

**Apple Inc.**



**Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon,  
Kernel, Software]  
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy**

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# 1. General

This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] cryptographic module. It contains the security rules under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for a Security Level 1 module.

This document provides all tables and diagrams (when applicable) required by NIST SP 800-140B. The column names of the tables follow the template tables provided in NIST SP 800-140B.

Table 1 describes the individual security areas of FIPS 140-3, as well as the Security Levels of those individual areas.

ISO/IEC 24759 Section 6.[Number Below]	FIPS 140-3 Section Title	Security Level
1	General	1
2	Cryptographic Module Specification	1
3	Cryptographic Module Interfaces	1
4	Roles, Services, and Authentication	1
5	Software/Firmware Security	1
6	Operational Environment	1
7	Physical Security	Not Applicable
8	Non-invasive Security	Not Applicable
9	Sensitive Security Parameter Management	1
10	Self-tests	1
11	Life-cycle Assurance	1
12	Mitigation of Other Attacks	Not Applicable

*Table 1 - Security Levels*

## 2. Cryptographic Module Specification

The Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] cryptographic module (hereafter referred to as “the module”) is a software module running on a multi-chip standalone general-purpose computing platform. The version of module is 11.1, written as v11.1. The module provides implementations of low-level cryptographic primitives to the Device OS’s (iOS 14, iPadOS 14, watchOS 7, tvOS14, TFW 11 and macOS Big Sur 11) Security Framework and Common Crypto. The module has been tested by atsec CST lab on the following platforms with and without PAA:

#	Operating System	Hardware Platform	Processor	PAA/Acceleration
1	iPadOS 14.2	iPad (5 <sup>th</sup> generation)	Apple A Series A9	NEON
2	iPadOS 14.2	iPad Pro 9.7-inch	Apple A Series A9X	NEON
3	iPadOS 14.2	iPad (7 <sup>th</sup> generation)	Apple A Series A10 Fusion	NEON
4	iPadOS 14.2	iPad Pro 10.5 inch	Apple A Series A10X Fusion	NEON
5	iPadOS 14.2	iPad mini (5 <sup>th</sup> generation)	Apple A Series A12 Bionic	NEON
6	iPadOS 14.2	iPad Pro 11-inch (1 <sup>st</sup> generation)	Apple A Series A12X Bionic	NEON
7	iPadOS 14.2	iPad Pro 11in (2nd generation)	Apple A Series A12Z Bionic	NEON
8	iPadOS 14.2	iPad Air (4 <sup>th</sup> generation)	Apple A Series A14 Bionic	NEON
9	iOS 14.2	iPhone 6S	Apple A Series A9	NEON
10	iOS 14.2	iPhone 7 Plus	Apple A Series A10 Fusion	NEON
11	iOS 14.2	iPhone X	Apple A Series A11 Bionic	NEON
12	iOS 14.2	iPhone XS Max	Apple A Series A12 Bionic	NEON
13	iOS 14.2	iPhone 11 Pro	Apple A Series A13 Bionic	NEON
14	iOS 14.2	iPhone 12	Apple A Series A14 Bionic	NEON
15	watch OS 7.1	Apple Watch Series S3	Apple S Series S3	NEON
16	watch OS 7.1	Apple Watch Series S4	Apple S Series S4	NEON
17	watch OS 7.1	Apple Watch Series S5	Apple S Series S5	NEON
18	watch OS 7.1	Apple Watch Series S6	Apple S Series S6	NEON
19	tvOS 14.2	Apple TV 4K	Apple A Series A10X Fusion	NEON
20	TxFW 11.0.1	Apple Security Chip T2	Apple T Series T2	NEON
21	macOS Big Sur 11.0.1	MacBook Air	Apple M Series M1	NEON

Table 2 - Tested Operational Environments

In addition to the platforms listed in Table 2, Apple Inc. has also tested the module on the following platforms and claims vendor affirmation on them:

#	Operating System	Hardware Platform	Processor	Model
1	iPadOS 14.2	iPad Pro 12.9-inch	Apple A Series A9X	A1584, A1652

2	iPadOS 14.2	iPad (6 <sup>th</sup> generation)	Apple A Series A10 Fusion	A1893, A1954
3	iPadOS 14.2	iPad Pro 12.9-inch (2 <sup>nd</sup> generation)	Apple A Series A10X Fusion	A1670, A1671, A1821
4	iPadOS 14.2	iPad Air (3 <sup>rd</sup> generation)	Apple A Series A12 Bionic	A2152, A2154, A2123, A2153
5	iPadOS 14.2	iPad (8 <sup>th</sup> generation)	Apple A Series A12 Bionic	A2270, A2428, A2429, A2430
6	iPadOS 14.2	iPad Pro 12.9-inch (3 <sup>rd</sup> generation)	Apple A Series A12X Bionic	A1876, A2014, A1895, A1983
7	iPadOS 14.2	iPad Pro 12.9-inch (4 <sup>th</sup> generation)	Apple A Series A12Z Bionic	A2229, A2232, A2069, A2233
8	iOS 14.2	iPhone SE	Apple A Series A9	A1662, A1723, A1724
9	iOS 14.2	iPhone 6S Plus	Apple A Series A9	A1634, A1687, A1690, A1699
10	iOS 14.2	iPhone 7	Apple A Series A10 Fusion	A1660, A1779, A1780, A1778
11	iOS 14.2	iPhone 8	Apple A Series A11 Bionic	A1863, A1906, A1907, A1905
12	iOS 14.2	iPhone 8 Plus	Apple A Series A11 Bionic	A1864, A1898, A1899, A1897
13	iOS 14.2	iPhone XS	Apple A Series A12 Bionic	A1920, A2097, A2098, A2099, A2100
14	iOS 14.2	iPhone XR	Apple A Series A12 Bionic	A1984, A2105, A2106, A2107, A2108
15	iOS 14.2	iPhone 11	Apple A Series A13 Bionic	A2111, A2221, A2223
16	iOS 14.2	iPhone 11 Pro Max	Apple A Series A13 Bionic	A2161, A2220, A2218, A2219
17	iOS 14.2	iPhone SE (2 <sup>nd</sup> generation)	Apple A Series A13 Bionic	A2275, A2296, A2297, A2298
18	iOS 14.2	iPhone 12 mini	Apple A Series A14 Bionic	A2176, A2398, A2399, A2400
19	iOS 14.2	iPhone 12 Pro	Apple A Series A14 Bionic	A2341, A2406, A2407, A2408
20	iOS 14.2	iPhone 12 Pro Max	Apple A Series A14 Bionic	A2342, A2410, A2411, A2412
21	watch OS 7.1	Apple Watch SE	Apple S Series S5	A2351, A2352, A2353, A2354, A2355, A2356
22	macOS Big Sur 11.0.1	MacBook Pro 13"	Apple M Series M1	A2338
23	macOS Big Sur 11.0.1	Mac mini	Apple M Series M1	A2348

Table 3 - Vendor Affirmed Operational Environments

The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate.

The table below lists all Approved or Vendor-affirmed security functions of the module, including specific key size(s) employed for approved services, and implemented modes of operation. The module is in the Approved mode of operation when the module utilizes the services that use the security functions listed in the table below. The Approved mode of operation is configured in the system by default and can only be transitioned into the non-Approved mode by calling one of the non-Approved services listed in Table 8 - Non-Approved Services. If the device starts up successfully, then the module has passed all self-tests and is operating in the Approved mode.

CAVP Cert.	Algorithm and Standard	Mode / Method	Description / Key Size(s)	Use / Function
A943 (vng_asm)	CTR_DRBG [SP800-90A]	AES-128, AES-256 Derivation Function Enabled No Prediction Resistance	Key Length: 128, 256	Random Number Generation
A945 (c_asm)	CTR_DRBG [SP800-90A]	AES-128, AES-256 Derivation Function Enabled No Prediction Resistance	Key Length: 128, 256	Random Number Generation
A942 (vng_its)	HMAC_DRBG [SP800-90A]	SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 No Prediction Resistance	Key Length: 112 bits or greater	Random Number Generation
A944 (c_its)	HMAC_DRBG [SP800-90A]	SHA-384, SHA-512 No Prediction Resistance	Key Length: 112 bits or greater	Random Number Generation
A945 (c_asm)	AES [FIPS 197] [SP 800-38A]	CBC, ECB, CFB128, CFB8, OFB, CTR	Key Length: 128, 192, 256	Symmetric Encryption and Decryption
A946 (asm_arm)	AES [FIPS 197] [SP 800-38A]	CBC, CFB128, ECB, OFB	Key Length: 128, 192, 256	Symmetric Encryption and Decryption
A946 (asm_arm)	AES [FIPS 197] [SP 800-38E]	XTS	Key Length: 128, 256	Symmetric Encryption and Decryption
A943 (vng_asm)	AES [FIPS 197] [SP 800-38A] [SP 800-38C] [SP 800-38D]	ECB, CCM, CTR, GCM	Key Length: 128, 192, 256	Symmetric Encryption and Decryption
A945 (c_asm)	KTS (AES) [SP 800-38F]	AES-KW	Key Length: 128, 192, 256	Key Wrapping and Unwrapping
A942 (vng_its)	RSA [FIPS 186-4]	Signature Generation (PKCS#1 v1.5) and (PKCS PSS)	Modulus: 2048, 3072, 4096	Digital Signature Generation
A942 (vng_its)	RSA [FIPS 186-4]	Signature Verification PKCS#1 v1.5) and (PKCS PSS)	Modulus: 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096	Digital Signature Verification
A942 (vng_its)	ECDSA ANSI X9.62 [FIPS 186-4]	Key Pair Generation (CKG). The module's CKG uses the method described in Section 5.1 of SP 800-133. The seeds used for generating the asymmetric keys are obtained from the output of an approved random bit generator.	Curve: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521	Asymmetric Key Generation



CAVP Cert.	Algorithm and Standard	Mode / Method	Description / Key Size(s)	Use / Function
A942 (vng_ltc)	ECDSA ANSI X9.62 [FIPS 186-4]	Public Key Validation (PKV)	Curve: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521	Asymmetric Key Validation
A942 (vng_ltc)	ECDSA ANSI X9.62 [FIPS 186-4]	Signature Generation	Curve: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521	Digital Signature Generation
A942 (vng_ltc)	ECDSA ANSI X9.62 [FIPS 186-4]	Signature Verification	Curve: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521	Digital Signature Verification
A942 (vng_ltc)	SHS [FIPS 180-4]	SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/256	N/A	Message Digest
A944 (c_ltc)	SHS [FIPS 180-4]	SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/256	N/A	Message Digest
A947 (vng_neon)	SHS [FIPS 180-4]	SHA-256 for all CPUs in Table 2 except S3)	N/A	Message Digest
A942 (vng_ltc)	HMAC [FIPS 198]	SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/256	Key Length: 112 bits or greater	Keyed Hash
A944 (c_ltc)	HMAC [FIPS 198]	SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/256	Key Length: 112 bits or greater	Keyed Hash
A947 (vng_neon)	HMAC [FIPS 198]	SHA-256 (for all CPUs in Table 2 except S3)	Key Length: 112 bits or greater	Keyed Hash
N/A	ENT (P) [SP800-90B]  ENT (NP) [SP800-90B]	N/A	Seeding for the DRBG. (is provided by the underlying operational environment)	Random Number Generation

Table 4 - Approved Algorithms

This module does not have any non-Approved algorithms used in the Approved mode of operation (with or without security claimed).

The table below lists the non-Approved algorithms and security functions that are used in the non-Approved mode of operation:

Algorithm/Functions	Use / Function	Notes
RSA Signature Generation	PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS Signature Generation Key Size < 2048	Non-Approved
RSA Signature Verification	PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS Signature Verification Key Size < 1024	Non-Approved
RSA Key Wrapping	OAEP, PKCS#1 v1.5 and -PSS schemes	Non-Approved

Ed25519	Key Agreement Key Generation Signature Generation Signature Verification	Non-Approved
ANSI X9.63 KDF	Hash based Key Derivation Function	Non-Approved
RFC6637	Key Derivation Function	Non-Approved
HKDF [SP800-56C]	Key Derivation Function	Non-Approved
DES	Encryption / Decryption Key Size 56-bits	Non-Approved
CAST5	Encryption / Decryption Key Sizes 40 to 128-bits in 8-bit increments	Non-Approved
RC4	Encryption / Decryption Key Sizes 8 to 4096-bits	Non-Approved
RC2	Encryption / Decryption Key Sizes 8 to 1024-bits	Non-Approved
MD2	Message Digest Digest size 128-bit	Non-Approved
MD4	Message Digest Digest size 128-bit	Non-Approved
MD5	Message Digest Digest size 128-bit	Non-Approved
RIPEMD	Message Digest Digest size 160-bits	Non-Approved
ECDSA	PKG: Curve P-192 PKV: Curve P-192 Signature Generation: Curve P-192 Signature Verification: Curve P-192	Non-Approved due to the small curve size
	Key Pair Generation for compact point representation of points	Non-Approved
Integrated Encryption Scheme on elliptic curves (ECIES)	Encryption / Decryption	Non-Approved
Blowfish	Encryption / Decryption	Non-Approved
OMAC (One-Key CBC MAC)	MAC generation	Non-Approved
Triple-DES [SP 800-67]	CBC, ECB	Encryption/Decryption  Note: The module does not enforce the limit of $2^{16}$ encryptions with the same Triple-DES key, as required by FIPS 140-3 IG C.G.

Table 5 - Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation

The Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] executes within the kernel space of the computing platforms and operating systems listed in Table 2 - Tested Operational Environments. Figure 1 below shows the logical block diagram<sup>1</sup> representing the following information:

- o The location of the logical object of the module with respect to the operating system, other supporting applications, and the cryptographic boundary so that all the logical and physical layers between the logical object and the cryptographic boundary are clearly defined; and
- o The interactions of the logical object of the module with the operating system and other supporting applications resident within the cryptographic boundary.




Figure 1 - logical block diagram

<sup>1</sup> KEXT stands for Kernel Extension. A kernel extension (or kext) is a bundle that performs low-level tasks. KEXTs run in kernel space, which gives them elevated privileges and the ability to perform tasks that user-space apps can't.

### 3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces

As a software-only module, the module does not have physical ports. For the purpose of the FIPS 140-3 validation, the physical ports are interpreted to be the physical ports of the hardware platform on which it runs.

The underlying logical interfaces of the module are the C language Kernel Interfaces (KPIs). In detail these interfaces are described in (Table 6 ):

Logical Interface	Data that passes over port/interface
Data Input	Data inputs are provided in the variables passed in the KPI and callable service invocations, generally through caller-supplied buffers
Data Output	Data outputs are provided in the variables passed in the KPI and callable service invocations, generally through caller-supplied buffers
Control Input	Control inputs which control the mode of the module are provided through dedicated parameters, namely the kernel module plist whose information is supplied to the module by the kernel module loader.
Control Output	Not Applicable
Status Output	Status output is provided in return codes and through messages. Documentation for each KPI lists possible return codes. A complete list of all return codes returned by the C language KPIs within the module is provided in the header files and the KPI documentation. Messages are also documented in the KPI documentation.

Table 6 - Interfaces

The module is optimized for library use within the Device OS kernel space and does not contain any terminating assertions or exceptions. It is implemented as a Device OS dynamically loadable library. The dynamically loadable library is loaded into the Device OS kernel and its cryptographic functions are made available to Device OS kernel services only. Any internal error detected by the module is reflected back to the caller with an appropriate return code. The calling Device OS kernel service must examine the return code and act accordingly.

The module communicates any error status synchronously through the use of its documented return codes, thus indicating the module's status. It is the responsibility of the caller to handle exceptional conditions in a FIPS 140-3 appropriate manner.

Caller-induced or internal errors do not reveal any sensitive material to callers. Cryptographic bypass capability is not supported by the module.

## 4. Roles, services, and authentication

The module supports a single instance of one authorized role: The Crypto Officer. No support is provided for multiple concurrent operators or a Maintenance Operator.

FIPS 140-3 does not require an authentication mechanism for level 1 modules. Therefore, the module does not implement an authentication mechanism for Crypto Officer. The Crypto Officer role is authorized to access all services provided by the module (see Table 7 - Approved Services and Table 8 - Non-Approved Services below).

The module implements a dedicated KPI function to indicate if a requested service utilizes an approved security function. For services listed in Table 7 - Approved Services, the indicator function returns 1. For services listed in Table 8 - Non-Approved Services, the indicator function returns 0.

The table below lists all approved services that can be used in the approved mode of operation. The abbreviations of the access rights to keys and SSPs have the following interpretation:

**G = Generate:** The module generates or derives the SSP.

**R = Read:** The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output).

**W = Write:** The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.

**E = Execute:** The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.

**Z = Zeroise:** The module zeroises the SSP.

**N/A=** The service does not access any SSP during its operation

Service	Description and Input/ Output	Approved Security Functions	Keys and/or SSPs	Roles	Access rights to Keys and/or SSPs	Indicator
AES Encryption / Decryption	Input for Encryption: key and plain text Output for Encryption: cipher text Input for Decryption: key and cipher text Output for Decryption: plain text	AES-CBC, AES-ECB, AES-CFB128, AES- CFB8, AES-OFB, AES- CTR, AES-XTS, AES- GCM, AES-CCM	AES key	CO	W, E	1
AES Key Wrapping	Input: key-encryption key and key to be wrapped Output: wrapped key	AES-KW	AES key- encryption key	CO	W, E	1
Secure Hash Generation	Input: message Output: Hash value	Message Digest: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/256	none	CO	N/A	1

Service	Description and Input/ Output	Approved Security Functions	Keys and/or SSPs	Roles	Access rights to Keys and/or SSPs	Indicator
HMAC generation and verification	Input for Generation: HMAC key and message Output: keyed Hash value Input for Verification: HMAC key, message, and keyed hash value Output: True or False	HMAC Keyed Hash	HMAC key	CO	W, E	1
RSA signature generation and verification	Input for Signature Generation: RSA private key and message Output: signature Input for Signature Verification: RSA public key and signature Output: True or False	RSA Signature Generation, RSA Signature Verification	RSA key pair	CO	W, E	1
ECDSA signature generation and verification	Input for Signature Generation: ECDSA private key and message Output: signature Input for Signature Verification: ECDSA public key and signature Output: True or False	ECDSA Signature Generation, ECDSA Signature Verification	ECDSA key pair	CO	W, E	1
Random number generation	Input: Entropy input string, nonce Output: Random numbers	HMAC_DRBG, CTR_DRBG	Entropy Input String, Seed, V value and Key	CO	G, R, E, Z	1
ECDSA key pair generation	Input: curve size Output: generated private and public key pair	Key Pair Generation: ECDSA KeyGen	ECDSA key pair	CO	G, R, E	1
Release all resources of symmetric crypto function context	Input: handler of symmetric crypto function context Output: zeroised and released memory space	N/A	AES key	CO	Z	1

Service	Description and Input/ Output	Approved Security Functions	Keys and/or SSPs	Roles	Access rights to Keys and/or SSPs	Indicator
Release all resources of hash context	Input: handler of hash context Output: released memory space	N/A	HMAC key	CO	Z	1
Release of all resources of asymmetric crypto function context	Input: handler of asymmetric crypto function context Output: zeroised and released memory space	N/A	RSA/ECDSA keys	CO	Z	1
Self-test	Input: power Output: Pass/Fail status	AES-CCM, AES-GCM, AES-XTS, AES-CBC, AES-ECB, HMAC_DRBG, CTR_DRBG, HMAC, RSA Signature Generation, RSA Signature Verification, ECDSA Signature Generation, ECDSA Signature Verification	Software integrity key	CO	E	1
Show Status	Input: KPI invocation Output: Operational/Error status	N/A	None	CO	N/A	None
Show Module Info	Input: KPI invocation Output: Module Base Name + Module Version Number	N/A	None	CO	N/A	None

Table 7 - Approved Services

The table below lists all non-Approved services that can only be used in the non-Approved mode of operation.

Service	Description and Input/Output	Algorithms Accessed	Role	Indicator
Triple-DES encryption / decryption	Module does not meet FIPS 140-3 IG C.G because it does not have a control over the number of blocks to be encrypted under the same Triple-DES key. Input for Encryption: key and plaintext data Output for Encryption: cipher text Input for Decryption: key and ciphertext data Output for Decryption: plaintext data	Triple-DES	CO	0
RSA Key Wrapping	The CAST does not perform the full KTS, only the raw RSA encrypt/decrypt. Input (RSA encrypt): RSA public key and key to be wrapped Output(RSA encrypt): wrapped key Input (RSA decrypt): RSA private key and key to be unwrapped Output(RSA decrypt): plaintext key	RSA encrypt/decrypt	CO	0
RSA Signature Generation	PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS Signature Generation Key Size < 2048 Input: private key and message Output: signature	RSA Signature Generation	CO	0
RSA Signature Verification	PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS Signature Verification Key Size < 1024 Input: RSA public key and signature Output: True or False	RSA Signature Verification	CO	0
ECDSA PKG and PKV	ECDSA PKG and PKV using curve P-192 Input for PKG: curve size (P-192) Output for PKG: generated (P-192) key pair Input for PKV: public key Output for PKG: True or False	ECDSA Key Generation, ECDSA Key Validation	CO	0
ECDSA Signature Generation	Input: (P-192) private key and message Output: signature	ECDSA Signature Generation	CO	0



Service	Description and Input/Output	Algorithms Accessed	Role	Indicator
ECDSA Signature Verification	Input: (P-192) public key and signature Output: True or False	ECDSA Signature Verification	CO	0
ECDSA Key Pair Generation for compact point representation of points	Key Pair Generation for compact point representation of points Input: key size Output: generated private and public key pair	ECDSA Key Generation	CO	0
Ed25519 Key Generation	Ed25519 Key Generation Input: none Output: generated Curve25519 private and public key pair	Ed25519 Key Generation	CO	0
Ed25519 Signature Generation	EdDSA Signature Generation over Curve25519 Input: (Curve25519) private key and message Output: signature	Ed25519 Sig Generation	CO	0
Ed25519 Signature Verification	EdDSA Signature Verification over Curve25519 Input: (Curve25519) public key and signature Output: True or False	Ed25519 Sig Verification	CO	0
Ed25519 Key Agreement	Ed25519 Key Agreement Input: peer public key and own private key Output: shared secret	Ed25519 Key Agreement	CO	0
ECIES	Elliptic Curve encrypt/decrypt Input for encryption: peer public key, plaintext Output for encryption: public key, ciphertext (with authentication tag) Input for decryption: authentication tag, ciphertext, own private key Output for decryption: plaintext message or error	ECIES Encrypt/Decrypt	CO	0
ANSI X9.63 Key Derivation	SHA-1 hash-based key derivation function Input: key derivation key Output: derived key	SHA-1	CO	0

Service	Description and Input/Output	Algorithms Accessed	Role	Indicator
SP800-56C Key Derivation (HKDF)	SHA-256 hash-based key derivation function Input: key derivation key Output: derived key	SHA-256	CO	0
RFC 6637 Key Derivation	SHA hash based key derivation function Input: key derivation key Output: derived key	SHA-256, SHA-512, AES-128, AES-256	CO	0
OMAC Message Authentication Code Generation and Verification	One-Key CBC MAC using 128-bit key Input: message and key Output: message authentication code	OMAC	CO	0
Message digest generation.	Input: message Output: message digest	MD2, MD4, MD5, RIPEMD	CO	0
(other) symmetric encryption / decryption	They are non-approved encryption algorithms. Input for Encryption: key and plaintext data Output for Encryption: ciphertext data Input for Decryption: key and ciphertext data Output for Decryption: plaintext data	Blowfish, CAST5, DES, RC2, RC4	CO	0

Table 8 - Non-Approved Services

## 5. Software/Firmware security

### 5.1. Integrity Techniques

The Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software], which is made up of a single component, is provided in the form of binary executable code. A software integrity test is performed on the runtime image of the module. The HMAC-SHA256 implemented in the module is used as an approved algorithm for the integrity test. If the test fails, the module enters an error state where no cryptographic services are provided, and data output is prohibited i.e., the module is not operational.

### 5.2. On-Demand Integrity Test

Integrity tests are performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests. It is automatically executed at power-on. It can also be invoked by self-test service or powering-off and reloading the module.

## 6. Operational Environment

### 6.1. Applicability

The Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] operates in a modifiable operational environment per FIPS 140-3 level 1 specifications. The module is supplied as part of Device OS, a commercially available general-purpose operating system executing on the computing platforms specified in section 2.

## 7. Physical Security

The FIPS 140-3 physical security requirements do not apply to the Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software], since it is a software module.

## 8. Non-invasive Security

Currently, the non-invasive security is not required by FIPS 140-3 (see NIST SP 800-140F). The requirements of this area are not applicable to the module.

## 9. Sensitive Security Parameter Management

The following table summarizes the keys and Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) that are used by the cryptographic services implemented in the module:

Key/SSP Name / Type	Strength	Security Function and Cert. Number	Generation	Import / Export	Establishment	Storage	Zeroisation	Use and related keys
AES Keys	128 to 256 bits	AES Encryption/Decryption A943 (vng_asm), A945 (c_asm), A946 (asm_arm)	N/A	Import from calling application No Export	N/A	N/A: The module does not provide persistent keys/SSPs storage.	Automatic zeroisation when structure is deallocated or when the system is powered down	Symmetric Encryption and Decryption
AES Key-encryption Keys	128 to 256 bits	AES Key Wrapping A945 (c_asm)	N/A	Import from calling application No Export	N/A	N/A: The module does not provide persistent keys/SSPs storage.	Automatic zeroisation when structure is deallocated or when the system is powered down	Key Transport
HMAC Keys	Min: 112 bits	HMAC generation and verification A942 (vng_ltc), A944 (c_ltc), A947 (vng_neon)	N/A	Import from calling application No Export	N/A	N/A: The module does not provide persistent keys/SSPs storage.	Automatic zeroisation when structure is deallocated or when the system is powered down	Keyed Hash
ECDSA Key Pair (including intermediate keygen values)	112 to 256 bits	ECDSA signature generation and verification A942 (vng_ltc)	The key pairs are generated conformant to SP800-133 r2 (CKG) using FIPS186-4 Key Generation method, and the random value used in the key generation is generated using SP800-90A DRBG	Import and Export to calling application. Intermediate keygen values are not output.	N/A	N/A: The module does not provide persistent keys/SSPs storage.	Automatic zeroisation when structure is deallocated or when the system is powered down.  Intermediate keygen values are zeroized before the module returns from the key generation function.	Digital Signature

RSA Key Pair	112 to 150 bits	RSA signature generation and verification A942 (vng_ltc)	N/A	Import from calling application  No Export.  Intermediate keygen values are not output.	N/A	N/A: The module does not provide persistent keys/SSPs storage.	Automatic zeroisation when structure is deallocated or when the system is powered down.  Intermediate keygen values are zeroized before the module returns from the key generation function.	Digital Signature
Entropy Input String	256 bits	Random Number Generation ENT (P) and ENT (NP)	Obtained from two entropy sources	Import from OS  No Export	N/A	N/A: The module does not provide persistent keys/SSPs storage.	Automatic zeroisation when structure is deallocated or when the system is powered down	Random Number Generation
DRBG Seed, internal state: V value and Key	256 bits	Random Number Generation A942 (vng_ltc) A943 (vng_asm) A944 (c_ltc) A945 (c_asm)	Derived from entropy input string as defined by SP800-90A	N/A	N/A	N/A: The module does not provide persistent keys/SSPs storage.	Automatic zeroisation when structure is deallocated or when the system is powered down	Random Number Generation
Software integrity key	N/A	HMAC SHA-256 A942 (vng_ltc), A944 (c_ltc), A947 (vng_neon)	N/A	N/A	N/A	Stored in the module binary computed during build.	N/A	Self-Test

Table 9 - SSPs

## 9.1. Random Number Generation

A NIST approved deterministic random bit generator based on a block cipher as specified in NIST [SP 800-90A] is used. The default Approved DRBG used for random number generation is a CTR\_DRBG using AES-256 with derivation function and without prediction resistance. The random numbers used for key generation are all generated by CTR\_DRBG in this module. Per section 10.2.1.1 of [SP 800-90A], the internal state of CTR\_DRBG is the value V and Key.

The module also employs a HMAC\_DRBG for random number generation. The HMAC\_DRBG is only used at the early boot time of Device OS kernel for memory randomization. The output of HMAC\_DRBG is not used for key generation. Per section 10.1.2.1 of [SP 800-90A], the internal state of HMAC\_DRBG is the value V and Key .

The deterministic random bit generators are seeded by "*read\_random*". The *read\_random* is the Kernel Space interface. Two entropy sources (one non-physical entropy source and one physical entropy source) residing within the TOEPP provide the random bits. The output of entropy pool provides 256-bits of entropy to seed and reseed SP800-90B DRBG during initialization (seed) and reseeding (reseed).



Entropy Source	Minimum number of bits of entropy	Details
NIST SP800-90B compliant ENT (P) and NIST SP800-90B compliant ENT (NP)	256	The seed is provided by post-processed entropy data from two entropy sources

Table 10 - Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification

## 9.2. Key / SSP Generation

The module generates Keys and SSPs in accordance with FIPS 140-3 IG D.H. The cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) for asymmetric keys as per [SP800-133r2] (vendor affirmed), compliant with [FIPS186-4], and using DRBG compliant with [SP800-90A]. A seed (i.e., the random value) used in asymmetric key generation is obtained from [SP800-90A] DRBG. The key generation service for ECDSA as well as the [SP 800-90A] DRBG have been ACVT tested with algorithm certificates found in Table 4.

## 9.3. Keys/SSPs Establishment

The module provides the following key/SSP establishment services in the Approved mode:

- AES-Key Wrapping

The module implements a Key Transport Scheme (KTS) using AES-KW compliant to [SP800-38F]. The SSP establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength.

## 9.4. Keys/SSPs Import/Export

All keys and SSPs that are entered from, or output to module, are entered from or output to the invoking application running on the same device. Keys/ SSPs entered into the module are electronically entered in plain text form. Keys/SSPs are output from the module in plain text form if required by the calling application.

The module allows the output of plaintext CSPs (i.e., ECDSA Key Pair). To prevent inadvertent output of sensitive information, the module performs the following two independent internal actions:

1. The module will internally request the random number generation service to obtain the random numbers and verify that the service completed without errors.
2. Once the keys are generated the module will perform the pairwise consistency test and verify that the test is completed without errors.

Only after successful completion of both these actions, are the generated CSPs output via the KPI output parameter in plaintext.

## 9.5. Keys/SSPs Storage

The Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] stores ephemeral keys/SSPs in memory only. They are received for use or generated by the module only at the command of the calling application. The module does not provide persistent keys/SSPs storage.

The module protects all keys/SSPs through the memory separation and protection mechanisms provided by the operating system. No process other than the module itself can access the keys/SSPs in its process' memory.

## 9.6. Keys/SSPs Zeroization

Keys and SSPs are zeroised when the appropriate context object is destroyed or when the system is powered down. Input and output interfaces are inhibited while zeroisation is performed.

## 10. Self-tests

This section specifies the pre-operational and conditional self-tests performed by the module. The pre-operational and conditional self-tests ensure that the module is not corrupted and that the cryptographic algorithms work as expected. The module does not implement a bypass mode nor security functions critical to the secure operation of the cryptographic module and thus, does not implement neither a pre-operational bypass test nor pre-operational critical functions test. While the module is executing the self-tests, services are not available, and input and output are inhibited. If the test fails either pre-operational and conditional self-tests, the module reports an error message indicating the cause of the failure and enters the Error State. See section 10.3. The module permits operators to initiate the pre-operational or conditional self-tests on demand for periodic testing of the module by rebooting the system (i.e., power-cycling).

### 10.1. Pre-operational Software Integrity Test

The module performs a pre-operational software integrity automatically when the module is loaded into memory (i.e., at power on) before the module transitions to the operational state. A software integrity test is performed on the runtime image of the Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] with HMAC-SHA256 used to perform the approved integrity technique. Prior to using HMAC-SHA-256, a Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests (CAST) is performed. If the CAST on the HMAC-SHA-256 is successful, The HMAC value of the runtime image is recalculated and compared with the stored HMAC value pre-computed at compilation time.

### 10.2. Conditional Self-Tests

Conditional self-tests are performed by a cryptographic module when the conditions specified for the following tests occur: Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test, Pair-Wise Consistency Test.

The module does not implement any functions requiring a Software/Firmware Load Test, Manual Entry Test, Conditional Bypass Test nor Conditional Critical Functions Test; therefore, these tests are not performed by the module.

The following sub-sections describe the conditional tests supported by the Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software].

#### 10.2.1. Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests

In addition to the pre-operational software integrity test described in Section 10.1, the Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] also runs the Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests (CAST) for all cryptographic functions of each approved cryptographic algorithm implemented by the module during power-up as well. All CASTs are performed prior to the first operational use of the cryptographic algorithm. These tests are detailed in the table below.

Cryptographic Algorithm	Notes
HMAC-SHA256	Used for module integrity test
AES implementations selected by the module for the corresponding environment AES-CCM, AES-GCM, AES-XTS, AES-CBC, AES-ECB using 128-bit key	Separate encryption / decryption operations are performed
CTR_DRBG and HMAC_DRBG	Each DRBG mode tested separately
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512	KAT
SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512	Covered by high level HMAC self-test
RSA, 2048-bit modulus with SHA-256	Separate Signature generation/ verification KAT are performed

Cryptographic Algorithm	Notes
ECDSA, P-256 curve with SHA-256	Separate Signature generation/ verification KAT are performed

Table 11 - Pre-Operational Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests

## 10.2.2. Conditional Pairwise Consistency Test

The Apple corecrypto Module v11.1 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] does generate asymmetric ECDSA keys and performs the required ECDSA pair-wise consistency tests on the newly generated key pairs.

## 10.3. Error Handling

If any of the self-tests described in Sections 10.1, 10.2.1 or 10.2.2 fail, the module reports the cause of the error and enters an error state. In the Error State, no cryptographic services are provided, and data output is prohibited. The only method to recover from the error state is to power cycle the device which results in the module being reloaded into memory and reperforming the pre-operational software integrity test and the Conditional CASTs. The module will only enter into the operational state after successfully passing the pre-operational software integrity test and the Conditional CASTs. The table below shows the different causes that lead to the Error State and the status indicators reported.

Cause of Error	Error Indicator
Failed Pre-operational Software Integrity Test	print statement "FAILED: fipspost_post_integrity" to stdout
Failed Conditional CAST	print statement "FAILED:<event>" to stdout (<event> refers to any of the cryptographic functions listed in Table 11. )
Failed Conditional PCT	Error code "CCEC_GENERATE_KEY_CONSISTENCY" returned

Table 12 - Error Indicators

## 11. Life-cycle assurance

### 11.1. Delivery and Operation

The module is built into iOS 14, iPadOS 14, watchOS 7, tvOS 14, TXFW 11 and macOS Big Sur 11.1 and delivered with Device OS. There is no standalone delivery of the module as a software library.

The vendor's internal development process guarantees that the correct version of module goes with its intended Device OS version. For additional assurance, the module is digitally signed by vendor, and it is verified during the integration into Device OS.

This digital signature-based integrity protection during the delivery/integration process is not to be confused with the HMAC-256 based integrity check performed by the module itself as part of its pre-operational self-tests.

### 11.2. Crypto Officer Guidance

The Approved mode of operation is configured in the system by default and can only be transitioned into the non-Approved mode by calling one of the non-Approved services listed in Table 8 - Non-Approved Services. If the device starts up successfully, then the module has passed all self-tests and is operating in the Approved mode.

A Crypto Officer Role Guide is provided by Apple which offers IT System Administrators with the necessary technical information to ensure FIPS 140-3 Compliance of the deployed systems. This guide walks the reader through the system's assertion of cryptographic module integrity and the steps necessary if module integrity requires remediation. A link to the Guide can be found on the Product security, validations, and guidance page found in [Device OS].

The Crypto Officer shall consider the following requirements and restrictions when using the module

- o AES-GCM IV is constructed in compliance with IG C.H scenario 1. The GCM IV generation follows RFC 4106 and shall only be used for the IPsec protocol version 3. When the IV in RFC 4106 exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given security association, either party to the security association that encounters this condition triggers a rekeying with IKEv2 to establish a new encryption key for the security association. The module uses RFC 7296 compliant IKEv2 to establish the shared secret SKEYSEED from which the AES-GCM encryption keys are derived. In case the module's power is lost and then restored, the key used for the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be re-distributed. This condition is not enforced by the module.
- o AES-XTS mode is only approved for hardware storage applications. The length of the AES-XTS data unit does not exceed  $2^{20}$  blocks. The module checks explicitly that Key\_1  $\neq$  Key\_2 before using the keys in the XTS-Algorithm to process data with them compliant with IG C.I.

## **12. Mitigation of other attacks**

The module does not claim mitigation of other attacks.

## A. Glossary and Abbreviations

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
CAVP	Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CAST	Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test
CAST5	A symmetric-key 64-bit block cipher with 128-bit key
CBC	Cipher Block Chaining
CCM	Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code
CFB	Cipher Feedback
CMVP	Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
CTR	Counter Mode
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB	Electronic Code Book
ENT	NIST SP 800-90B Compliant Entropy Source
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
GCM	Galois Counter Mode
HMAC	Hash Message Authentication Code
KAT	Known Answer Test
KDF	Key Derivation Function
KEXT	Kernel Extension
KW	AES Key Wrap
MAC	Message Authentication Code
KPI	Kernel Programming Interface
NIST	National Institute of Science and Technology
OFB	Output Feedback
PAA	Processor Algorithm Acceleration
PKG	Key-Pair Generation
PKV	Public Key Validation
PSS	Probabilistic Signature Scheme
RSA	Rivest, Shamir, Addleman
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS	Secure Hash Standard
TOEPP	Tested Operational Environment Physical Perimeter
XTS	XEX-based Tweaked-codebook mode with cipher text Stealing

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SP 800-140D	CMVP Approved Sensitive Security Parameter Generation and Establishment Methods <a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-140d/final">https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-140d/final</a>
SP 800-140E	<b>CMVP Approved Authentication Mechanisms</b> <a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-140e/final">https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-140e/final</a>
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