INIT and IKE_AUTH exchanges (Phase 1).

VPN	<i>ChildSecurityAssociationParameters</i>	Optional. A dictionary which specifies the parameters for IKEv2 child SAs (Phase 2).  If parameters are not specified for Phase 2, the Phase 1 parameters will be used. If the corresponding Phase 1 parameters are also not specified, the default values for those parameters will be used.	
IKESecurityAssociationParameters and ChildSecurityAssociationParameters Dictionary Keys			
VPN	<i>EncryptionAlgorithm</i>	May be set to one of the following. <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• 'AES-128'</li><li>• 'AES-256' (Default)</li><li>• 'AES-128-GCM' (16-octet ICV)</li><li>• 'AES-256-GCM' (16-octet ICV)</li></ul> 'DES' and '3DES' are not allowed in the evaluated configuration.  Note that 'AES-128' and 'AES-256' use the CBC mode of operation.	
VPN	<i>IntegrityAlgorithm</i>	May be set to one of the following. <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• 'SHA1-160'</li><li>• 'SHA2-256' (Default)</li><li>• 'SHA2-384'</li><li>• 'SHA2-512'</li></ul> 'SHA1-96' is not allowed in the evaluated configuration.	
VPN	<i>DiffieHellmanGroup</i>	Set to one of the following: '5', '14', '15', '19', or '20'.	
VPN	<i>LifeTimeInMinutes</i>	Optional. SA lifetime (rekey interval) in minutes. Allowed values are '10' through '1440'. Defaults to '1440' (24 hours).	
AlwaysOn Dictionary Keys			
VPN	<i>UIToggleEnabled</i>	Must be set to '0'.  If set to '1', allows the mobile device user to disable this VPN configuration. Defaults to '0'.	
		<i>ProtocolType</i>	Must be set to 'IKEv2'

VPN	<i>TunnelConfigurations</i>	<i>Interfaces</i>	Optional. An array which lists the interfaces to which this configuration applies. Valid array entries are 'Cellular' and 'WiFi'. Defaults to 'Cellular, WiFi'.
VPN	<i>ServiceExceptions</i>	<i>ServiceName</i>	The name of a system service which is exempt from AlwaysOn VPN.  May be set to one of the following. <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• VoiceMail</li><li>• AirPrint</li><li>• CellularServices</li></ul>
		<i>Action</i>	May be set to one of the following. <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Allow</li><li>• Drop</li></ul>
VPN	<i>AllowCaptiveWebSheet</i>	Optional. If set to '1', allows traffic from Captive Web Sheet outside the VPN tunnel. Defaults to '0'.	
VPN	<i>AllowAllCaptiveNetworkPlugins</i>	Optional. If set to '1', allows traffic from all Captive Networking apps outside the VPN tunnel to perform Captive network handling. Defaults to '0'.	
VPN	<i>AllowedCaptiveNetworkPlugins</i>	Optional. An array of dictionaries which describes Captive Networking apps whose traffic will be allowed outside the VPN tunnel to perform Captive network handling. Used only when <i>AllowAllCaptiveNetworkPlugins</i> is '0'.  Each dictionary in this array must contain a <i>BundleIdentifier</i> key of type string, the value of which must be the application's bundle identifier.	
OnDemandRules Dictionary Keys			
VPN	<i>SSIDMatch</i>	Must be set.  An array of allowed SSIDs must be given which the iOS/iPadOS device is allowed to connect to.	

DNS Dictionary Keys		
VPN	<i>SupplementalMatchDomains</i>	Must not be set.  (This key is used to create a split DNS, which is not allowed in the evaluated configuration.)

**Table 12: Essential Keys for the VPN Payload**

## 5.4 Data Protection

### 5.4.1 Data-At-Rest (DAR) Protection Configuration

#### 5.4.1.1 General information

To ensure data at rest protection, establishment of a passcode on the mobile device is required.

The TOE only supports external storage encryption with storage devices formatted in the APFS format, other formats with encryption or encrypted volumes are not supported by the TOE.

In the evaluated configuration, external storage devices must be formatted in the APFS file format and volumes must be encrypted. All other storage formats are not allowed in the evaluated configuration.

Further information on the APFS format can be found in [APFS\_DOC] and [APFS\_DEV\_DOC].

#### 5.4.1.2 Mobile device users

Users can check that data at rest protection is enabled on their device in the Settings at [Touch ID and Passcode](#) on devices without Face ID functionality (models with a Home button) and [Face ID and Passcode](#) on devices with Face ID functionality (models without a Home button). A passcode is required to access the device and this enables data protection on the device. No further configuration is required to enable data protection on the device. More information can be found in the ["Set a passcode on iPhone"](#) subsection of the ["Protect your iPhone"](#) subsection of the ["Security and privacy"](#) section of the [iPhone\_UG] and in ["Set a passcode on iPad"](#) subsection of the ["Protect your iPad"](#) subsection of the ["Security and privacy"](#) section of the [iPad\_UG].

Mobile device users can only use external storage devices formatted in the APFS format with encrypted volumes. No other file format is supported in the evaluated configuration and the APFS formatted device must have only encrypted volumes. An APFS formatted device without encrypted volumes is not supported.

Instructions on formatting devices in the APFS format with encrypted volumes can be found in [APFS\_DOC]. Further technical information on the APFS format with encrypted volumes can be found in [APFS\_DEV\_DOC].

#### 5.4.1.3 Mobile device administrators

Mobile device administrators must ensure that mobile device users set a passcode by using the *forcePin* key in the Passcode Policy Payload. Other keys available in this payload allow administrators to configure passcode requirements to their deploying organizations policy.

See 5.5.1, Passcode Authentication Configuration, for more information on passcode configuration.

Mobile device administrators can restrict USB drive access in the Files app if desired by setting the *allowFilesUSBDriveAccess* key to 'false' in the "Restrictions" section of the Configuration Profile.

Mobile device administrators must ensure through organizational policies that mobile device users only use external storage devices formatted in the APFS format with encrypted volumes. Unencrypted volumes and other formats are not allowed in the evaluated configuration.

### 5.4.2 Restrict Application Access to System Services

#### 5.4.2.1 General information

Access control to system services in the Core Services layer is hardcoded and thus not configurable by the mobile device user or administrator.

Access control for applications to system services can be restricted on a per-app basis. In the operating systems, these services are as follows.

- Location Services
- Contacts
- Calendars
- Reminders
- Photos
- Bluetooth Sharing
- Microphone
- Speech Recognition
- Camera
- Health
- HomeKit
- Media & Apple Music
- Motion & Fitness

#### 5.4.2.2 Mobile device users

A list of system services can be obtained from the mobile device [Settings » Privacy](#). For each system service, the Applications which have permission to use that service can be inspected and changed.

#### 5.4.2.3 Mobile device administrators

Mobile device administrators can not specify access control for applications to system services.

### 5.4.3 Wiping of Protected Data

#### 5.4.3.1 General information

A wipe operation is performed after the mobile device user exceeds the limit number of failed authentication attempts or upon receiving a request from an authorized administrator. The administrator can configure the number of failed attempts by using the following Configuration Profile key in the Passcode Policy Payload: *maxFailedAttempts*. This key takes an integer value between '2' and '11'.

#### 5.4.3.2 Mobile device users

The mobile device user can wipe the device themselves. This is described in [iPhone\_UG] and [iPad\_UG] in the “[Restart, update, reset, and restore](#)” section, and is accessed on the device from [Settings » General » Reset » Erase all Content and Settings](#). Depending on the organizational policy, the mobile device administrator can disable this function.

#### 5.4.3.3 Mobile device administrators

It is mandatory that the mobile device administrator can issue a remote wipe command from the MDM server using the MDM protocol as described in [MDM\_SETTINGS] and [DEV\_MAN].

The following key is required to execute a remote device wipe: *RequestType* with a value of 'EraseDevice'. Upon receiving this command, the device immediately erases itself. No warning is given to the user. This command is performed immediately even if the device is locked.

In order to execute this command successfully, Device Erase access rights must be set. To enable this access, the following MDM Payload related key must be used: *AccessRights*. The value for this key is determined by a logical “OR” that includes the value '8', where 8 stands for allowing device erase rights.

Depending on the organizational policy, the mobile device administrator can disallow the mobile device user from wiping the device themselves. This ability can be configured by the mobile device administrator by setting the *allowEraseContentAndSettings* key to 'false' in the Restrictions Payload.



## 5.4.4 Keys for Configuring Data Protection

This section provides details of the dictionary key values that must be used, or where certain options for the key value are not allowed, in order to meet the requirements of the evaluated configuration described in the [IOS\_ST] and the [IPADOS\_ST].

For dictionary keys not mentioned in this document, please refer to the deploying organization's security policies.

Payload	Key	Description
MDM	<i>RequestType</i>	EraseDevice  (Warning: Only set this if the intention is to wipe the mobile device.)
MDM	<i>AccessRights</i>	A logical "OR" including the value "8"
Passcode Policy	<i>MaxFailedAttempts</i>	A value between '2' and '11' according to the organizations security policy
Restrictions	<i>allowEraseContentAndSettings</i>	Disables the option to erase all content and settings from the mobile device UI if set to 'false'
Restrictions	<i>allowFilesUSBDriveAccess</i>	Disables external storage via device connection

**Table 13: Essential keys for Data Protection**

## 5.5 Identification & Authentication

### 5.5.1 Passcode Authentication Configuration

#### 5.5.1.1 General information

In the evaluated configuration, mobile devices must be configured to use either a numeric passcode or an alphanumeric passcode.

The Passcode Policy Payload is described in [DEV\_MAN] and describes the keys that can be used to set attributes such as:

- defining the minimum passcode length,
- defining requirements for the passcode complexity,
- defining the maximum passcode lifetime,
- defining the maximum time of inactivity after which the mobile device is locked automatically, and
- defining the maximum number of consecutive authentication failures after which the mobile device is wiped.

The devices allow the following parameters for passcode complexity.

- Passcodes can be composed of any combination of upper- and lower-case letters, numbers, and special characters: "!", "@", "#", "\$", "%", "^", "&", "\*", "(", ")"
- Passcode length must be between 1 and 16.

#### *5.5.1.2 Mobile device users*

In the evaluated configuration, the mobile device user cannot configure the passcode policy.

#### *5.5.1.3 Mobile device administrators*

It is mandatory that the mobile device administrator configures the passcode policy for the mobile device.

The Passcode Policy Payload presents the administrator with an alphanumeric passcode entry mechanism, which allows for the entry of arbitrarily long and complex passcodes including the selection of special characters. To do this, set the configuration keys *allowSimple* to 'false' and *RequireAlphanumeric* to 'Yes'.

Also, set the configuration key *minLength* to a value greater than zero, defined by the deploying organization's policy.

### **5.5.2 Protected Authentication Feedback**

#### *5.5.2.1 General information*

All passcode entries are obscured by iOS/iPadOS. This is done by displaying a dot symbol in place of each character as the passcode entry user input occurs. No configuration of this feature is required from the mobile device administrator.

Biometric authentication inputs do not provide feedback to the user unless the input is rejected. Additionally, biometric authentication inputs do not relay authentication entry information and are inherently obscured. When an invalid fingerprint sample is given or a fingerprint sample cannot be authenticated, a simple error message is returned which prompts the user to try again. When an invalid facial sample is given or a facial sample cannot be authenticated, the mobile device will vibrate. If three invalid biometric samples are presented the mobile device will offer passcode entry. After five invalid biometric samples are presented passcode authentication is required.

Refer to [PASSCODE\_Help] for more information on how to manage a passcode.

#### *5.5.2.2 Mobile device users*

Passcode entry is obscured by iOS/iPadOS, no configuration of this feature is required from the mobile device user.

### 5.5.2.3 Mobile device administrators

Passcode entry is obscured by iOS/iPadOS, no configuration of this feature is required from the mobile device administrator.

## 5.5.3 Biometric Authentication Factors

### 5.5.3.1 General information

Enrollment and management of biometric authentication factors and credentials is detailed in [iPhone\_UG] and [iPad\_UG] in the ["Set up Face ID"](#) and ["Set up Face ID"](#) subsections of the ["Protect your iPhone"/"Protect your iPad"](#) subsection of the ["Security and privacy"](#) section, and found on the device at [Settings » Face ID & Passcode](#) or [Settings » Touch ID & Passcode](#).

### 5.5.3.2 Mobile device users

In the evaluated configuration, the mobile device user cannot enable Touch ID or Face ID. Only the mobile device administrator can enable/disable Touch ID or Face ID using the Restrictions Payload. If the mobile device administrator has enabled these biometric authentication factors, the following is guidance on how the mobile user can configure Touch ID and Face ID.

Enrollment for Touch ID is typically accomplished during initial device configuration but can also be performed using the [Settings » Touch ID & Passcode](#) menus. Multiple fingerprints may be enrolled, named, and deleted from this menu. In order to remove a specific finger, a device user must tap the finger for removal followed by delete fingerprint. Mobile device users may place a finger on the Touch ID sensor to determine which biometric credential entry it is mapped to. Users may also disable Touch ID selectively for applications, or entirely, from the [Settings » Touch ID & Passcode](#) menu, by authenticating using their passcode and turning off one or more of the following corresponding options.

- Unlock
- Apple Pay
- iTunes & App Store

Enrollment for Face ID is typically accomplished during initial device configuration but can also be performed using the [Settings » Face ID & Passcode](#) menu by tapping the ["Set up Face ID"](#) option. Mobile users can enroll an alternative appearance for Face ID, for a total of two enrollments per device. Mobile users may establish Face ID credentials by providing biometric samples. They may also remove biometric samples from the [Settings » Face ID & Passcode](#) menu by tapping the [Reset Face ID](#) option. This action removes all established Face ID credentials. Users may also disable Face ID selectively for applications, or entirely, from the [Settings » Face ID & Passcode](#) menu by turning off one or more of the following corresponding options.

- Unlock
- Apple Pay
- iTunes & App Store

- Safari AutoFill

### 5.5.3.3 Mobile device administrators

A mobile device administrator can configure to not allow a device user to enable Touch ID or Face ID by setting the key *allowFingerprintForUnlock* to false in a Configuration Profile using the Restrictions Payload.

## 5.5.4 Authentication Attempt Configuration

### 5.5.4.1 General information

Both Face ID and Touch ID allow up to five unsuccessful authentication attempts before passcode authentication is required. For the details, please see section “[Hardware Security and Biometrics](#)” → “[Touch ID and Face ID](#)” → “[Touch ID, Face ID, passcodes, and passwords](#)” in [AP\_SEC].

### 5.5.4.2 Mobile device users

In the evaluated configuration, the mobile device user cannot configure the maximum number of failed authentication attempts.

### 5.5.4.3 Mobile device administrators

To limit/configure the number of consecutive failed authentication attempts for the passcode; the administrator can use the key *maxFailedAttempts*. This key takes an integer value between ‘2’ and ‘11’. See the Passcode Policy Payload in section 5.5.1, Passcode Authentication Configuration.

## 5.5.5 Re-Authentication Configuration

### 5.5.5.1 General information

When the use of a passcode is enabled, the mobile device automatically prompts the user for a passcode to unlock the device. No additional configuration is required.

Use of Touch ID or Face ID can be set in the [Settings » Touch ID & Passcode](#) or [Settings » Face ID & Passcode](#). The biometric authentication factor can be configured for device unlock, Apple Pay and iTunes and App Store.

The Passcode Policy Payload allows an administrator to enable/disable modification of Touch ID or Face ID through specification of the *allowFingerprintModification* key.

A passcode must be supplied for additional security validation in any of the following instances:

- The mobile device has just been turned on or restarted
- For device software updates
- To wipe the device
- To view or change passcode settings

- To install iOS/iPadOS Configuration Profiles
- The mobile device has just been turned on or restarted
- The mobile device hasn't been unlocked for more than 48 hours
- The passcode hasn't been used to unlock the mobile device in the last 156 hours (six and a half days) and Face ID or Touch ID hasn't been used to unlock the mobile device in the last 4 hours
- The device has received a remote lock command
- After five unsuccessful biometric attempts (though for usability, the device might offer entering a passcode instead of using biometrics after a smaller number of failures).
- After exiting power off/Emergency SOS by pressing and holding either volume button and the sleep/wake simultaneously for 2 seconds and then pressing Cancel.

Note that When Touch ID or Face ID is enabled on an iPhone or iPad, the device immediately locks when the sleep/wake is pressed, and the device locks every time it goes to sleep. Touch ID and Face ID require a successful match - or optionally the passcode - at every wake.

#### *5.5.5.2 Mobile device users*

In the evaluated configuration, the mobile device user cannot enable/disable the modification of Touch ID or Face ID.

#### *5.5.5.3 Mobile device administrators*

In the evaluated configuration, the mobile device administrator set the *allowFingerprintModification* key to a value defined by the organization's policy.

### **5.5.6 X.509 Certificate Configuration**

#### *5.5.6.1 General*

X.509 certificates are configured by an administrator using the keys of the *Certificate Payload* in a Configuration Profile; see [DEV\_MAN].

Certificates have a certificate type that defines their respective application area. This ensures that only certificates defined for a specific application area are used. In addition, the database containing trust anchors for all certificates is protected via integrity check and write protection. The certificate types supported by the devices are as follows.

- AppleX509Basic
- AppleSSL
- AppleSMIME
- AppleEAP
- AppleIPsec
- AppleCodeSigning

- AppleIDValidation
- AppleTimeStamping

The list of supported certificate and identity formats:

- X.509 certificates with RSA keys, and
- File extensions .cer, .crt, .der, .p12, and .pfx.

External entities can be authenticated using a digital certificate. Out of the box, the TOE includes a number of preinstalled root certificates.

Code signing certificates need to be assigned by Apple and can be imported into a device. The issue of such a certificate can be by app developers or by enterprises that want to deploy apps from their MDM to managed devices. All apps must have a valid signature that can be verified by a code signing certificate before they are installed on a device.

The mobile devices have a Trust Anchor Database which contains trusted root certificates preinstalled with iOS/iPadOS to establish a chain of trust; see [TRUST\_STORE]. These preinstalled trusted root certificates cannot be modified, are automatically trusted, and do not need to be included when creating a Configuration Profile. New certificates can be added to the Trust Anchor Database or currently installed certificates can be removed.

There are also blocked and always-ask certificates in the Trust Anchor Database. Blocked certificates are believed to be compromised and are never trusted. Always-ask certificates prompt the user whether they want to trust the certificate. Lists of these certificates can also be found at [TRUST\_STORE].

When attempting to establish a connection using a peer certificate (i.e., a certificate received from the other endpoint), the peer certificate is first checked to ensure it is valid as per RFC 5280. Certificates are validated against the Subject Alternative Name (SAN). Wildcards are supported. The Common Name (CN) is ignored. If the SAN does not match the corresponding domain name system (DNS) or IP Address of the server being accessed, validation and subsequently the connection will fail. If the certificate is valid, the attempt to establish the connection continues. If the certificate is invalid, the next step is up to the application.

The iOS/iPadOS device, excluding WLAN, uses OCSP for validating the revocation status of certificates. When a connection cannot be established to the OCSP server to determine the revocation status of a certificate, the iOS/iPadOS device considers the certificate as not revoked.

As part of the certificate chain validation, the validity period of each certificate in the chain is verified. If the certificate is marked as an extended validation certificate, the iOS/iPad device performs an OCSP lookup to verify the validity (revocation status) of the certificate (except for WLAN certificate validation which does not support OCSP). The basicConstraints extension and the Certificate Authority (CA) flag are checked. CA certificates must have the basicConstraints extension, the CA flag set to TRUE, and include the caSigning purpose. The extendedKeyUsage (EKU) is validated against the rules defined in FIA\_X509\_EXT.1 (which is a superset of the rules in FIA\_X509\_EXT.1/WLAN). Finally, the signature of the issuer of the certificate is verified. Only

when all checks succeed, the certificate is considered valid and the next certificate in the certificate chain is checked.

The certificate chain searches for the certificates in the trust store. The trust store is a combination of the trust store delivered with the iOS/iPadOS device and the certificates stored in the key chain and marked as trustworthy. Certificates from the trusted store are validated using the previously described checks at the time that they are used. Certificate path validation terminates with a certificate in the trust store.

Further information on certificates can be found in the Certificates section of [CKTSREF], in [DeployRef] and in [DEV\_MAN].

#### 5.5.6.2 Mobile device users

In the evaluated configuration, the mobile device user cannot import X.509v3 certificates into the Trust Anchor Database. However, if the mobile device is unsupervised, the mobile device user can install root certificates into the Trust Anchor Database.

Unless the administrator has disallowed the removal of the Configuration Profile that contains the certificate, mobile device users can manually remove certificates that have been installed on their device. Choose [Settings » General » Profile & Device Management](#), select a profile, choose [More Details](#), and then choose the appropriate certificate to remove.

In the evaluated configuration, the mobile device user can remove imported X.509v3 certificates but cannot remove other X.509v3 certificates in the Trust Anchor Database.

#### 5.5.6.3 Mobile device administrators

In the evaluated configuration, mobile device administrators are allowed to modify the Trust Anchor Database. X.509 certificates can be configured by using a Configuration Profile.

Certificate identities can be deployed using the following two methods: 1) using Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #12 identity certificate and 2) Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP). The mobile device administrator should use the Certificate Payload of the Configuration Profile if using the first option and should use the SCEP Payload of the Configuration Profile if using the second option.

The mobile device administrator can also send the mobile device user an email with the certificate as an attachment or a link to a secure site hosting the certificate. The user will download the certificate, from the email or site, to install on the mobile device.

More information on certificate configuration can be found in [DeployRef] and subsection EAPClientConfiguration Dictionary of the Wi-Fi section of [DEV\_MAN].

In the evaluated configuration, the mobile device administrator must disallow the removal of a Certificate Payload by a user in a Configuration Profile by setting the *PayloadRemovalDisallowed* key for that payload to 'true'. See the [DEV\_MAN] section.

When configuring the devices to utilize EAP-TLS as part of a WPA2 protected Wi-Fi network, the CA certificate(s) to which the server's certificate must chain can be configured using the *PayloadCertificateAnchorUUID* key in the Wi-Fi Payload of the Configuration Profile. More

information can be found in the Wi-Fi Payload and subsection EAPClientConfiguration Dictionary of [DEV\_MAN].

Mobile device administrators can view all certificates on a device and remove any certificates it has installed via the MDM protocol using the *RequestType* key with the content "CertificateList". The MDM protocol also allows for certificate removal.

A list of all available trusted root certificates on the iOS/iPadOS device can be found in [TRUST].

### Certificate Validation

To configure the devices to reject untrusted certificates, the administrator can use the *TLAllowTrustExceptions* dictionary key in the Wi-Fi Payload EAPClientConfiguration Dictionary of the Configuration Profile which enforces that untrusted certificates are not accepted and the authentication fails if such untrusted certificates are presented.

To enforce the verification of the server name defined with the X.509 certificate during the WPA-EAP handshake between the mobile device and the remote access point, the policy must contain the server name to be expected in the certificate with the *TLTrustedServerNames* dictionary key in the Wi-Fi Payload EAPClientConfiguration Dictionary of the Configuration Profile.

Guidance and the API documentation related to certificate validation is provided in "Certificate, Key, and Trust Services" [CKTSREF] in the section "[Trust](#)".

### 5.5.7 Keys for Identification and Authentication

This section provides details of the dictionary key values that must be used, or where certain options for the key value are not allowed, in order to meet the requirements of the evaluated configuration described in the [IOS\_ST] and the [IPADOS\_ST].

Payload	Key	Setting
Passcode Policy	<i>allowSimple</i>	Must be set to 'false'.
Passcode Policy	<i>forcePin</i>	Must be set to 'true'.
Passcode Policy	<i>maxFailedAttempts</i>	Must be set to a value between 2 and 11 according to the deploying organizations policy.
Passcode Policy	<i>maxInactivity</i>	Should be set to a value defined by the deploying organization's policy.
Passcode Policy	<i>maxPINAgeInDays</i>	Should be set to a value defined by the deploying organization's policy.
Passcode Policy	<i>minComplexChars</i>	Should be set to a value defined by the deploying organization's policy.



Payload	Key	Setting
Passcode Policy	<i>minLength</i>	Should be set to a value defined by the organization's policy.
Passcode Policy	<i>requireAlphanumeric</i>	Should be set to a value defined by the organization's policy.
Passcode Policy	<i>pinHistory</i>	Should be set to a value defined by the organization's policy.
Passcode Policy	<i>maxGracePeriod</i>	Must be set to 0.
Passcode Policy	<i>allowFingerprintModification</i>	Should be set to a value defined by the organization's policy.
Passcode Policy	<i>changeAtNextAuth</i>	Should be set to a value defined by the organization's policy.

**Table 14: Essential keys for Identification and Authentication**

## 5.6 Security Management

### 5.6.1 Install/Remove Apps from the Device

#### 5.6.1.1 General information

If the mobile device is enrolled in MDM, managed apps on the mobile device can be removed by an administrator remotely via the MDM System, or when the mobile device user removes their own device from MDM. If a mobile phone is removed from MDM, the mobile device administrator has some control over what happens to the associated data. When a managed app is removed from a device, the associated data is removed with it.

For more information on managed apps refer to ["Content distribution"](#) → ["Deploying managed apps and books"](#) in [DeployRef].

#### 5.6.1.2 Mobile device users

Mobile device users may be able to install or remove an application from their device. (This depends upon the organization's policy and the value of the dictionary keys in the Restrictions Payload for *allowAppRemoval* and *allowAppInstallation*).

For more information on installing applications see [iPhone\_UG] and [iPad\_UG] section ["Apps"](#) → ["App Store"](#) → ["Get apps"](#).

For more information on removing applications see [iPhone\_UG] and [iPad\_UG] section ["Basics"](#) → ["Use your apps"](#) → ["Delete apps"](#).

### 5.6.1.3 Mobile device administrators

The mobile device administrator can install applications on the mobile device using an MDM system or Apple Configurator 2. Refer to the [DeployRef] section [“Deploying apps and books”](#); the [AConfig] section [“Distribute content”](#) → [“Add apps to a device”](#); and the [DEV\_MAN] subsection [“Install an App”](#) of section [“Commands and Queries”](#). If installing an enterprise application, refer to [DEV\_MAN] subsection [“Install an Enterprise App”](#) of section [“Commands and Queries”](#).

The mobile device administrator can remove managed applications using MDM. To remove an application, the MDM server sends a command using the *RequestType* and *Identifier* keys. The below table provides additional information these keys.

Key	Description
<i>RequestType</i>	This key must be set to: RemoveApplication
<i>Identifier</i>	The application’s identifier

More information can be found in [DEV\_MAN] in subsection [“Remove an App”](#) of section [“Commands and Queries”](#).

## 5.6.2 Configure Access and Notification in Locked State

### 5.6.2.1 General information

By default, the following features are available when the mobile device is locked, and authentication is not needed:

- Making emergency calls,
- Using the camera, and
- Using the flashlight.

Access to certain optional features can be allowed when the mobile device is in a locked state. These optional features include the following.

- Email notification
- Calendar appointment
- Text message notification

### 5.6.2.2 Mobile device users

To allow access to the optional features when the mobile device is locked, go to [Settings » Touch ID & Passcode](#) (mobile devices with Touch ID) or [Settings » Face ID & Passcode](#) (mobile devices with Face ID), enter the passcode and select the features you want to allow access under the [Allow Access When Locked](#) menu.

Those items may be restricted by a Configuration Profile installed by an administrator. Refer to the [iPad\_UG] and [iPhone\_UG] section “[Basics](#)” → “[Access features from the Lock screen](#)” for more information.

Certain display notifications can be set when the mobile device is in the locked state. To enable/disable display notifications in the locked state, go to [Settings » Face ID & Passcode](#) or [Settings » Touch ID & Passcode](#) and enter the passcode. Once authenticated, turn on Notification Center (found in the [Allow Access When Locked](#) options list). Refer to the [iPhone\_UG] and [iPad\_UG] section “[Basics](#)” → “[Use notifications and Do Not Disturb](#)” → “[Change notification settings](#)” for more information.

### 5.6.2.3 Mobile device administrators

The mobile device administrator can use the `allowLockScreenNotificationsView` key in the Restrictions Payload in a Configuration Profile to disallow the user from viewing past notifications (i.e., disable Notification history). However, the mobile device user can see notifications as they arrive. To disable displaying notifications on the lock screen for applications, the `ShowInLockScreen` key in the Notifications Payload must be set to ‘true’.

Once the notification settings have been implemented by the mobile device administrator, the `allowNotificationsModification` key in the Restrictions Payload must be set to ‘true’ if the settings are not allowed to be modified.

Refer to [DEV\_MAN] for more information.

## 5.6.3 Device/Session Locking

### 5.6.3.1 General information

The mobile device is locked after a configurable time of user inactivity. To unlock the mobile device, an authentication mechanism must be enabled. For example, the device user uses a passcode or Face ID or Touch ID for authentication.

### 5.6.3.2 Mobile device users

In the evaluated configuration the mobile device user is not allowed to configure the auto-lock in [Settings » Display & Brightness » Auto-Lock](#).

Mobile device users can transition to the locked state by pressing the side button (or for some mobile device models) the Sleep/Wake button.

### 5.6.3.3 Mobile device administrators

It is mandatory that mobile device administrators configure the device/session locking policy on the mobile devices. This is done by setting the Configuration Profile key `maxInactivity` in the Passcode Policy Payload to the desirable time. The number of authentication failures allowed is set using the `maxFailedAttempts` key, in the same payload, to a value between ‘2’ and ‘11’. Refer to [DEV\_MAN] for additional information.

Additionally, the mobile device administrator can use the *DeviceLock* key described in [DEV\_MAN] subsection “[Lock a Device](#)” of section “[Commands and Queries](#)”. This key requires the Device Lock and Passcode Removal access rights. In the MDM payload, setting the *AccessRights* key to ‘4’ allows for device lock and passcode removal.

## 5.6.4 Timestamp Configuration

### 5.6.4.1 General information

In the evaluated configuration, the mobile device must be configured to update its time automatically. Accurate timestamps are crucial when it comes to analyzing audit logs (see Section 6, Security Audit for information on audit logs). The devices can use several time sources to automatically update the time: Network, Identity and Time Zone (NITZ); Global Positioning Satellites (GPS); Network Time Protocol (NTP) standards; or the cellular carrier time service. When configured and maintained using one of these time sources, the time may be considered reliable. Only the NTP is configurable by the mobile device administrator.

### 5.6.4.2 Mobile device users

In the evaluated configuration, the mobile device user is not allowed to configure the automatic time update options.

### 5.6.4.3 Mobile device administrators

The mobile device administrator can configure the mobile device to connect to a time server. Using the Time Server Payload, the *timeServer* and *timeZone* keys should be used. The following table provides additional details about these keys.

Key	Description
<i>timeserver</i>	This value represents the network time protocol (NTP) server to connect to.
<i>timeZone</i>	This value represents the timezone. It must be an entry in the <code>/usr/share/zoneinfo/</code> . Examples include: “America/Denver” or “Zulu”.

The mobile administrator can disallow the mobile user from turning off the “Set Automatically” option for the date and time. In the Restrictions Payload, setting the *forceAutomaticDateAndTime* key to true turns on the Date and Time “Set Automatically” feature and it cannot be turned off by the mobile device user.

Additional information on these settings can be found in [DEV\_MAN].

## 5.6.5 Access Banner Configuration

### 5.6.5.1 General information

In the evaluated configuration the mobile devices are required to display an access banner as an advisory warning message regarding unauthorized use of the mobile device.

### 5.6.5.2 Mobile device users

In the evaluated configuration, the mobile device user is not allowed to configure the access banner.

### 5.6.5.3 Mobile device administrators

Also, the access banner can be configured by creating a background picture with the relevant information and configuring that picture as the background for the lock screen as described in [DEV\_MAN] section "[Profile-Specific Payload Keys](#)" subsection "[Restrictions](#)". This banner is not allowed to be changed by the mobile device user and this can be prevented by specifying the *allowWallpaperModification* key to 'false' as described in [DEV\_MAN].

The image is sent as a Base64 encoded image (as part of the Wallpaper command). It must be either a PNG or JPEG.

Alternatively, a notice and consent warning message can be configured through an app that provides the requisite notice and acknowledgement functionality rather than through iOS/iPadOS itself. The implementing organization must deploy a customizable application that provides users' notice of the banner (e.g., through the Apple Push Notification Service) and also the ability to acknowledge the banner content within the application.

## 5.6.6 Enable/Disable Cameras and Microphones

### 5.6.6.1 General information

The cameras and microphones on the iPhone and iPad can be managed across the devices or on a per-app basis.

Additional information on these settings can be found in [DEV\_MAN].

### 5.6.6.2 Mobile device users

Mobile device users can optionally disable the use of the cameras on a per-app basis. This can be done on the iPhone or iPad from [Settings » Privacy » Camera](#). If the mobile device administrator has restricted the use of the camera then this functionality will not work.

Mobile device users can optionally disable the use of the microphones on a per-app basis. This can be done on the iPhone or iPad from [Settings » Privacy » Microphone](#).

### 5.6.6.3 Mobile device administrators

The mobile device administrator can optionally disallow camera use across the mobile device by using the key *allowCamera* in the Restrictions Payload.

The mobile device administrator can optionally disallow camera use on a per app basis using the key *Camera* in the Privacy Preferences Policy Control Payload.

The mobile device administrator can optionally disallow microphone use on a per app basis using the key *Microphone* in the Privacy Preferences Policy Control Payload.

Refer to [DEV\_MAN] for more information.

## 5.6.7 Enable/Disable Cellular, Wi-Fi, Wi-Fi Hotspot, Bluetooth, NFC, UWB

### 5.6.7.1 General information

The devices contain a variety of radios which can be configured by the users or administrators according to the organization's policy.

### 5.6.7.2 Mobile device users

Mobile device users can enable/disable cellular by following instructions provided in the [iPhone\_UG] and [iPad\_UG] section "[Safety, handling, and support](#)" → "[View or change cellular data settings](#)".

Mobile device users can enable/disable Bluetooth by following the instructions provided in the [iPhone\_UG] and [iPad\_UG] section "[Accessories](#)" → "[AirPods and other headphones](#)" → "[Use other Bluetooth headphones](#)". Further information on enabling and disabling Bluetooth can be found in [BLUETOOTH\_HELP].

Mobile device users can enable/disable Wi-Fi by following the instructions provided in the [iPhone\_UG] and [iPad\_UG] section "[Set up and get started](#)" → "[Connect to the internet](#)".

Mobile device users can enable/disable Wi-Fi hotspot by following the instructions provided in the [iPhone\_UG] section "[Use iPhone with iPad, iPod touch, Mac, and PC](#)" → "[Share your internet connection](#)" and [iPad\_UG] section "[Use iPad with iPhone, iPod touch, Mac, and PC](#)" → "[Share your internet connection](#)".

NFC will be disabled if there are no passes and no payment cards including credit/debit cards or Apple Cash stored in the Apple Wallet application and there are no 3<sup>rd</sup> party applications with NFC functionality are installed on the device. Passes are stored data representing physical cards such as boarding passes and credit cards. When the mobile user adds a pass, a credit/debit card, Apple Cash or installs an application with NFC capabilities, NFC is automatically activated. The mobile device administrator is able to disable NFC using a Configuration Profile key, see section 5.6.7.3 for details.

Instructions for adding passes are located in [PAY\_SETUP] and removing passes are located in [MANAGE\_CARDS].

Mobile device users can enable/disable Ultra-Wideband (UWB) communications by following the instructions provided in the [iPhone\_UG] section "[Safety, handling, and support](#)" → "[Ultra Wideband information](#)". Only certain iPhone models (iPhone 11, iPhone 11 Pro, iPhone 11 Pro Max, iPhone 12 mini, iPhone 12, iPhone 12 Pro, and iPhone 12 Pro Max) possess UWB communication chips, iPads currently do not have UWB chips. To disable only the UWB

functionality whilst maintaining cellular and Wi-Fi functions, mobile device users should turn off “[Location for Networking & Wireless](#)” by navigating on the device to [Settings » Privacy » Location Services » System Services](#) and setting the “[Networking and Wireless](#)” toggle to the OFF position, then at the prompt, confirm by selecting “[Turn Off](#)”.

### 5.6.7.3 Mobile device administrators

The mobile device administrator can optionally restrict the mobile device from using cellular data by specifying the Network Usage Rules Payload key *AllowCellularData* to ‘false’.

The mobile device administrator can optionally restrict the mobile device user from modifying any cellular data settings by using the Restrictions Payload key: *allowAppCellularDataModification*.

The mobile device administrator can optionally enable/disable the ability of the mobile device user to modify Bluetooth settings by using the following Configuration Profile key: *allowBluetoothModification*.

The mobile device administrator can optionally enable/disable Wi-Fi hotspot functionality by using the *IsHotspot* key in the Wi-Fi Payload.

Wi-Fi can effectively be enabled/disabled by an administrator setting the Restrictions payload key *forceWiFiWhitelisting*.

The mobile device administrator can specify the allowed SSID of the Wi-Fi network which the iOS/iPadOS device can connect to by using the *SSID\_STR* Configuration Profile key in the Wi-Fi Payload. To use this method of specifying SSIDs, the *DomainName* Configuration Profile key in the Wi-Fi Payload must not be set.

The mobile device administrator can optionally enable/disable NFC by using the following Configuration Profile key: *allowNFC*. If set to ‘false’, this will disable NFC. This requires a supervised device.

NFC can also be disabled by not having any passes stored in the Apple Wallet application, having no credit/debit payment cards or Apple Cash stored in the application and by not having any 3<sup>rd</sup> party applications with NFC capabilities on the device. Passes are stored data representing physical cards such as boarding passes. If there are no passes stored and no credit/debit payment cards or Apple Cash, the mobile device administrator can disable the Wallet application using the Restrictions payload key *blacklistedAppBundleIDs* with a string array containing the value “com.apple.Passbook”. If the Wallet application is not disabled, the mobile device user can add a pass and enable NFC.

Refer to [DEV\_MAN] for more information.

## 5.6.8 Enable/Disable Location Services

### 5.6.8.1 General information

Additional information on enabling and disabling location services can be found in [DEV\_MAN].

### 5.6.8.2 Mobile device users

Device users can enable/disable location services by following the instructions provided in the [iPhone\_UG] section "[Security and privacy](#)" → "[Privacy protections on iPhone](#)" → "[Control the location information you share](#)" and in the [iPad\_UG] section "[Security and privacy](#)" → "[Privacy protections on iPad](#)" → "[Control the location information you share](#)".

### 5.6.8.3 Mobile device administrators

The mobile device administrator can enable/disable location services during initial setup of the mobile device. This can occur after a device wipe or setting up the device for the first time. Setting the *skip\_setup\_items* key to 'Location' causes the Setup Assistant to skip the Location Services screens. By skipping these screens, Location Services will not be set up.

More information can be found in [MDM\_SETTINGS] and [DEV\_MAN].

## 5.6.9 Enable/Disable iCloud Drive Documents and Data

### 5.6.9.1 General information

The devices have the functionality to upload files to iCloud. In the evaluated configuration, this functionality must be disabled.

Additional information on this setting can be found in [DEV\_MAN] and in the [iPhone\_UG] and [iPad\_UG] section "[Apps](#)" → "[Files](#)" → "[Set up iCloud Drive](#)".

### 5.6.9.2 Mobile device users

In the evaluated configuration, the mobile device user is not allowed to configure the iCloud Drive Documents and Data functionality.

### 5.6.9.3 Mobile device administrators

It is mandatory that the mobile device administrator disable iCloud Drive Documents and Data during initial setup of the device. Using the Restrictions Payload, the *allowCloudDocumentSync* key should be used. The following table provides additional details about these keys.

Payload	Key	Description
Restrictions	<i>allowCloudDocumentSync</i>	Should be set to <i>false</i> .  This disables document and key-value syncing to iCloud.

Additional information on these settings can be found in [DEV\_MAN].



## 5.6.10 Secure Software Updates

### 5.6.10.1 General information

The mobile device startup process helps ensure that only Apple-signed code can be installed on a device. To prevent devices from being downgraded to older versions that lack the latest security updates, iOS/iPadOS uses a process called System Software Authorization. If downgrades were possible, an attacker who gains possession of a device could install an older version of iOS/iPadOS and exploit a vulnerability that has been fixed in the newer version.

Software updates to the mobile devices are released regularly to address emerging security concerns and also provide new features; these updates are provided for all supported devices simultaneously. A request is sent to the mobile device to pull the update from the servers. Updates are delivered wirelessly, encouraging rapid adoption of the latest security fixes as well as downloadable through the iTunes and Finder applications.

Mobile device users receive iOS/iPadOS update notifications on the mobile device, through Finder on macOS versions 10.15.0 (Catalina) and higher, or through iTunes on macOS versions prior to 10.15.0 and on PCs. Note that the iTunes application is not available on macOS versions 10.15.0 and higher. The mobile device user is notified of the availability of the update upon connection of the device via a USB cable.

iOS/iPadOS software updates can be installed automatically (if the Software 'Automatic Updates' Settings are turned ON in [Settings » General » Software Update » Automatic Updates](#) on the device) or manually using over-the-air (OTA) on the device. Software updates may also be installed manually using Finder on macOS versions 10.15.0 (Catalina) and higher, or manually using iTunes on macOS versions prior to 10.15.0 and on PCs. A USB connection between the computer and the device is necessary to perform updates using Finder or iTunes.

With Finder or iTunes, a full copy of iOS/iPadOS is downloaded and installed. OTA software updates download only the components required to complete an update, rather than downloading the entire OS, improving network efficiency. Additionally, software updates can be cached on a local network server running the caching service on macOS Server so that iOS/iPadOS devices do not need to access Apple servers to obtain the necessary update data. Software updates may also be cached on a standard macOS system using the built-in Caching Service which can be found in [System Preferences » Sharing » Content Caching](#). More information about content caching on macOS can be found in [CONTENT-CACHING].

All iOS/iPadOS updates are digitally signed by Apple. The user can verify the software version installed on the mobile devices. Refer to section 4.2.2 Verifying the device(s) for more information.

More info about iOS/iPadOS application and system security as well as encryption and data protection can be found in [AP\_SEC].

### 5.6.10.2 Mobile device users

The integrity and authenticity of software updates is ensured by the design of iOS/iPadOS. There is no configuration for a device user to change that. Mobile device users can update iOS/iPadOS

software on their device. See [iPhone\_UG] section [“Restart, update, reset, and restore”](#) → [“Update iOS”](#) and [iPad\_UG] section [“Restart, update, reset, and restore”](#) → [“Update iPadOS”](#).

#### 5.6.10.3 Mobile device administrators

The integrity and authenticity of software updates is ensured by the design of iOS/iPadOS. There is no configuration for a device administrator to change that.

Mobile device administrators can delay iOS/iPadOS software updates by setting the *forceDelayedSoftwareUpdates* and *enforcedSoftwareUpdateDelay* keys in the Restrictions Payload. More information can be found in section [DEV\_MAN] section [“Profile-Specific Payload Keys”](#) subsection [“Restrictions”](#).

### 5.6.11 Enable/Disable Remote Backup

#### 5.6.11.1 General information

The devices have the functionality to backup remotely to iCloud. In the evaluated configuration, this functionality must be disabled.

Backups are done using iCloud on the device or by connecting the device to a computer using a USB cable and using Finder on macOS versions 10.15.0 (Catalina) and higher, or using iTunes on macOS versions prior to 10.15.0 and on PCs. Note that the iTunes application is not available on macOS versions 10.15.0 and higher.

If backup is enabled, iCloud automatically backs up a device daily when the device is connected to power, locked, and on Wi-Fi. In the evaluated configuration, backups to iCloud are not allowed and must be restricted by the mobile device administrator using a configuration profile.

#### 5.6.11.2 Mobile device users

Device users can use disable remote backup to iCloud or enable backup to a Mac or PC by following the instructions provided in the [iPhone\_UG] section [“Restart, update, reset, and restore”](#) → [“Back up iPhone”](#) and in the [iPad\_UG] section [“Restart, update, reset, and restore”](#) → [“Back up iPad”](#).

Mobile device users should note that backup to a Mac or PC is done by connecting the device to a computer using a USB cable and using Finder on macOS versions 10.15.0 (Catalina) and higher, or using iTunes on macOS versions prior to 10.15.0 and on PCs. Note that the iTunes application is not available on macOS versions 10.15.0 and higher.

#### 5.6.11.3 Mobile device administrators

In the evaluated configuration, administrators must disable remote backup for the mobile device to iCloud by setting the *allowCloudBackup* key to ‘false’ in the Restrictions Payload.

This does not restrict mobile device users from backing up a device to a Mac or PC, which is allowed in the evaluated configuration.

Additional information on these settings can be found in [DEV\_MAN] and example Configuration Profiles can be found in [Appendix: Configuration Profiles](#).

## 5.6.12 Configure Application Installation Policy

### 5.6.12.1 General information

Apple recommends that MDM is used to manage applications for an enterprise. MDM can be used to help users install enterprise apps.

### 5.6.12.2 Mobile device users

In the evaluated configuration, mobile device users cannot change the application installation policy.

### 5.6.12.3 Mobile device administrators

It is mandatory that mobile device administrators configure an application installation policy.

This is accomplished by setting *allowAppInstallation* to 'false' in the Restrictions Payload, which means that the App Store is disabled. Mobile device users are unable to install or update their applications.

## 5.6.13 Importing keys/ shared secrets

### 5.6.13.1 General information

It is mandatory that key can be imported and destroyed on the mobile devices by the mobile device administrators.

All keys/secrets are automatically stored in secure key storage.

### 5.6.13.2 Mobile device users

In the evaluated configuration, mobile device users cannot import and destroy keys/secrets.

### 5.6.13.3 Mobile device administrators

Mobile device administrators can import keys/secrets into the secure key storage by specifying the value when using dictionary keys that are associated with keys/secrets.

## 5.6.14 Dictionary Keys for Management Functions

Payload	Key	Description
<b>Cameras and Microphones</b>		
Restrictions	<i>allowCamera</i>	If set to 'false' will completely disable the cameras.
Privacy Preferences Policy Control	<i>Camera</i>	Provide the array of bundle IDs / binary installation path that is not allowed to use the camera.

Privacy Preferences Policy Control	<i>Microphone</i>	Provide the array of bundle IDs / binary installation path that is not allowed to use the microphone.
<b>Access Banner</b>		
Restrictions	<i>allowWallpaperModification</i>	Must be false.
<b>Date and Time</b>		
Restrictions	<i>forceAutomaticDateAndTime</i>	Must be true.

*Table 15: Essential keys for Management functions*

## 6 Security Audit

### 6.1 Audit Logging

iOS/iPadOS logging capabilities collect a wide array of information concerning device usage and configuration. The available commands and responses constitute audit records and must be configured by administrators using Configuration Profiles. The details for profile implementation and audit record collection are located in [DEV\_MAN], [PROFS\_LOGS], and [LOGGING].

Each audit record, at a minimum, contains the following:

- date and time of the event
- type of event (this is described as log level and log tag)
- subject identity (this is described as PID and PPID)
- the outcome (success or failure) of the event
- any applicable required additional information

Each field of the example log below corresponds with the above format.

Date and Time	Type of event	Subject identity	The outcome
Dec 10 15:22:29.546196	<Error>:	iPadAir2 neagent[446]	Certificate authentication data could not be verified.  Failed to process IKE Auth packet.

*Figure 1: Example Audit Log*

Table 16: Audit Record Format provides examples of audit events required by [PP\_MD\_V3.1] as well as the [MOD\_MDM\_AGENT], [MOD\_VPN\_CLI] and [PP\_WLAN\_CLI\_EP].

SFR specified in [IOS_ST] and the [IPADOS_ST]	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents	Example of Audit Records
<b>Device audit records</b>			
FAU_GEN.1(1) {MDF}	Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions	No additional information.	Dec 5 11:34:58 iPhone-6s mdmd(libdyld.dylib)[6307] <Notice>: mdmd starting...  Dec 5 11:39:19 iPhone-6s mdmd(libdyld.dylib)[6314] <Notice>: mdmd preparing to stop.
	All auditable events for the [ <i>not selected</i> ] level of audit	No additional information.	Dec 5 11:34:58 iPhone-6s mdmd(libdyld.dylib)[6307] <Notice>: mdmd starting...
	All administrative actions	No additional information.	Dec 5 12:30:48 iPhone-6s dmd[3038] <Notice>: Received request: <DMFInstallProfileRequest: 0x100c207f0>, from client: <CATTaskSession: 0x100c2f620 { state = Connected, session = BCD262D5-C3B1-4E1F-879C-900ADAF490E, transport = <CATXPCTransport: 0x100c375b0 { state = Connected }> }>
	Start-up and shutdown of the Rich OS	No additional information.	Apr 27 14:39:22 iPhone SpringBoard(SpringBoard)[57] <Notice>: Shutdown requested for with context: <SBShutdownContext:0x282a38940 - reason:'Powerdown UI'; fromUserPowerDown:YES>  Apr 27 14:39:22 iPhone SpringBoard(FrontBoard)[57] <Notice>: [com.apple.Preferences] Executing termination for reason shutting down system with request: <FBSPProcessTerminationRequest: 0x283f717c0; label: "Shutdown (<SBShutdownContext:0x282a38940 - reason:'Powerdown UI'; fromUserPowerDown:YES>)">; exceptionCode: "Force Quit (0xFBFBFBFB)"; performGracefully: YES; reportType: (none);

SFR specified in [IOS_ST] and the [IPADOS_ST]	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents	Example of Audit Records
			<p>explanation: "Shutdown (&lt;SBShutdownContext:0x282a38940 - reason:'Powerdown UI'; fromUserPowerDown:YES&gt;)"&gt;</p> <p>Apr 27 14:39:22 iPhone CommCenter(IMFoundation)[80] &lt;Notice&gt;: IMSystemMonitor: Updating to note that system is currently shutting down</p> <p>Apr 27 14:39:22 iPhone rapportd(IMFoundation)[76] &lt;Notice&gt;: IMSystemMonitor: Received IMSystemMonitorSBShutdownCallback</p> <p>Apr 27 14:39:22 iPhone rapportd(IMFoundation)[76] &lt;Notice&gt;: IMSystemMonitor: Updating to note that system is currently shutting down</p> <p>Apr 27 14:39:22 iPhone contextstored(CoreDuet)[56] &lt;Notice&gt;: Got shutdown notification com.apple.springboard.deviceWillShutDown</p> <p>Apr 27 14:39:22 iPhone contextstored(CoreDuet)[56] &lt;Notice&gt;: Calling shutdown handler for monitor &lt;private&gt;.</p> <p>Apr 27 14:39:22 iPhone SpringBoard(RunningBoardServices)[57] &lt;Notice&gt;: Firing exit handlers for 190 with context &lt;RBSPProcessExitContext; specific: &lt;RBSPProcessExitStatus; domain: frontboard (10); code: 0xfbfbfbf&gt;; terminationContext: &lt;RBSTerminateContext: 0x2831c9540; domain: 10; code: 0xFBFBFBFB; explanation: "Shutdown (&lt;SBShutdownContext:0x282a38940 - reason:'Powerdown UI'; fromUserPowerDown:YES&gt;)"</p>
FCS_STG_EXT.1 {MDF}	Import or key destruction	Identity of key. Role and identity of requestor.	<p>49506633: AKS unwrap_media_key_from_class succeeded for tag = 7</p> <p>49506633: aks_migrate_SEPUUID2b_to_classM_key() succeeded for AES, container = /dev/disk0s1</p> <p>49506633: AKS unwrap_media_key_from_class succeeded for tag = 7</p>

SFR specified in [IOS_ST] and the [IPADOS_ST]	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents	Example of Audit Records
			<p>apfs_meta_crypto_state_unwrap:980: got key for volume 2F29025D-A75E-40CE-9EFE-61A6B8848880</p> <p>apfs_device_locked:3837: apfs Data is now UN-locked! (flags 0x40)</p>
FCS_STG_EXT.3 {MDF}	Failure to verify integrity of stored key.	Identity of key being verified.	apfs_unwrap_key:1263: AKS unwrap_key failed, error = e00002e2
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 {MDF} {AGENT}	Failure to establish an EAP-TLS session.	Reason for failure.  Non-iOS/iPadOS device endpoint connection.	<p>May 13 15:28:40 iPhone wifid(WiFiPolicy)[45] &lt;Notice&gt;: {ASSOC+} Attempting Apple80211AssociateAsync</p> <p>May 13 15:28:40 iPhone wifid(WiFiPolicy)[45] &lt;Notice&gt;: Attempting to join EAP network: test</p> <p>May 13 15:28:41 iPhone wifid(WiFiPolicy)[45] &lt;Notice&gt;: {ASSOC*} Completed Apple80211AssociateAsync (-3905 - 0xFFFFF0BF)</p> <p>May 13 15:28:41 iPhone wifid(WiFiPolicy)[45] &lt;Error&gt;: {ASSOC-} Failed to join(-3905 - 0xFFFFF0BF): test</p>
	Establishment/termination of an EAP-TLS session.	Reason for failure.  Non-iOS/iPadOS device endpoint connection.	<p>May 13 15:28:40 iPhone wifid(WiFiPolicy)[45] &lt;Notice&gt;: {ASSOC+} Attempting Apple80211AssociateAsync</p> <p>May 13 15:28:40 iPhone wifid(WiFiPolicy)[45] &lt;Notice&gt;: Attempting to join EAP network: test</p> <p>May 13 15:28:41 iPhone wifid(WiFiPolicy)[45] &lt;Notice&gt;: {ASSOC*} Completed Apple80211AssociateAsync (-3905 - 0xFFFFF0BF)</p> <p>May 13 15:28:41 iPhone wifid(WiFiPolicy)[45] &lt;Error&gt;: {ASSOC-} Failed to join(-3905 - 0xFFFFF0BF): test</p>
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 {MDF}	Failure to encrypt/decrypt data.	No additional information.	<p>Sep 25 09:19:38 iPhone securityd[96] &lt;Notice&gt;: ks_encrypt_data (db): failed:</p> <p>AppleKeyStore: operation failed (pid: 156 sel: 17 ret: e00002c2 '-536870206')</p>



SFR specified in [IOS_ST] and the [IPADOS_ST]	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents	Example of Audit Records
FDP_DAR_EXT.2 {MDF}			
FDP_STG_EXT.1 {MDF}	Addition or removal of certificate from Trust Anchor Database	Subject name of certificate	May 13 13:40:22 iPhone mc_mobile_tunnel(MDM)[4225] <Notice>: Attempting to perform Supervised request: RemoveProfile  May 13 13:40:22 iPhone profiled[97] <Notice>: Removing profile \M-b\M^\M^\Testers-MacBook-Air.local.D3DACE3B-FD7E-489B-B20C-FC89E076C028\M-b\M^\M^\M^]...  May 13 13:40:22 iPhone profiled[97] <Notice>: Committing restrictions.
FIA_X509_EXT.1 {MDF} {VPN} {AGENT}	Failure to validate x.509v3 certificate	Reason for failure of validation	default 14:49:33.115596+0200 nsurlsessiond boringssl_session_handshake_incomplete(191) [C5.1:2][0x10119f090] Early handshake return caused by SSL_ERROR_WANT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY [16]
FPT_TST_EXT.1/WLAN {WLAN}	Initiation of self-test	No additional information.	SEP: SEP: FIPS POST begin  SEP: FIPSPOST_L4 fipspost_post:109: PASSED: (2 ms) - fipspost_post_integrity  SEP: sks: FIPS POST Succeeded
FPT_TST_EXT.1/WLAN {WLAN}	Failure of self-test	No additional information.	fipspost_post fipspost_post_integrity -POST_FAILURE: 0xFFFFFFFF
FPT_TST_EXT.2(1) {MDF}	Start-up of iOS/iPadOS device	No additional information.	Darwin Kernel Version 19.0.0: Wed Oct 9 22:37:47 PDT 2019; root:xnu_development-6153.42.1~1/DEVELOPMENT_ARM64_T8010 iBoot version: iBoot-5540.40.51
FPT_TST_EXT.1/WLAN {WLAN}	Execution of this set of TSF self-test.	No additional information.	corecrypto_kext_start called: tracing enabled  FIPSPOST_KEXT fipspost_post:109: PASSED: (0 ms) - fipspost_post_integrity

SFR specified in [IOS_ST] and the [IPADOS_ST]	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents	Example of Audit Records
			<p>FIPSPPOST_KEXT fipspost_post:115: PASSED: (0 ms) - fipspost_post_hmac</p> <p>FIPSPPOST_KEXT fipspost_post:117: PASSED: (0 ms) - fipspost_post_aes_ecb</p> <p>FIPSPPOST_KEXT fipspost_post:118: PASSED: (0 ms) - fipspost_post_aes_cbc</p> <p>FIPSPPOST_KEXT fipspost_post:119: PASSED: (0 ms) - fipspost_post_aes_gcm</p> <p>FIPSPPOST_KEXT fipspost_post:120: PASSED: (0 ms) - fipspost_post_aes_xts</p> <p>FIPSPPOST_KEXT fipspost_post:121: PASSED: (0 ms) - fipspost_post_tdes_cbc</p> <p>FIPSPPOST_KEXT fipspost_post:125: PASSED: (39 ms) - fipspost_post_rsa_sig</p> <p>FIPSPPOST_KEXT fipspost_post:126: PASSED: (9 ms) - fipspost_post_ecdsa</p> <p>FIPSPPOST_KEXT fipspost_post:127: PASSED: (2 ms) - fipspost_post_ecdh</p> <p>FIPSPPOST_KEXT fipspost_post:128: PASSED: (0 ms) - fipspost_post_drbg_ctr</p> <p>FIPSPPOST_KEXT fipspost_post:129: PASSED: (0 ms) - fipspost_post_drbg_hmac</p> <p>FIPSPPOST_KEXT fipspost_post:136: all tests PASSED (129 ms)</p>
FTA_WSE_EXT.1 {WLAN}	All attempts to connect to access points.	Identity of access point being connected to as well as success and failures	<p>May 13 15:28:40 iPhone wifid(WiFiPolicy)[45] &lt;Notice&gt;: {ASSOC+} Attempting Apple80211AssociateAsync</p> <p>May 13 15:28:40 iPhone wifid(WiFiPolicy)[45] &lt;Notice&gt;: Attempting to join EAP network: test</p>

SFR specified in [IOS_ST] and the [IPADOS_ST]	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents	Example of Audit Records
		(including reason for failure)	<p>May 13 15:28:41 iPhone wifid(WiFiPolicy)[45] &lt;Notice&gt;: {ASSOC*} Completed Apple80211AssociateAsync (-3905 - 0xFFFFF0BF)</p> <p>May 13 15:28:41 iPhone wifid(WiFiPolicy)[45] &lt;Error&gt;: {ASSOC-} Failed to join(-3905 - 0xFFFFF0BF): test</p>
FTP_ITC_EXT.1/WLAN (3) {WLAN}	<p>All attempts to establish a trusted channel.</p> <p>Detection of modification of channel data.</p>	Identification of the non-iOS/iPadOS device endpoint of the channel.	<p>Apr 27 15:36:58 iPhone wifid(WiFiPolicy)[45] &lt;Notice&gt;: {ASSOC+} Attempting Apple80211AssociateAsync</p> <p>Apr 27 15:36:58 iPhone wifid(WiFiPolicy)[45] &lt;Notice&gt;: Attempting to join WPA network: test</p> <p>Apr 27 15:36:59 iPhone wifid(WiFiPolicy)[45] &lt;Notice&gt;: {ASSOC*} Completed Apple80211AssociateAsync (0 - 0x0)</p> <p>Apr 27 15:36:59 iPhone wifid(WiFiPolicy)[45] &lt;Notice&gt;: {ASSOC-} Joined: test</p>
Agent related audit records			
FAU_GEN.1(2) {AGENT}	Start-up and shutdown of the MDM Agent	No additional information.	<p>Dec 5 11:34:58 iPhone-6s mdmd(libdyld.dylib)[6307] &lt;Notice&gt;: mdmd starting...</p> <p>Dec 5 11:39:19 iPhone-6s mdmd(libdyld.dylib)[6314] &lt;Notice&gt;: mdmd preparing to stop.</p>
	Change in MDM policy	No additional information.	May 13 14:10:46 iPhone profiled[97] <Notice>: Profile \M-b\M^@\M^\Tester-MacBook-Air.local.D3DACE3B-FD7E-489B-B20C-FC89E076C028\M-b\M^@\M^] is replacing an existing profile having the same identifier.
	Any modification commanded by the MDM Server	No additional information.	default 15:05:35.071156+0200 mdmd Received push notification.

SFR specified in [IOS_ST] and the [IPADOS_ST]	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents	Example of Audit Records
FAU_ALT_EXT.2 {AGENT}	Type of alert.	No additional information.	Dec 5 11:34:58 iPhone-6s mdmd(libdyld.dylib)[6307] <Notice>: mdmd starting.
FAU_SEL.1(2) {AGENT}	All modifications to the audit configuration that occur while the audit collection functions are operating.	No additional information.	May 13 14:40:22 iPhone profiled[97] <Notice>: Profile \M-b\M^\M^\Tester-MacBook-Air.local.D3DACE3B-FD7E-489B-B20C-FC89E076C028\M-b\M^\M^\ removed.
			May 13 13:40:22 iPhone mc_mobile_tunnel(MDM)[4225] <Notice>: Attempting to perform Supervised request: RemoveProfile May 13 14:10:22 iPhone mc_mobile_tunnel(MDM)[4225] <Notice>: Handling request type: RemoveProfile
			May 13 13:40:22 iPhone mc_mobile_tunnel(MDM)[4225] <Notice>: Attempting to perform Supervised request: RemoveProfile May 13 13:40:22 iPhone profiled[97] <Notice>: Removing profile \M-b\M^\M^\Tester-MacBook-Air.local.D3DACE3B-FD7E-489B-B20C-FC89E076C028\M-b\M^\M^\... May 13 13:40:22 iPhone profiled[97] <Notice>: Committing restrictions.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 {MDF} {AGENT}	Failure to establish a TLS session	Reason for failure.  Presented identifier and reference identifier.  Non-iOS/iPadOS device endpoint of connection.	May 13 15:28:40 iPhone wifid(WiFiPolicy)[45] <Notice>: {ASSOC+} Attempting Apple80211AssociateAsync May 13 15:28:40 iPhone wifid(WiFiPolicy)[45] <Notice>: Attempting to join EAP network: test May 13 15:28:41 iPhone wifid(WiFiPolicy)[45] <Notice>: {ASSOC*} Completed Apple80211AssociateAsync (-3905 - 0xFFFFF0BF) May 13 15:28:41 iPhone wifid(WiFiPolicy)[45] <Error>: {ASSOC-} Failed to join(-3905 - 0xFFFFF0BF): test

SFR specified in [IOS_ST] and the [IPADOS_ST]	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents	Example of Audit Records
	Failure to verify presented identifier	Reason for failure.  Presented identifier and reference identifier.  Non-iOS/iPadOS device endpoint of connection.	May 13 15:28:40 iPhone wifid(WiFiPolicy)[45] <Notice>: {ASSOC+} Attempting Apple80211AssociateAsync  May 13 15:28:40 iPhone wifid(WiFiPolicy)[45] <Notice>: Attempting to join EAP network: test  May 13 15:28:41 iPhone wifid(WiFiPolicy)[45] <Notice>: {ASSOC*} Completed Apple80211AssociateAsync (-3905 - 0xFFFFF0BF)  May 13 15:28:41 iPhone wifid(WiFiPolicy)[45] <Error>: {ASSOC-} Failed to join(-3905 - 0xFFFFF0BF): test
	Establishment/termination of a TLS session.	Reason for failure.  Presented identifier and reference identifier.  Non-iOS/iPadOS device endpoint of connection.	May 13 15:28:09 iPhone nsurlsessiond(CFNetwork)[162] <Notice>: Connection 571: enabling TLS
FIA_ENR_EXT.2 {AGENT}	Enrollment in management	Reference identifier of MDM Server	default 14:09:39.308624+0200 profiled Checking for MDM installation... default 14:09:39.312514+0200 profiled ...finished checking for MDM installation.  default 14:09:39.318516+0200 profiled Beginning profile installation... default 14:09:39.318710+0200 profiled Beginning profile installation for com.apple.config.osxserver.atsec.com.mdm

SFR specified in [IOS_ST] and the [IPADOS_ST]	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents	Example of Audit Records
			<p>default 14:09:39.321386+0200 profiled Profile "com.apple.config.osxserver.atsec.com.mdm" is replacing an existing profile having the same identifier.</p> <p>default 14:09:39.346118+0200 profiled Refreshing MDM details.</p> <p>Default 14:09:39.346309+0200 profiled No MDM installation found.</p>
FMT_POL_EXT.2 {AGENT}	Failure of policy validation.	Reason for failure of validation.	<p>error 17:13:20.765096+0200 wifid {ASSOC-} Failed to join(-369033199 - 0xEA010011): test</p> <p>default 15:19:57.113029+0200 wifid {AUTOJOIN, ASSOC*} Failed to associate with test, reason -369033199</p>
FMT_SMF_EXT.3 {AGENT}	Success or failure of function.	No additional information.	default 15:05:35.071156+0200 mdmd Received push notification.
FTP_ITC_EXT.1(2) {AGENT} {MDF}	Initiation and termination of trusted channel.	Trusted channel protocol. Non-iOS/iPadOS device endpoint of connection.	<p>Apr 27 15:36:58 iPhone wifid(WiFiPolicy)[45] &lt;Notice&gt;: {ASSOC+} Attempting Apple80211AssociateAsync</p> <p>Apr 27 15:36:58 iPhone wifid(WiFiPolicy)[45] &lt;Notice&gt;: Attempting to join WPA network: test</p> <p>Apr 27 15:36:59 iPhone wifid(WiFiPolicy)[45] &lt;Notice&gt;: {ASSOC*} Completed Apple80211AssociateAsync (0 - 0x0)</p> <p>Apr 27 15:36:59 iPhone wifid(WiFiPolicy)[45] &lt;Notice&gt;: {ASSOC-} Joined: test</p>

Table 16: Audit Record Format

## 6.2 Audit Storage

Audit records cannot be directly accessed by device users, administrators or MDM administrators on the iOS/iPadOS device regardless of the device's configuration. [AConfig] describes how to use the mobile device console to see all logged. The device console is a function within Apple Configurator 2. While viewing the log files, Administrators have capabilities such as: marking selections, clearing the window to view specific events, or saving the log for troubleshooting.

Additionally, audit records cannot be modified in any way. All audit records can be synced to an MDM application using a Configuration Profile or manually via a trusted workstation using the Apple Configurator 2.

Depending on the underlying OS of the trusted workstation or MDM server, all of the mobile device audit records are transferred to the following locations.

### macOS

- ~/Library/Logs/CrashReporter/MobileDevice/[Your\_Device\_Name]/

### Windows:

- C:\Users\[Your\_User\_Name]\AppData\Roaming\AppleComputer\Logs\CrashReporter\MobileDevice\[Your\_Device\_Name]\

Audit records are not confined by a global capacity limit and are instead predefined individual services depending on what information is being captured. More information may be found in [PROFS\_LOGS].

iOS/iPadOS has a logging framework that is used to configure different logging levels for the various iOS/iPadOS subsystems. This framework is configured by creating and installing a logging configuration profile property list file (i.e., .plist file) into the appropriate directory. More information may be found in [LOGGING].

There is no configuration required for audit log locations. since audit logs are stored in the locations specified in this section, by default. These locations cannot be changed.

If unified logging is used, log messages are written to centralized data store on disk instead of in different directories as text log files. More information may be found in [LOGGING].

## 6.3 Configure the Auditable Items

According to [PROFS\_LOGS], additional logs can be specified by performing user actions on a device or through using a Configuration Profile. The table below shows which audit logs can be optionally gathered, and how they can be initiated.

Log type	Device user	Configuration Profile
3rd Party Apps for iOS	Instructions	

Log type	Device user	Configuration Profile
Accounts/AuthKit for iOS	Instructions	Profile
Ad Platforms for iOS	Instructions	Profile
AirTraffic for iOS	Instructions	
APNS (Apple Push Notification Service) for iOS	Instructions	Profile
App Store for iOS	Instructions	Profile
Apple Pay for iOS	Instructions	Profile
Background Networking for iOS	Instructions	
Baseband for iOS	Instructions	Profile
Battery Life for iOS	Instructions	Profile
Bluetooth for iOS	Instructions	Profile
Calendar/Reminders for iOS	Instructions	Profile
Carousel for iOS	Instructions	
CarPlay for iOS	Instructions	Profile
CFNetwork for iOS	Instructions	Profile
Charles Logs for iOS	Instructions	
Classroom for iOS	Instructions	Profile
CloudKit for iOS	Instructions	Profile
Console Logs for iOS	Instructions	
Contacts Data Export for iOS	Instructions	
Continuity (IDS) for iOS	Instructions	Profile
CoreMedia (HTTP Live Streaming) for iOS	Instructions	Profile
Crash Logs for iOS	Instructions	
Device-specific Information for iOS	Instructions	
Disk Space Diagnostics (FSMetadata) for iOS	Instructions	Profile
Enterprise SSO and Kerberos for iOS	Instructions	Profile
FaceTime for iOS	Instructions	Profile
Handoff for iOS	Instructions	
HangTracer (Slow UI)	Instructions	Profile
Health Database Extraction for iOS	Instructions	
HealthKit for iOS	Instructions	Profile



Log type	Device user	Configuration Profile
Home app/HomeKit for iOS	Instructions	Profile
HomePod for iOS	Instructions	Profile
iAP for iOS	Instructions	Profile
iCloud Backup for iOS	Instructions	Profile
iCloud Drive for iOS	Instructions	Profile
iCloud Photos for iOS	Instructions	Profile
iWork for iOS	Instructions	Profile
Location Services for iOS	Instructions	Profile
Mail for iOS	Instructions	Profile
Mail Sync Diagnostics for iOS	Instructions	
Managed Configuration (MDM) for iOS	Instructions	Profile
Maps for iOS	Instructions	Profile
mDNSResponder for iOS	Instructions	Profile
Media Player for iOS	Instructions	
Messages for iOS	Instructions	Profile
Multipeer Connectivity for iOS	Instructions	
Music for iOS	Instructions	
Network Diagnostics for iOS	Instructions	Profile
Notes for iOS	Instructions	Profile
Phone (General) for iOS	Instructions	Profile
Photos Logging for iOS	Instructions	Profile
Podcasts for iOS	Instructions	
Schoolwork/ClassKit	Instructions	Profile
Screenshots and Screen Recordings for iOS	Instructions	
Significant Locations for iOS	Instructions	Profile
Single Sign-On for iOS	Instructions	Profile
Siri for iOS	Instructions	Profile
Slow Launches (Launch Hangs) for iOS	Instructions	Profiles
Software Update for iOS	Instructions	Profile
Spotlight for iOS	Instructions	Profile

Log type	Device user	Configuration Profile
Stackshots for iOS	Instructions	
Sync Diagnostics (DataAccess) for iOS	Instructions	Profile
sysdiagnose for iOS	Instructions	Profile
Tailspin for iOS	Instructions	Profile
TCP Dump for iOS	Instructions	
Test Cases/Sample Projects for iOS	Instructions	
TestFlight for iOS	Instructions	Profile
Touch ID for iOS	Instructions	Profile
Unlock for iOS	Instructions	
Updater for iOS	Instructions	
VPN (Network Extension) for iOS	Instructions	Profile
Wallet for iOS	Instructions	Profile
Wi-Fi for iOS	Instructions	Profile

Table 17: Additional Audit Logs

## 7 Installed Apps

Table 18: Built-in and Preinstalled Apps lists the Built-in and pre-installed applications on the mobile devices. Those marked "Built in" cannot be removed. Those marked "Preinstalled" are included with purchased devices but may be removed by the user or administrator.

Devices purchased in accordance with section 4.2.1 Obtaining the mobile device(s) do not include any other third party applications when purchased.

App Name	iPad	iPhone
App Store	Built In	Built In
Books	Built In	Built In
Calculator	Not Available	Built In
Calendar	Built In	Built In
Camera	Built In	Built In
Clock	Built In	Built In
Contacts	Built In	Built In
Clips	Preinstalled	Preinstalled
Compass	Not Available	Built In
FaceTime	Built In	Built In
Files	Built In	Built In
Find My	Built In	Built In
Health	Not Available	Built In
Home	Built In	Built In
iTunes Store	Built In	Built In
Mail	Built In	Built In
Maps	Built In	Built In
Measure	Built In	Built In
Messages	Built In	Built In
Music	Built In	Built In
News	Built In	Built In
Notes	Built In	Built In
Phone	Not Available	Built In
Photo Booth	Built In	Not Available
Photos	Built In	Built In

App Name	iPad	iPhone
Podcasts	Built In	Built In
Reminders	Built In	Built In
Safari	Built In	Built In
Settings	Built In	Built In
Shortcuts	Built In	Built In
Siri	Built In	Built In
Stocks	Built In	Built In
Tips	Built In	Built In
Translate	Not Available	Built In
TV	Built In	Built In
Voice Memos	Built In	Built In
Weather	Not Available	Built In
Wallet	Not Available	Built In
Watch	Not Available	Built In
Pages	Preinstalled	Preinstalled
Numbers	Preinstalled	Preinstalled
Keynote	Preinstalled	Preinstalled
iMovie	Preinstalled	Preinstalled
GarageBand	Preinstalled	Preinstalled
Clips	Preinstalled	Preinstalled
Apple Store app	Preinstalled	Preinstalled

***Table 18: Built-in and Preinstalled Apps***

## 8 References

Table 1: Guidance Documents, contains the references to the guidance documents used when configuring the mobile devices. Below are the references documents providing further more detailed technical information.

[BT] Specification of the Bluetooth System

<https://www.bluetooth.com/specifications>

[PP\_MD\_V3.1] U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.1

<https://www.niap-ccevs.org/Profile/Info.cfm?id=417>

[MOD\_MDM\_AGENT\_V1.0] U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile – PP-Module for MDM Agents Version 1.0

<https://www.niap-ccevs.org/Profile/Info.cfm?PPID=441&id=441>

[PP\_WLAN\_CLI\_EP\_V1.0] Extended Package for WLAN Client Version 1.0

<https://www.niap-ccevs.org/Profile/Info.cfm?id=386>

[MOD\_VPN\_CLI\_EP\_V2.1] PP-Module for VPN Client Version 2.1

<https://niap-ccevs.org/Profile/Info.cfm?PPID=419&id=419>

[CORECRYPTO]

Apple corecrypto Module v11.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software] (User Space):

<https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/validated-modules/>

[CORECRYPTO\_KERNEL]

Apple corecrypto Module v11.0 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] (Kernel Space):

<https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/validated-modules/>

[SECURE\_KEY\_STORE]

Apple corecrypto Module v11.0 [Apple silicon, Secure Key Store, Hardware]:

<https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/validated-modules/>

## 9 Abbreviations and Acronyms

<b>ABM</b>	Apple Business Manager	<b>JTAG</b>	Joint Test Action Group
<b>AES</b>	Advanced Encryption Standard	<b>KEK</b>	Key Encryption Key
<b>API</b>	Application Programming Interface	<b>L2TP</b>	Layer Two Tunneling Protocol
<b>APNS</b>	Apple Push Notification Service	<b>LE</b>	Low Energy
<b>ARM</b>	Advanced RISC Machine	<b>LTE</b>	Long-Term Evolution
<b>ASLR</b>	Anti-Exploitation Services	<b>MDF</b>	Mobile Device Fundamentals
<b>CA</b>	Certificate of Authority	<b>MDFPP</b>	Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile
<b>CBC</b>	Cypher Block Chaining	<b>MDM</b>	Mobile Device Management
<b>CC</b>	Common Criteria	<b>NITZ</b>	Network Identity and Time Zone
<b>CCM</b>	Counter with CBC-MAC	<b>NFC</b>	Near Field Communication
<b>CRL</b>	Certificate Revocation List	<b>NTP</b>	Network Time Protocol
<b>DAR</b>	Data-at-Rest	<b>OCSP</b>	Online Certificate Status Protocol
<b>DEK</b>	Data Encryption Key	<b>OTA</b>	Over-the-Air
<b>DEP</b>	Device Enrollment Program	<b>PAE</b>	Port Access Entity
<b>DES</b>	Data Encryption Standard	<b>PBKDF</b>	Password Based Key Derivation Function
<b>DH</b>	Diffie-Hellman	<b>PKCS</b>	Public Key Cryptography Standards
<b>DRBG</b>	Deterministic Random Bit Generator	<b>PKI</b>	Public Key Infrastructure
<b>EAP</b>	Extensible Authentication Protocol	<b>PP</b>	Protection Profile
<b>EAP-TLS</b>	Extensible Authentication Protocol-Transport Layer Security	<b>REK</b>	Root Encryption Key
<b>ECC</b>	Elliptic Curve Cryptography	<b>RISC</b>	Reduced Instruction Set Computing
<b>ECDH</b>	Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman	<b>RSA</b>	Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
<b>ECDSA</b>	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm	<b>SA</b>	Secure Association
<b>EP</b>	Extended Package	<b>SCEP</b>	Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol
<b>FIA</b>	Identification and Authentication	<b>SEP</b>	Secure Enclave Processor
<b>FIPS</b>	Federal Information Processing Standard	<b>SFR</b>	Security Functional Requirement
<b>GCM</b>	Galois/Counter Mode	<b>SHA</b>	Secure Hash Algorithm
<b>GPS</b>	Global Positioning Satellites	<b>SPD</b>	Security Policy Database
<b>GSM</b>	Global System for Mobile Communications	<b>SSID</b>	Service Set Identifier
<b>GTK</b>	Group Temporal Key	<b>SSL</b>	Secure Sockets Layer
<b>HMAC</b>	Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code	<b>ST</b>	Security Target
<b>IKE</b>	Internet Key Exchange	<b>TLS</b>	Transport Layer Security
<b>IPsec</b>	Internet Protocol Security	<b>TOE</b>	Target of Evaluation
<b>IV</b>	Initialization Vector	<b>TSF</b>	TOE Security Functionality
<b>JSON</b>	JavaScript Object Notation	<b>UI</b>	User Interface
		<b>UUID</b>	Universally Unique Identifier
		<b>UI</b>	User Interface
		<b>UWB</b>	Ultra-Wideband
		<b>VPN</b>	Virtual Private Network

<b>WLAN</b>	Wireless Local Area Network	<b>XML</b>	Extensible Markup Language
<b>WPA</b>	Wi-Fi Protected Access		
<b>WPA2</b>	Wi-Fi Protected Access 2		

## 10 Appendix: Configuration Profiles

### 10.1 Configuration Profile 1: “MDF PP Configuration Profile AirPrint”

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
  <key>AccessRights</key>
  <integer>8</integer>
  <key>ConsentText</key>
  <dict>
    <key>default</key>
    <string>Configuration profile achieving compliance with the security settings defined by the Common Criteria
evaluation.</string>
  </dict>
  <key>HasRemovalPasscode</key>
  <false/>
  <key>PayloadContent</key>
  <array>
    <dict>
      <key>AirPrint</key>
      <array>
        <dict>
          <key>ForceTLS</key>
          <true/>
        </dict>
      </array>
      <key>PayloadDescription</key>
      <string>AirPrint Configuration</string>
      <key>PayloadDisplayName</key>
      <string>AirPrint</string>
      <key>PayloadIdentifier</key>
      <string>com.apple.airprint.F0AC096F-52CD-4FAB-83A3-675259987CD7</string>
      <key>PayloadType</key>
      <string>com.apple.airprint</string>
      <key>PayloadUUID</key>
      <string>F0AC096F-52CD-4FAB-83A3-675259987CD7</string>
      <key>PayloadVersion</key>
      <integer>1</integer>
    </dict>
  </array>
  <key>PayloadDescription</key>
  <string>The configuration profile defining the AirPrint restrictions provides the general settings compliant to the
Common Criteria evaluated configuration following the Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile.</string>
  <key>PayloadDisplayName</key>
```



```

<string>MDF PP Configuration Profile AirPrint</string>
<key>PayloadIdentifier</key>
<string>MDFPP2020.7F5C2634-0C2B-4610-9FCB-65B6298D8734</string>
<key>PayloadRemovalDisallowed</key>
<true/>
<key>PayloadType</key>
<string>Configuration</string>
<key>PayloadUUID</key>
<string>42FA88A0-76CF-4D15-90C3-EED747194B32</string>
<key>PayloadVersion</key>
<integer>1</integer>
</dict>
</plist>

```

## 10.2 Configuration Profile 2: "MDF PP Configuration Profile for General Restrictions"

```

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
  <key>AccessRights</key>
  <integer>8</integer>
  <key>ConsentText</key>
  <dict>
    <key>default</key>
    <string>Configuration profile achieving compliance with the security settings defined by the Common Criteria
evaluation.</string>
  </dict>
  <key>HasRemovalPasscode</key>
  <false/>
  <key>PayloadContent</key>
  <array>
    <dict>
      <key>PayloadDescription</key>
      <string>Restriction Configuration</string>
      <key>PayloadDisplayName</key>
      <string>Restrictions</string>
      <key>PayloadIdentifier</key>
      <string>com.apple.applicationaccess.16FBE9FC-1D94-49F8-91EA-806F0CE6B3EC</string>
      <key>PayloadType</key>
      <string>com.apple.applicationaccess</string>
      <key>PayloadUUID</key>
      <string>16FBE9FC-1D94-49F8-91EA-806F0CE6B3EC</string>
      <key>PayloadVersion</key>
      <integer>1</integer>
    </dict>
  </array>
</dict>
</plist>

```

```

    <key>allowAssistant</key>
    <false/>
    <key>allowAssistantUserGeneratedContent</key>
    <false/>
    <key>allowAssistantWhileLocked</key>
    <false/>
    <key>allowLockScreenControlCenter</key>
    <false/>
    <key>allowEnablingRestrictions</key>
    <false/>
    <key>allowUSBRestrictedMode</key>
    <true/>

    <key>allowUntrustedTLSPrompt</key>
    <false/>
    <key>forceAirPrintTrustedTLSRequirement</key>
    <true/>

    <key>allowWallpaperModification</key>
    <true/>
    <key>forceAutomaticDateAndTime</key>
    <false/>

    <!-- Optional settings to further restrict permissions

    <key>allowEraseContentAndSettings</key>
    <false/>

    <key>allowCamera</key>
    <false/>

    -->
  </dict>
</array>
<key>PayloadDescription</key>
<string>The configuration profile defining general restrictions locks various mechanisms to the secure settings
compliant to the Common Criteria evaluated configuration following the Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection
Profile.</string>
<key>PayloadDisplayName</key>
<string>MDF PP Configuration Profile for General Restrictions</string>
<key>PayloadIdentifier</key>
<string>MDFPP2020.7F5C2634-0C2B-4610-9FCB-65B6298D8732</string>
<key>PayloadRemovalDisallowed</key>
<true/>
<key>PayloadType</key>
<string>Configuration</string>
<key>PayloadUUID</key>
<string>1FAFA759-5DE3-4EEA-8F8E-8F742A2DADC2</string>

```

```

    <key>PayloadVersion</key>
    <integer>1</integer>
  </dict>
</plist>

```

### 10.3 Configuration Profile 3: "MDF PP Configuration Profile Passcode Restrictions"

```

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
  <key>AccessRights</key>
  <integer>8</integer>
  <key>ConsentText</key>
  <dict>
    <key>default</key>
    <string>Configuration profile achieving compliance with the security settings defined by the Common Criteria
evaluation.</string>
  </dict>
  <key>HasRemovalPasscode</key>
  <false/>
  <key>PayloadContent</key>
  <array>
    <dict>
      <key>PayloadDescription</key>
      <string>Passcode Restrictions</string>
      <key>PayloadDisplayName</key>
      <string>Code</string>
      <key>PayloadIdentifier</key>
      <string>com.apple.mobiledevice.passwordpolicy.41664EF5-450A-48C0-A19B-970C5E522638</string>
      <key>PayloadType</key>
      <string>com.apple.mobiledevice.passwordpolicy</string>
      <key>PayloadUUID</key>
      <string>41664EF5-450A-48C0-A19B-970C5E522638</string>
      <key>PayloadVersion</key>
      <integer>1</integer>
      <key>allowSimple</key>
      <false/>
      <key>forcePIN</key>
      <true/>

      <!-- Any value between 2 and 11 -->
      <key>maxFailedAttempts</key>
      <integer>10</integer>
    </dict>
  </array>
</dict>
</plist>

```

```

    <!-- Any value defined by organization -->
    <key>maxInactivity</key>
    <integer>2</integer>

    <!-- Any value defined by organization -->
    <key>maxPINAgeInDays</key>
    <integer>360</integer>

    <!-- Any value defined by organization -->
    <key>minComplexChars</key>
    <integer>1</integer>

    <!-- Any value defined by organization -->
    <key>minLength</key>
    <integer>6</integer>

    <!-- Any value defined by organization -->
    <key>minHistory</key>
    <integer>1</integer>

    <!-- Any value defined by organization -->
    <key>maxGracePeriod</key>
    <integer>0</integer>

    <!-- Any value defined by organization -->
    <key>allowFingerprintModification</key>
    <true/>
  </dict>
</array>
<key>PayloadDescription</key>
<string>The configuration profile template provides passcode restrictions compliant to the Common Criteria
evaluated configuration following the Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile.</string>
<key>PayloadDisplayName</key>
<string>MDF PP Configuration Profile for Passcode Restrictions</string>
<key>PayloadIdentifier</key>
<string>MDFPP2020.7F5C2634-0C2B-4610-9FCB-65B6298D8733</string>
<key>PayloadRemovalDisallowed</key>
<true/>
<key>PayloadType</key>
<string>Configuration</string>
<key>PayloadUUID</key>
<string>754A56E0-6E64-444E-9675-FBBE0DE5CAB0</string>
<key>PayloadVersion</key>
<integer>1</integer>
</dict>
</plist>

```

## 10.4 Configuration Profile 4: "MDF PP Configuration Profile VPN"

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
  <key>ConsentText</key>
  <dict>
    <key>default</key>
    <string>Configuration profile achieving compliance with the security settings defined by the Common Criteria
evaluation.</string>
  </dict>
  <key>HasRemovalPasscode</key>
  <false/>
  <key>PayloadContent</key>
  <array>
    <dict>
      <!-- Replace certificate -->
      <key>Password</key>
      <string>1234</string>
      <key>PayloadCertificateFileName</key>
      <string>client-certificate.p12</string>
      <key>PayloadContent</key>
      <data>
INVALID
      </data>
      <key>PayloadDescription</key>
      <string>PKCS#12-formatted certificate that MUST be replaced</string>
      <key>PayloadDisplayName</key>
      <string>PKCS#12-formatted certificate that MUST be replaced</string>
      <key>PayloadIdentifier</key>
      <string>com.apple.security.pkcs12.51F4CAA0-B295-4557-8D91-C4BDFB4AE825</string>
      <key>PayloadType</key>
      <string>com.apple.security.pkcs12</string>
      <key>PayloadUUID</key>
      <string>51F4CAA0-B295-4557-8D91-C4BDFB4AE825</string>
      <key>PayloadVersion</key>
      <integer>1</integer>
    </dict>
    <dict>
      <key>AlwaysOn</key>
      <dict>
        <!-- Any value defined by organization is allowed -->
        <key>AllowedCaptiveNetworkPlugins</key>
        <array/>
      </dict>
    </dict>
  </array>
</plist>
```

```

<!-- Any value defined by organization is allowed -->
<key>ServiceExceptions</key>
<array/>

<key>TunnelConfigurations</key>
<array>
  <dict>
    <key>AuthenticationMethod</key>
    <string>Certificate</string>
    <key>ChildSecurityAssociationParameters</key>
    <dict>
      <!-- Allowed options: 5, 14, 15, 19, 20 -->
      <key>DiffieHellmanGroup</key>
      <integer>14</integer>

      <!-- Allowed options: AES-128, AES-256, AES-128-GCM, AES-256-GCM -->
      <key>EncryptionAlgorithm</key>
      <string>AES-256</string>

      <!-- Allowed options: SHA1-160, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 -->
      <key>IntegrityAlgorithm</key>
      <string>SHA2-512</string>

      <!-- Any value defined by organization is allowed -->
      <key>LifeTimeInMinutes</key>
      <integer>1440</integer>
    </dict>

    <!-- Any value defined by organization is allowed -->
    <key>DeadPeerDetectionRate</key>
    <string>Medium</string>

    <key>IKESecurityAssociationParameters</key>
    <dict>
      <!-- Allowed options: 5, 14, 15, 19, 20 -->
      <key>DiffieHellmanGroup</key>
      <integer>14</integer>

      <!-- Allowed options: AES-128, AES-256, AES-128-GCM, AES-256-GCM -->
      <key>EncryptionAlgorithm</key>
      <string>AES-256</string>

      <!-- Allowed options: SHA1-160, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 -->
      <key>IntegrityAlgorithm</key>
      <string>SHA2-512</string>

      <!-- Any value defined by organization is allowed -->
      <key>LifeTimeInMinutes</key>

```

```

        <integer>1440</integer>
    </dict>

    <!-- Any value defined by organization is allowed -->
    <key>Interfaces</key>
    <array>
        <string>Cellular</string>
        <string>WiFi</string>
    </array>

    <!-- Any value defined by organization is allowed -->
    <key>LocalIdentifier</key>
    <string>client</string>

    <!-- Refer to certificate above -->
    <key>PayloadCertificateUUID</key>
    <string>51F4CAA0-B295-4557-8D91-C4BDFB4AE825</string>

    <!-- Allowed options: RSA -->
    <key>CertificateType</key>
    <string>RSA</string>

    <key>ProtocolType</key>
    <string>IKEv2</string>

    <!-- Any value defined by organization is allowed -->
    <key>RemoteAddress</key>
    <string>10.0.0.1</string>

    <!-- Any value defined by organization is allowed -->
    <key>RemoteIdentifier</key>
    <string>server</string>

    <!-- Any value defined by organization is allowed -->
    <key>ServerCertificateCommonName</key>
    <string>server</string>

    <!-- Any value defined by organization is allowed -->
    <key>ServerCertificateIssuerCommonName</key>
    <string>CN of CA certificate</string>
</dict>
</array>
</dict>
<key>IPv4</key>
<dict>
    <key>OverridePrimary</key>
    <integer>1</integer>
</dict>

```

```

    <key>PayloadDescription</key>
    <string>Configures VPN settings</string>
    <key>PayloadDisplayName</key>
    <string>VPN</string>
    <key>PayloadIdentifier</key>
    <string>com.apple.vpn.managed.CC967500-DE00-4AA4-B775-6563EEE7E26D</string>
    <key>PayloadType</key>
    <string>com.apple.vpn.managed</string>
    <key>PayloadUUID</key>
    <string>CC967500-DE00-4AA4-B775-6563EEE7E26D</string>
    <key>PayloadVersion</key>
    <real>1</real>
    <key>Proxies</key>
    <dict/>
    <key>UserDefinedName</key>
    <string>MDFPP Compliant VPN</string>
    <key>VPNType</key>
    <string>AlwaysOn</string>
    <key>OnDemandEnabled</key>
    <integer>0</integer>
    <key>VendorConfig</key>
    <dict/>
  </dict>
</array>

  <key>PayloadDescription</key>
  <string>The configuration profile provides VPN settings compliant to the Common Criteria evaluated configuration
following the Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile.</string>
  <key>PayloadDisplayName</key>
  <string>MDF PP Configuration Profile VPN Settings</string>
  <key>PayloadIdentifier</key>
  <string>MDFPP2020.7F5C2634-0C2B-4610-9FCB-65B6298D8736</string>
  <key>PayloadRemovalDisallowed</key>
  <true/>
  <key>PayloadType</key>
  <string>Configuration</string>
  <key>PayloadUUID</key>
  <string>125B2C0F-2EF0-4AA5-8381-8F1C752F4CF5</string>
  <key>PayloadVersion</key>
  <integer>1</integer>
  <key>AccessRights</key>
  <integer>8</integer>
</dict>
</plist>

```



## 10.5 Configuration Profile 5: "MDF PP Configuration Profile WLAN"

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
  <key>AccessRights</key>
  <integer>8</integer>
  <key>ConsentText</key>
  <dict>
    <key>default</key>
    <string>Configuration profile achieving compliance with the security settings defined by the Common Criteria
evaluation.</string>
  </dict>
  <key>HasRemovalPasscode</key>
  <false/>
  <key>PayloadContent</key>
  <array>
    <dict>
      <!-- Replace certificate -->
      <key>PayloadCertificateFileName</key>
      <string>cacert.crt</string>
      <key>PayloadContent</key>
      <data>
INVALID
      </data>
      <key>PayloadDescription</key>
      <string>CA certificate to be replaced</string>
      <key>PayloadDisplayName</key>
      <string>CA certificate to be used for WLAN EAP-TLS</string>
      <key>PayloadIdentifier</key>
      <string>com.apple.security.root.EB096643-9B1C-468B-8471-EFC210017C60</string>
      <key>PayloadType</key>
      <string>com.apple.security.root</string>
      <key>PayloadUUID</key>
      <string>EB096643-9B1C-468B-8471-EFC210017C60</string>
      <key>PayloadVersion</key>
      <integer>1</integer>
    </dict>
    <dict>
      <key>AutoJoin</key>
      <true/>
      <key>EAPClientConfiguration</key>
      <dict>
        <key>AcceptEAPTypes</key>
        <array>
          <integer>13</integer>
        </array>
      </dict>
    </dict>
  </array>
</plist>
```

```

    <!-- Use certificate defined above -->
    <key>PayloadCertificateAnchorUUID</key>
    <array>
      <string>EB096643-9B1C-468B-8471-EFC210017C60</string>
    </array>
    <key>TLSTrustedServerNames</key>
    <array/>

    <!-- This is default and may be removed -->
    <key>TLSCertificateIsRequired</key>
    <true/>
  </dict>
  <key>EncryptionType</key>
  <string>WPA2</string>

  <!-- Any value defined by organization is allowed for the following options -->
  <key>HIDDEN_NETWORK</key>
  <false/>
  <key>IsHotspot</key>
  <false/>
  <key>PayloadCertificateUUID</key>
  <string>35DC8662-79F1-4640-B628-A8F1CF9C85DA</string>
  <key>PayloadDescription</key>
  <string>Configures Wi-Fi settings</string>
  <key>PayloadDisplayName</key>
  <string>WiFi</string>
  <key>PayloadIdentifier</key>
  <string>com.apple.wifi.managed.9E1F3E37-2CEF-468A-B8C2-BBD5C92C6E7C</string>
  <key>PayloadType</key>
  <string>com.apple.wifi.managed</string>
  <key>PayloadUUID</key>
  <string>9E1F3E37-2CEF-468A-B8C2-BBD5C92C6E7C</string>
  <key>PayloadVersion</key>
  <real>1</real>
  <key>ProxyType</key>
  <string>None</string>
  <key>SSID_STR</key>
  <string>EAP-TLSWLAN</string>
</dict>
</array>
<key>PayloadDescription</key>
<string>The configuration profile template provides the Wireless LAN settings compliant to the Common Criteria
evaluated configuration following the Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile.</string>
<key>PayloadDisplayName</key>
<string>MDF PP Configuration Profile WLAN Configuration</string>
<key>PayloadIdentifier</key>
<string>MDFPP2020.7F5C2634-0C2B-4610-9FCB-65B6298D8735</string>

```

```
<key>PayloadRemovalDisallowed</key>
<true/>
<key>PayloadType</key>
<string>Configuration</string>
<key>PayloadUUID</key>
<string>12926851-84EE-4270-9EE2-7CCB87E7B00D</string>
<key>PayloadVersion</key>
<integer>1</integer>
</dict>
</plist>
```